No. 00-492 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

STATE OF ALABAMA, PETITIONER 

v. 

MICHAEL HERMAN BOZEMAN 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD 
Acting Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 

JOHN C. KEENEY 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

MICHAEL R. DREEBEN 

Deputy Solicitor General 

JEFFREY A. LAMKEN 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
(202) 514-2217 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether a one-day transfer of a federal prisoner to 
state custody for purposes of arraignment, without 
completing the trial on the state charges, violates 
Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
and requires dismissal of the state charges. 

(I) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Interest of the United States ...................................................... 
1 

Statement ........................................................................................ 2 

Summary of argument .................................................................. 
10 

Argument: 

Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers is not violated by a brief interruption of 

confinement that does not affect substantial rights ........ 

12 

A. The vast majority of federal courts have 

correctly concluded that de minimis transfers 

do not offend the IAD .................................................... 

13 

B. The decision below is inconsistent with 

fundamental principles of statutory con- 
struction ............................................................................ 20 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 27 

Appendix ......................................................................................... 1a 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) .................... 

23 

Baxter v. United States, 966 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 

1992) ......................................................................................... 16 

Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985) ........................ 

2, 3, 13 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ...................... 

23 

Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981) ............................... 

2 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) ................. 

23 

General Carbon Co. v. OSHA, 860 F.2d 479 

(D.C. Cir. 1988) ....................................................................... 

20 

Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E., Inc. 

v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2423 (2000) ........................... 

21 

New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) ..................... 

3, 14, 23, 24 

Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) .................... 

24 

Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 

1981) .............................................................................. 8, 15-16, 17 

(III) 

IV 

Cases—Continued: Page 

State v. Sassoon, 242 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. 1978) ...................... 

8 

United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974) ................... 

22 

United States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 

1993) ................................................................................. 

15, 17, 18 

United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977) ................ 

22 

United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) ............... 

22 

United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 879 (1992) ......................................... 

16 

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) .................... 

3 

United States v. Roy, 771 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986) ............................... 

15, 17, 25 

United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 

1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988) ................ 

4, 10, 15, 16 

United States v. Sorrell, 413 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. 

Pa. 1976), aff’d, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. 

denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978) .................................................. 

9 

United States v. Taylor, 173 F.3d 538 (6th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 987 (1999) ......................................... 

16 

United States v. Taylor, 947 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 991 (1992) ............................. 

16 

United States v. Taylor, 861 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 

1988) ......................................................................................... 15, 17 

United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) ...................... 

24 

Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., 

Co., 505 U.S. 214 (1992) ........................................ 

11, 12, 21, 26 

Constitution, statutes and rules: 

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, Cl. 3 (Compact Clause) ................. 

2, 1a 

Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, ch. 406, 

48 Stat. 909 (4 U.S.C. 112(a)) ............................................... 

2 

Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. 

No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397, as amended by Anti-Drug 

Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7059, 

102 Stat. 4403 (18 U.S.C. App. 2) .................................. 

2, 18, 1a 

§ 2: 

Art. I .............................................................................. 13, 2a 

V 

Statutes and rules—Continued: 

Page 

Art. II(a) ....................................................................... 

3, 2a 

Art. III .......................................................................... 

5, 3a 

Art. III(a) ..................................................................... 

14, 3a 

Art. IV ..................................................................... 

3, 13, 5a 

Art. IV(a) ...................................................................... 

3, 5a 

Art. IV(c) ................................................................ 

3, 14, 6a 

Art. IV(e) .................................................................. 

passim 

Art. V ...................................................................... 

3, 13, 7a 

Art. V(c) ........................................................................ 

14, 8a 

Art. V(e) .................................................................. 

3, 14, 8a 

Art. IX ................................................................... 

8, 24, 10a 

§ 9 ...................................................................................... 

2, 18, 12a 

§ 9(1) .................................................................................... 14, 18, 12a 

§ 9(2) ..................................................................................... 

18, 12a 

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 

1968, Tit. III, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. ................................... 

22 

21 U.S.C. 846 ............................................................................. 

4 

28 U.S.C. 2111 ........................................................................... 

23, 1a 

Ala. Code §§ 15-9-80 et seq. (1995) ......................................... 

2 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) .......................................................... 

23, 13a 

Ala. R. App. P. 45 .................................................................. 

23, 13a 

Miscellaneous: 

134 Cong. Rec. 32,703 (1988) ................................................... 

15, 19 

4 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1951) ................ 

21 

Council of State Governments, Suggested State 

Legislation, Program for 1957 (1956) ................................ 

13, 25 

2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 

(1990) ........................................................................................ 21 

W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 

(5th ed. 1984) .......................................................................... 

20-21 

15 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 
2000) ......................................................................................... 21 

S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ...................... 25 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 00-492 

STATE OF ALABAMA, PETITIONER 

v. 

MICHAEL HERMAN BOZEMAN 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 

This case involves the construction of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), a congressionally 
authorized interstate compact to which the United 
States is a party. The question presented is whether 
Article IV(e) of the IAD requires the dismissal of the 
state charges against respondent with prejudice be- 
cause he was transferred from federal custody to state 
custody for arraignment and returned to federal 
custody one day later without completing his state trial. 
As a party to the compact, the United States has an 
interest in its correct interpretation and application. In 
addition, the United States has an interest in being able 
to accommodate a State’s request for temporary cus- 

(1) 

2 

tody of a federal prisoner in connection with a state 
prosecution that may not be completed before the 
prisoner is returned. Finally, issues similar to the 
present one have arisen in federal prosecutions, 
although Congress has enacted special laws to address 
the case in which the federal government obtains 
custody of a state prisoner from the State in connection 
with a federal prosecution and returns the prisoner to 
state custody before trial has been completed, see 18 
U.S.C. App. 2, § 9. 

STATEMENT 

1. The Compact Clause of the United States Consti- 
tution, Art. I, § 10, Cl. 3, provides that States may enter 
into agreements and compacts with one another, but 
only with “the Consent of Congress.” Pursuant to that 
authority, Congress in 1934 authorized the States to 
enter into agreements, including the Interstate Agree- 
ment on Detainers (IAD), to regulate the apprehension 
and prosecution of criminals. See Crime Control 
Consent Act of 1934, ch. 406, 48 Stat. 909 (4 U.S.C. 
112(a)); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441-442 & n.9 
(1981). Since the IAD’s promulgation, 48 States have 
entered into it. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 
(1985). For example, the IAD is codified as part of 
Alabama Law as Ala. Code §§ 15-9-80 et seq. (1995). 
The United States became a party to the IAD in 1970, 
see Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. 
No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397, as amended, Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7059, 102 Stat. 4403, 
and the IAD is codified as a matter of federal law in 18 
U.S.C. App. 2.1 

1 Before the United States became a party to the IAD, the 
government employed the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
to obtain custody of state prisoners in order to proceed with 

3 

Detainers are ordinarily employed when one State 
seeks to bring charges against a prisoner in another 
State’s custody. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111- 
112 (2000).2 As this Court has explained, a “detainer is 
a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the 
institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking 
the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency 
or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is 
imminent.” Carchman, 473 U.S. at 719. Articles IV 
and V of the IAD provide the mechanisms through 
which one jurisdiction may, for purposes of criminal 
prosecution, obtain temporary custody of a prisoner 
incarcerated by another jurisdiction. Under Article IV, 
a State that has lodged a detainer against a prisoner 
may, by written notice, request temporary custody or 
availability of the prisoner. IAD, Art. IV(a). Once that 
State has received custody of the prisoner, it must try 
him within 120 days, subject to reasonable continuances 
for good cause shown in open court. IAD, Art. IV(c). 
Article V(e) provides that, “[a]t the earliest practicable 
time consonant with the purposes of ” the IAD, “the 
prisoner shall be returned to the sending State.” 

Article IV(e), known as the anti-shuttling provision, 
provides that, “[i]f trial is not had on any indictment, 
information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to 

federal prosecutions. This Court has held that, notwithstanding 
Congress’s adoption of the IAD, the federal government may con- 
tinue to employ that writ to obtain custody of state prisoners. See 
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360-361 (1978). 

2 The IAD defines the term “State” as including not only the 
various States and Commonwealths that compose the Union, but 
also the United States of America, the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States. IAD, 
Art. II(a). Throughout this brief, we use the term “State” in the 
same sense. 

4 

the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment pursuant to article V(e)” of the IAD, 
“such indictment, information or complaint shall not be 
of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter 
an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” The anti- 
shuttling provision is meant “to protect the prisoner 
against endless interruption of the rehabilitation pro- 
grams because of criminal proceedings in other juris- 
dictions.” United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 636 (7th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988). 

2. In June of 1995, respondent Michael Herman 
Bozeman was arrested in Covington County, Alabama, 
on federal charges, including conspiracy to possess 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute it in vio- 
lation of 21 U.S.C. 846. On November 3, 1995, respon- 
dent appeared before the United States District Court 
for the District of Georgia, and pleaded guilty to those 
charges. He was sentenced to 75 months of impris- 
onment, to be followed by four years of supervised 
release; the term of imprisonment was later reduced to 
36 months, but the term of supervised release was left 
unchanged. 

In September of 1996, a Covington County, Alabama, 
grand jury indicted respondent on various shooting 
charges, including two counts of discharging a firearm 
into an occupied dwelling, two counts of discharging a 
firearm into an unoccupied vehicle, and one count of 
discharging a firearm into an unoccupied dwelling. 
Respondent had committed those offenses in June of 
1995, before he was arrested on federal charges. The 
Covington County District Attorney sent a request to 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons in Atlanta, asking that a 
detainer be placed against respondent under the IAD. 
Bureau of Prisons officials responded by stating that 
the detainer had been filed pursuant to the District 

5 

Attorney’s request. Respondent apparently received 
and signed, on November 4, 1996, a notice that advised 
him of the detainer, notified him of the untried indict- 
ments, and informed him that he had the right under 
Article III of the IAD to request prompt disposition of 
the charges against him. Respondent was later trans- 
ferred from the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta to a 
federal facility in Marianna, Florida. Pet. 5. Marianna 
is in northwestern Florida, near the Alabama border, 
approximately 80 miles (as the crow flies) from the 
county seat of Covington County, which is the city of 
Andalusia.3 

On January 8, 1997, the District Attorney requested 
temporary custody of respondent from Bureau of Pri- 
sons officials in Marianna, Florida, indicating that 
respondent was needed for arraignment and appoint- 
ment of counsel on the shooting charges. The written 
request stated that respondent would be picked up on 
January 15, 1997, and returned the next day, on 
January 16, 1997. It was not until January 23, 1997, 
however, that respondent was made available to and 
placed in the temporary custody of Covington County 
authorities, who transported him to Covington County. 
The next day, January 24, 1997, respondent received 
appointed counsel, was arraigned on the shooting 
charges, and transferred back to federal custody in 
Marianna, Florida. Pet. App. 17-18, 28; Pet. 5-6. 

On the day of arraignment, respondent’s pro se 
motion to dismiss the indictment, which claimed that 
there had been a violation of the IAD, was filed. 
(Respondent apparently had earlier been transferred 

3 The driving distance between Marianna, Florida, and An- 
dalusia, Alabama, is approximately 110 miles. We are advised that 
the estimated travel time is two hours and ten minutes. 

6 

for arraignment on separate drug charges, which were 
later dismissed, and returned to federal authorities 
before being indicted on the shooting charges. See note 
4, infra.) Appointed counsel stated that there were 
possible questions on that issue, and asked to reserve 
the issue for post-arraignment consideration; the trial 
court granted the motion. Apparently, respondent did 
not object to being returned to federal custody follow- 
ing the arraignment, and he was so returned. Pet. 6. 

On February 21, 1997, respondent’s counsel filed a 
motion to dismiss the untried charges. Article IV(e) of 
the IAD, he argued, compelled dismissal because re- 
spondent had been brought to Covington County under 
the IAD, but had been returned to his original place of 
incarceration without having been tried. Shortly there- 
after, on February 27, 1997, respondent was trans- 
ferred back into the custody of Covington County 
officials to stand trial on the shooting charges. He was 
tried that day, and the jury unanimously found him 
guilty of all charges the next day, February 28, 1997. 
Pet. 7. 

Following his conviction, respondent renewed the 
motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the trial court 
denied the motion. The only issue before it, the trial 
court stated, was whether Article IV of the IAD had 
been violated. Pet. App. 27. The trial court found that, 
because respondent had been “brought to Covington 
County * * * to attend to short pre-trial matters, not 
anticipated to require his extended presence,” it “made 
much sense to bring him into the county briefly to see 
to those matters, and thereupon return him to the 
surroundings to which he was accustomed.” Id. at 28. 
“That course,” the court explained, “appears to have 
been conservative of defendant’s interest in main- 
taining any course of rehabilitation available to him in 

7 

federal prison. He certainly would not receive much 
rehabilitation in a county jail.” Ibid. “[M]any prison 
inmates,” the court continued, “don’t care to stay in our 
county jail for two or three months pending trial.” Ibid. 

The court therefore found that “there was a failure of 
proof that” respondent’s transfer had “interfered with 
[his] participation in any rehabilitative program, or that 
he was denied, threatened with the denial of, or feared 
losing any privileges because of this state charge.” Pet. 
App. 28.4 Instead, the court found that the transfer was 
“wholly consistent with the goal of the IAD to expedite 
the prosecution of state charges without interfering 
with any rehabilitative programs.” Id. at 29. The court 
therefore held that there had been no violation of the 
IAD, and it declined to dismiss the charges. 

3. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 
Pet. App. 15-26. The court began by noting that the 
federal courts of appeals were divided on whether a 
one-day transfer between a sending and a receiving 
jurisdiction, without resolution of the pending charges, 
violates Article IV(e) of the IAD. Id. at 21. The posi- 

4 The trial court’s opinion speaks of “transfers” in the plural 
because, before being transferred to Covington County on the 
shooting charges, respondent was once transferred to Covington 
County in connection with state drug charges that were later 
dismissed. See Pet. 4 n.2. The Court of Criminal Appeals con- 
cluded that, because the shooting charges were not pending at the 
time respondent was transferred to Covington County and then 
returned to federal custody in connection with the drug charges, 
the IAD could not be read as requiring dismissal of the shooting 
charges based on that earlier transfer. The IAD, the court ex- 
plained, only applies to “untried indictments,” and there was no 
untried indictment charging the shooting offenses when respon- 
dent was transferred and returned in connection with the drug 
charges. See Pet. App. 16-17. Respondent has not sought further 
review of that holding. 

8 

tion of the courts finding no violation, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals concluded, was more persuasive in 
light of paragraph 1 of Article IX of the IAD, which 
states that the agreement “shall be liberally construed 
so as to effectuate its purposes.” Ibid. In this case, the 
court noted, the transfers did not interfere with the 
purpose of the IAD. Ibid. To the contrary, the court of 
appeals observed that respondent had failed (until 
appeal) to claim that he had suffered any prejudice 
from the transfer. Id. at 21-22.5 Keeping a prisoner 
“for trial, rather than returning him immediately after 
arraignment,” the court explained, often would “inter- 
fere[] with [the prisoner’s] legitimate interest in partici- 
pating in the program of rehabilitation in which he was 
enrolled;” in contrast, brief removal and “prompt return 

* * * after arraignment” did not have that effect. Id. 
at 23 (quoting Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371, 
375 (5th Cir. 1981), and State v. Sassoon, 242 S.E.2d 
121, 123 (Ga. 1978)). Based on that reasoning and the 
record before it, the court held that respondent’s “brief 
transfer in January 1997 for arraignment * * * and 
return to federal custody the following day did not 
violate Article IV(e) of ” the IAD. Id. at 26. 

4. The state supreme court reversed, with three 
justices dissenting. Pet. App. 1-14. The majority 

5 On appeal, respondent apparently “made a conclusory asser- 
tion that his transfers interfered with his ability to aid in his de- 
fense.” Pet. App. 22 n.2. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted 
that the argument had not been timely raised before appeal, id. at 
21-22, and declined to address it, id. at 22 n.2. See also id. at 12 
(dissenting opinion) (Respondent “does not argue on appeal that he 
was prejudiced by the transfer back to federal custody before his 
trial.”); id. at 12 n.9 (noting that “the record does not contain “evi- 
dence to support” the assertion of prejudice). See also id. at 7-10 
(state supreme court decision reversing without finding prejudice). 

9 

reasoned that, under the text of the IAD, there is no 
exception for technical violations of Article IV(e). 
Instead, the majority stated, the IAD unambiguously 
requires that, whenever the prisoner is returned to the 
sending jurisdiction before trial, any untried charges in 
the receiving jurisdiction must be dismissed. Id. at 8. 

The court did not dispute that, in individual cases, a 
one day trip might cause no more than “minimal inter- 
ruption of the rehabilitative process.” Pet. App. 7 
(quoting United States v. Sorrell, 413 F. Supp. 138 
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aff ’d, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978)). The court concluded, how- 
ever, that the IAD was not drafted to deal with “an 
individual situation, but rather [to be] an agreement of 
national scope.” Ibid. Given the tremendous distances 
between and within States, the court continued, trans- 
fers could require trips measuring hundreds of miles 
and create more than minimal disruption. Id. at 8. The 
legislature could have, the court continued, “stepped 
beyond the confines of the text of the compact and 
included limitations in the statute expressly allowing 
‘technical’ violations to occur. However, it * * * did 
not do so. This Court will not interject its interpreta- 
tion of what the Legislature should have done.” Ibid. 

Three justices dissented, and a fourth recused herself 
because she had been a member of the Court of 
Criminal Appeals when that court considered the case. 
Pet. App. 10-14. The dissenting justices stated that a 
technical violation of the IAD does not require the 
dismissal of charges with prejudice. A majority of 
federal courts of appeals, they pointed out, had con- 
cluded that a one-day transfer like the one at issue here 
was not a material violation of the Act. Indeed, they 
noted, transferring the prisoner back to the sending 
institution promptly will often be more consonant with 

10 

the Act’s purposes, because it enables the prisoner to 
participate in rehabilitation programs that he would 
otherwise miss. Id. at 12. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

The Supreme Court of Alabama erroneously held 
that even a technical and wholly harmless defect in a 
temporary transfer under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers requires dismissal of an indictment with 
prejudice. 

A. The IAD seeks to minimize the negative impact 
that detainers can have on a prisoner’s participation in 
rehabilitation programs in the jurisdiction in which he 
is incarcerated. Article IV(e), the anti-shuttling rule, 
serves that goal by protecting “the prisoner against 
endless interruption of the rehabilitation programs be- 
cause of criminal proceedings in other jurisdictions.” 
United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 636 (7th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988). Consistent with that 
purpose, the overwhelming majority of federal courts of 
appeals have reached the common sense conclusion that 
Article IV(e) of the IAD is not materially violated 
when a prisoner’s confinement is briefly interrupted 
by transfer to another jurisdiction for purposes of 
arraignment if the prisoner is returned to the original 
place of confinement within a day and his participation 
in rehabilitation programs is unaffected. Those courts 
have observed that a contrary, inflexible construction of 
the statute would undermine the IAD’s express goals. 
The rapid return of a prisoner to the original place 
of confinement minimizes any interruption of the 
prisoner’s participation in rehabilitative programs. In 
contrast, requiring the prisoner to remain in what may 
be lengthy custody in the receiving State would 
prevent the prisoner from participating in rehabili- 

11 

tation programs at his original place of confinement, 
forcing him instead to spend an extended period in a 
local pre-trial detention facility where, as here, such 
programs are often unavailable. 

B. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the 
plain language of the IAD compelled it to require dis- 
missal because of the one-day transfer of custody in this 
case. In particular, that court reasoned that, because 
the IAD does not contain an express exception for 
“technical” or “de minimis” breaches, excusing such 
errors would be tantamount to judicial legislation. Pet. 
App. 8. That conclusion, however, is inconsistent with 
the principle of de minimis non curat lex—“the law 
cares not for trifles”—which, this Court has held, “is 
part of the established background of legal principles 
against which all enactments are adopted, and which all 
enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to 
accept.” Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue v. William 
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992). In fact, the 
reasoning adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court in 
this case is virtually indistinguishable from the line of 
argument this Court rejected in Wrigley. It is also 
inconsistent with the similar and universally accepted 
principle of criminal procedure that harmless errors— 
errors that do not affect substantial rights—cannot be 
noticed. Nothing in the IAD indicates that it was 
meant to abrogate the well-settled de minimis principle 
or the doctrine of harmless error. To the contrary, 
applications of those principles in this context would be 
wholly consistent with the statutory purpose of mini- 
mizing, rather than exacerbating, the potentially dis- 
ruptive effect that pending charges in another juris- 
diction can have. 

12 

ARGUMENT 

ARTICLE IV(e) OF THE INTERSTATE AGREE- 
MENT ON DETAINERS IS NOT VIOLATED BY A 
BRIEF INTERRUPTION OF CONFINEMENT THAT 
DOES NOT AFFECT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS 

In Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William 
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992), this Court 
held that “the venerable maxim de minimis non curat 
lex (‘the law cares not for trifles’) is part of the estab- 
lished background of legal principles against which 
all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments 
(absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept.” In 
criminal procedure, the similar view that non- 
prejudicial errors shall be disregarded finds expression 
in the related and universally accepted principle of 
harmless error, under which a conviction may not be set 
aside unless the error complained of affected the defen- 
dant’s substantial rights. In this case, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama erroneously declined to construe 
Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
in light of those background principles of law. To the 
contrary, that court held that, even if the alleged 
violation of the IAD is wholly trivial, causes no injury 
to the substantial rights of the prisoner, and actually 
benefits the interests of the prisoner that the IAD was 
meant to protect, the “plain language” of Article IV(e) 
requires that the harsh remedy of dismissal with pre- 
judice be imposed and the criminal defendant must be 
permitted to escape prosecution for his crimes. Be- 
cause that result is not compelled by the statutory 
language, is inconsistent with the background prin- 
ciples that all federal enactments are deemed to accept, 
and defeats the purposes Article IV(e) of the IAD is 

13 

designed to serve, this Court should reverse the judg- 
ment below. 

A. The Vast Majority Of Federal Courts Have Correctly 

Concluded That De Minimis Transfers Do Not Offend 

The IAD 

The IAD seeks to minimize the negative impact that 
the lodging of a detainer can have on a prisoner’s parti- 
cipation in rehabilitation programs in the jurisdiction in 
which he is incarcerated. In proposing the legislation 
that became the IAD, the Council of State Govern- 
ments observed that an inmate who has a detainer 
against him often confronts great uncertainty about his 
future and, as a result, “frequently does not respond to” 
rehabilitation efforts. Council of State Governments, 
Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, at 74 
(1956). In addition: 

[A prisoner subject to a detainer] often must be 
kept in close custody, which bars him from treat- 
ment such as trustyships, moderations of custody 
and opportunity for transfer to farms and work 
camps. * * * Instead, he often becomes embittered 
with continued institutionalization and the objective 
of the correctional system is defeated. 

Ibid. See also Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719-720 
(1985). 

The IAD was drafted to minimize such interference 
with rehabilitation programs and “to encourage the 
expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] 
charges and determination of the proper status of any 
and all detainers based on untried indictments, informa- 
tions, or complaints.” IAD, Art. I. To that end, 
Articles IV and V of the IAD provide (among other 
things) procedures for the temporary transfer of 

14 

custody of a prisoner from the jurisdiction where he is 
incarcerated to the jurisdiction filing the detainer for 
prompt resolution of the charges on which the detainer 
is based. To minimize the time the prisoner must spend 
away from his original place of incarceration, Article 
IV(c) requires States that request temporary custody 
of a prisoner for purposes of trial to begin the trial 
within 120 days of obtaining custody. And Article V(e) 
of the IAD requires that, “[a]t the earliest practicable 
time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, 
the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State.” 
See also New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 118 n.3 (2000).6 

To ensure that repeated transfers between juris- 
dictions do not interfere with the prisoner’s partici- 
pation in rehabilitation programs in the jurisdiction in 
which he is incarcerated, the IAD contains the pro- 
vision at issue in this case, Article IV(e), which is 
known as the “anti-shuttling” provision. Article IV(e) 
states: 

If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or 
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the pris- 
oner’s being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such 
indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of 

6 In addition, under Article III(a) of the IAD, the prisoner can 
demand prompt resolution of the charges underlying any detainer 
lodged against him. Upon such a request, the prisoner must be 
brought to trial within 180 days, subject to reasonable con- 
tinuances for good cause shown in open court in the presence of the 
prisoner or his counsel. IAD, Art. III(a). Failure to try the 
prisoner within the applicable statutory period requires dismissal 
of the indictment, with prejudice. IAD, Art. V(c). See generally 
Hill, 528 U.S. at 112. But see 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 9(1) (providing 
that, where federal charges are at issue, dismissal can be with or 
without prejudice). 

15 

any further force or effect, and the court shall enter 
an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 

IAD, Art. IV(e). Article IV(e) is “meant to protect the 
prisoner against endless interruption of the rehabili- 
tation programs because of criminal proceedings in 
other jurisdictions,” United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 
636 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988), 
and “prevent[s] prisoners from being abused by the 
lodging of detainers and transfer to a requesting 
state unaccompanied by an intent or ability to try the 
individual,” 134 Cong. Rec. 32,703 (1988). See also 
United States v. Taylor, 861 F.2d 316, 319 (1st Cir. 
1988) (“[T]he requirement * * * primarily was 
designed to avoid the shuttling of prisoners back and 
forth between institutions in different states or in 
distant parts of the same state.”). 

Consistent with that purpose, the overwhelming ma- 
jority of federal courts of appeals—including the First, 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits—have concluded that Article IV(e) of the IAD 
is not materially violated by a brief interruption in 
confinement for purposes of arraignment when the 
prisoner is returned to the original place of confinement 
within a day and his participation in rehabilitation 
programs is unaffected. Absent a material violation, 
those courts hold, the sanction of dismissal with pre- 
judice is improper. See United States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d 
25, 27 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[A] brief interruption in state 
prison confinement for purposes of arraignment, where 
the prisoner is returned to state custody the same day, 
does not violate the IAD.”); United States v. Roy, 771 
F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) (no violation necessitating dis- 
missal where prisoner was out of state custody over- 
night), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986); Sassoon v. 

16 

Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 1981) (no vio- 
lation when prisoner’s return to federal penitentiary, 
after five day absence for arraignment, “allowed him to 
participate in the extensive rehabilitative education 
program available there”); United States v. Taylor, 173 
F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir.) (“[W]e agree with the ‘common 
sense’ approach applied by a majority of the circuits.”), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 987 (1999); Roy, 830 F.2d at 636 
(no violation when prisoner’s “overnight stay” in 
federal custody was not a “real interruption of [his] 
state incarceration and * * * he was not deprived of 
any privilege at the state institution as a result”); 
Baxter v. United States, 966 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 
1992) (“[A]rticle IV(e) of the IADA does not apply 
when a prisoner is removed from a state prison for a 
few hours to be arraigned, plead, and be sentenced in 
federal court without ever being held at any other 
place of imprisonment and without interrupting the 
prisoner’s rehabilitation in the state prison.”); United 
States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.) (con- 
cluding that one-day transfers did not violate the IAD 
absent some injury to the prisoner’s opportunity to 
participate in prison programs), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
879 (1992). See also United States v. Taylor, 947 F.2d 
1002, 1004 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[W]e rely on * * * the 
single day interruption of the state confinement, and 
the manifest lack of injury.”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 991 
(1992). 

A contrary, inflexible construction of the statute 
would be at war with the IAD’s express goals. The 
rapid return of a prisoner to the original place of con- 
finement following a single-day absence for arraign- 
ment, those courts have noted, minimizes any interrup- 
tion of the prisoner’s participation in rehabilitative 
programs. Roy, 830 F.2d at 636 (“one-day interruption” 

17 

of confinement “quite obviously ‘pose[s] no threat to a 
prisoner’s rehabilitation sufficient to constitute a 
violation of the Agreement’ ”); Daniels, 3 F.3d at 27 
(“brief interruption in state custody poses no threat to 
the prisoner’s rehabilitation efforts”). In contrast, 
requiring the prisoner to remain in the custody of the 
charging State—precluding his return to the original 
place of confinement upon threat of dismissal—during 
the sometimes lengthy period between arraignment 
and trial would force the prisoner to remain in a local 
pre-trial detention facility, where rehabilitation ser- 
vices are often unavailable, for an extended period of 
time. As one court of appeals has explained: 

[If] a prisoner could not be returned safely to 
his original place of imprisonment * * * , the 
[receiving jurisdiction] would be forced to keep the 
prisoner in its custody throughout the period 
necessary for final resolution of the * * * charges; 
to do otherwise would risk dismissal of the indict- 
ment for technical noncompliance with the Agree- 
ment. This practice would frequently result in 
incarceration for several weeks or months in local 
jails, often in disadvantageous ‘holdover’ status, 
thereby unnecessarily interrupting the rehabili- 
tation of the prisoner and bringing about the very 
evil that the Agreement was enacted to prevent. 

Roy, 771 F.2d at 60. Accord Taylor, 861 F.2d at 319 
(“[R]equiring the [receiving State] to retain custody of 
appellant until his trial would conflict with the 
Agreement’s goal that a prisoner be able to pursue his 
original rehabilitation program with as little inter- 
ruption as possible.”); Sassoon, 654 F.2d at 375 (retain- 
ing prisoner “for trial, rather than returning him 
immediately after arraignment” would have “interfered 

18 

with [the prisoner’s] legitimate interest in participating 
in the program of rehabilitation in which he was en- 
rolled”); Daniels, 3 F.3d at 28 (“such interruptions may 
be advantageous to a defendant”). 

Congress, in fact, reached precisely the same con- 
clusion, and it amended the federal statutes imple- 
menting the IAD to clarify Article IV(e) as a result. 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 
§ 7059, 102 Stat. 4403. In particular, responding to the 
decisions of the two courts of appeals that had parted 
company from the rest on this issue, Congress in 1988 
amended 18 U.S.C. App. 2 by adding a new Section 9. 
Section 9(1) provides that dismissals of federal charges 
for violations of the Act can be made with or without 
prejudice, depending on the circumstances. 18 U.S.C. 
App. 2, § 9(1). And Section 9(2) essentially codifies the 
position taken by the majority of federal courts of 
appeals, declaring that “it shall not be a violation of the 
agreement on detainers if prior to trial the prisoner is 
returned to the custody of the sending State pursuant 
to an order of the appropriate court issued after rea- 
sonable notice to the prisoner and the United States 
and an opportunity for a hearing.” 18 U.S.C. App. 2, 
§ 9(2) (emphasis added).7 

The legislative history of that amendment notes that, 
when a prisoner is transferred between federal and 
state authorities for a brief period, the “sanction” of 
dismissal for returning the prisoner before trial “makes 

7 Congress, of course, did not attempt to unilaterally amend 
the IAD itself, or the various state laws adopting and imple- 
menting it. As a result, 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 9, operates only with 
respect to the disposition of federal charges where a violation of 
the IAD is alleged; it does not by its terms directly control the 
disposition of state charges. 

19 

little sense,” because such a transfer often will be 
within “the same state, perhaps across the street, for 
trial.” 134 Cong. Rec. 32,703 (1988). If the two loca- 
tions are sufficiently close and the interruption of con- 
finement brief, Congress observed, permitting the 
prisoner to return to the original institution of con- 
finement following arraignment “is clearly not harmful 
to the prisoner and ought not to lead to the drastic 
remedy of dismissal.” Ibid. To the contrary, permitting 
the prisoner to continue his residence in the original 
place of confinement following arraignment “frequently 
is for the prisoner’s benefit” because it “may enable him 
or her to resume participation in * * * rehabilitative 
programs whereas, if retained in [the receiving juris- 
diction’s] custody, the prisoner might have to be lodged 
in a * * * jail-type institution for a protracted time 
without comparable treatment or facilities.” Ibid. 

The same considerations exist in this case as well. 
Respondent, who was serving a multi-year sentence 
in a federal penitentiary in Marianna, Florida, was 
briefly placed in the custody of Covington County 
officials, transported a relatively short distance (a drive 
of approximately two hours) to Covington County, 
Alabama, for purposes of arraignment, and then sent 
back to his original place of confinement, all within a 24- 
hour period. Respondent has not shown that the brief, 
one-day interruption in federal custody interfered with 
his participation in rehabilitative programs. And the 
procedure may well have accrued to his benefit. Rather 
than having to spend a month awaiting trial in a local 
Covington County jail, respondent returned to the 
federal facility with which he was familiar. As the trial 
court observed, the transfer was “conservative of 
defendant’s interest in maintaining any course of 
rehabilitation available to him in federal prison,” since 

20 

he “certainly would not receive much rehabilitation in a 
county jail.” Pet. App. 28. Indeed, respondent nowhere 
claims that he would have preferred to stay in the 
Covington County jail. The trial court, which was most 
familiar with local conditions, noted that such a pref- 
erence would be somewhat unusual. “[M]any prison 
inmates,” the court explained, “don’t care to stay in our 
county jail for two or three months pending trial.” Ibid. 

B. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Funda- 
mental Principles Of Statutory Construction 

The Supreme Court of the State of Alabama did not 
disagree with the above considerations. It concluded, 
however, that the result reached by the overwhelming 
majority of federal courts of appeals could not be 
reconciled with the IAD’s language. Under the IAD, 
the court stated, any untried charges must be dismissed 
with prejudice “[i]f trial is not had” on them “prior to 
the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment.” Pet. App. 4, 8. We disagree with that 
analysis of the IAD. 

The Supreme Court of Alabama’s supposedly “plain 
text” construction of the IAD overlooks the background 
legal principle, which should be found applicable to a 
compact such as the IAD, that in the absence of a 
material breach of the relevant proscription, no remedy 
may be imposed—de minimis non curat lex. Indeed, 
one can often fairly say that, absent a material breach 
and resulting injury, there has been no breach at all.8 

8 See, e.g., General Carbon Co. v. OSHA, 860 F.2d 479, 487 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (where violation is “de minimis,” it “means not 
only that no penalty is imposed * * * but also that the violation 
need not be abated”). Thus, in the law of torts, the absence of a 
material injury to the plaintiff defeats any cause of action for 
negligence. W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 30, at 

21 

As the Court explained in Wrigley, 505 U.S. at 231, “the 
venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex (‘the law 
cares not for trifles’) is part of the established back- 
ground of legal principles against which all enactments 
are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary 
indication) are deemed to accept.” 

The Alabama Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case 
cannot be reconciled with that principle. That court 
reasoned that, because the IAD does not contain an 
express exception for “technical” or “de minimis” 
breaches, excusing such errors would be tantamount to 
judicial legislation. Pet. App. 8. But Wrigley holds 
the opposite to be true: That absent an indication of 
contrary intent, the maxim of de minimis non curat 
lex—that the law does not recognize insignificant 
errors—is part of the “background of legal principles 
against which all enactments,” including the IAD, “are 
adopted, and which all enactments,” including the IAD, 
“are deemed to accept.” Indeed, the reasoning adopted 
by the Alabama Supreme Court in this case is virtually 
indistinguishable from the line of argument this Court 
rejected in Wrigley. In Wrigley, the State asserted 
that the “plain language of the statute bars * * * 
recognition of a de minimis exception, because” no such 
exception was expressly provided for. 505 U.S. at 231. 

165 (5th ed. 1984). And, in the law of contracts, one party’s failure 
of performance cannot justify the dramatic remedy of excusing the 
other party’s performance unless the breach is “material,” or “goes 
to the root or essence of the contract.” See 2 E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.16, at 442 (1990); 15 Richard A. Lord, 
Williston on Contracts § 44:55, at 231-232 (4th ed. 2000); 4 Arthur 
L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 946, at 809, 811 (1951). See also 
Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United States, 
120 S. Ct. 2423, 2440-2441 (2000); id. at 2449 (Stevens, J., dis- 
senting). 

22 

Here, the Alabama Supreme Court declined to excuse 
de minimis infractions because there is no “limitation[] 
in the statute expressly allowing ‘technical’ violations to 
occur.” Pet. App. 8. This Court rejected the State’s 
“plain language” argument in Wrigley because the 
de minimis principle is deemed accepted by “every 
statute” absent a contrary indication. The Court should 
for the same reasons reject the Alabama Supreme 
Court’s “plain language” argument here. 9 

That result is particularly appropriate in light of the 
fact that the rule against cognizance of non-prejudicial 
defects finds universal application through the criminal 
procedure doctrine of harmless error, under which 
courts will not vacate or reverse convictions unless the 
asserted error affected the defendant’s substantial 

9 This Court has construed other federal statutes restricting 
the scope of permissible government conduct, including Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 
U.S.C. 2510 et seq.—the principal federal wiretapping statute— in 
a manner consistent with that principle. For example, the Court 
has rejected the contention that “every failure to comply fully with 
any requirement provided in Title III would render the inter- 
ception of wire or oral communications ‘unlawful’ ” within the 
meaning of Title III so as to require the suppression of the 
evidence so obtained. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433 
(1977) (quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-575 
(1974)). Instead, the Court held, the exclusionary rule applies 
where the requirement of Title III that was allegedly violated 
serves a “substantive” and “central” role in the statutory purpose 
of preventing “unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic sur- 
veillance.” Chavez, 416 U.S. at 578. See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433- 
434 (“[S]uppression is required only for a ‘failure to satisfy any of 
those statutory requirements that directly and substantially 
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept 
procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment 
of this extraordinary investigative device.’ ”) (quoting United 
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)). 

23 

rights. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 
(1967) (“All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or 
rules.”). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for 
example, provide that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity 
or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). See also 
28 U.S.C. 2111. The Alabama Rules of Appellate Pro- 
cedure similarly provide that “[n]o judgment may be 
reversed or set aside * * * unless * * * the error 
complained of has probably injuriously affected sub- 
stantial rights of the parties.” Ala. R. App. P. 45. The 
harmless error doctrine, this Court has explained, “is 
essential to preserve the ‘principle that the central 
purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual 
question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and 
promotes public respect for the criminal process by 
focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather 
than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial 
error.’ ” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 
(1991) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
681 (1986)). 

Nothing in the text of the IAD or its history suggests 
that it was meant to preclude application of the prin- 
ciple of de minimis non curat lex, or to eliminate the 
application of the related doctrine of harmless error. To 
the contrary, on its face, the IAD, including Article 
IV(e), is silent with respect to those doctrines. Last 
Term, this Court confronted similar silence in the IAD 
with respect to the effect of waiver or forfeiture of the 
speedy-trial right provided by that Act. See Hill, 528 
U.S. at 114 (“No provision of the IAD prescribes the 
effect of a defendant’s assent to delay on the applicable 
time limits.”). In light of that silence, the Court con- 
cluded that the rights provided by the IAD are, like 
almost all other rights of a criminal defendant, subject 

24 

10 The Court should similarly 
hold that the purported violations of Article IV(e) at 
issue here, like almost all other procedural errors in the 
criminal process, are subject to the de minimis prin- 
ciple and thus the rule that they cannot form the basis 
of relief unless they affect substantial rights. 

to waiver. Id. at 663-664. 

11 

The rule of liberal construction provided by the IAD 
itself, as well as the IAD’s legislative history, both 
support that result. Article IX of the IAD, which the 
Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion did not mention, 
states that the “agreement shall be liberally construed 
so as to effectuate its purposes.” IAD, Art. IX (empha- 
sis added). Construing the IAD as abrogating the de 
minimis and harmless error principles would, as the 
above discussion attests, undermine the IAD’s purpose. 
See pp. 15-20, supra. The anti-shuttling provision is 
designed to prevent transfers and re-transfers between 

10 Indeed, the Court explained that, even though it was pos- 
sible to draw a “negative implication” from the statutory text, that 
implication was “not clear enough to constitute the ‘affirmative 
indication’ required to overcome the ordinary presumption that 
waiver is available.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 116. 

11 That is not to say that Congress implicitly intends to exempt 
from the scope of all of its criminal laws those violations that might 
be argued to be “relatively trivial.” See United States v. Wells, 
519 U.S. 482, 498 (1997). The question is one of the intent of the 
drafters. In construing criminal laws, this Court has made clear 
that “the first criterion in the interpretive hierarchy” is “a natural 
reading of the full text.” Id. at 490; see Salinas v. United States, 
522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) (“Courts in applying criminal laws generally 
must follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of statutory 
language.”). In the present context, however, involving application 
of a procedural regime governing prisoners who face charges in 
another jurisdiction, application of the Wrigley principle is con- 
sistent with the purpose of the IAD, and there is no countervailing 
indication that it should not be applied. 

25 

different States from disrupting the prisoner’s partici- 
pation in rehabilitation and training programs in the 
institution in which he is incarcerated. Where, as here, 
the prisoner is removed from federal custody for only a 
day, is transferred a relatively moderate distance for 
arraignment, and promptly returned with no apparent 
interruption of his participation in rehabilitative pro- 
grams, the transfer poses no threat to that purpose. 
The contrary rule, in contrast, would. Under it, a pris- 
oner would have to be kept away—for the sometimes 
lengthy period between arraignment and trial—from 
the institution to which he had become accustomed and 
from any training and rehabilitation programs there in 
which he might be enrolled; the prisoner, moreover, 
would likely end up confined in a pre-trial facility that 
offers no such programs. See pp. 16-20, supra; Pet. 
App. 28 (explaining that, in this case, respondent 
“certainly would not receive much rehabilitation in a 
county jail”). There is no warrant for reading the IAD 
in a manner that is inconsistent with settled back- 
ground principles, when the result is to contradict the 
statute’s underlying purpose. See Roy, 771 F.2d at 60 
(“Construing the Agreement to have been violated in 
[such] circumstances * * *, thereby precipitating 
serious interruption of rehabilitative programs, would 
not comport with the requirement that the Agreement 
should be ‘liberally construed so as to effectuate its 
purposes.’ Art. IX.”). That is especially true where, as 
here, such a construction would provide criminal defen- 
dants with a windfall, a result the IAD was supposed to 
avoid. See Council of State Governments, supra, at 76- 
77 (agreement “gives [the defendant] no greater oppor- 
tunity to escape just conviction”); S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) (“The agreement gives the 

26 

prisoner no greater opportunity to escape a convic- 
tion.”). 

“Whether a particular activity is a de minimis 
deviation from a prescribed standard must, of course, 
be determined with reference to the purpose of the 
standard.” Wrigley, 505 U.S. at 232. In this case, there 
can be little doubt that any violation of the IAD was de 
minimis and did not affect respondent’s “substantial 
rights.” Respondent was out of the federal prison for 
only a day; there is no evidence that his participation in 
federal training programs was affected; and the local 
Covington County, Alabama, jail where respondent 
would have had to remain for the month between 
arraignment and trial absent his prompt return could 
offer him none of the programs and services available in 
the federal facility to which he had become accustomed. 
We do not mean to suggest that the de minimis prin- 
ciple or harmless error rule would excuse repeated and 
vexing transfers between jurisdictions, transfers be- 
tween distant institutions, or return after an extended 
period in the custody of the receiving State. But re- 
turning a prisoner to a federal facility after an 
overnight stay with the charging State not only im- 
poses no injury on the prisoner, but serves his interests 
and those the IAD seeks to protect. Under such 
circumstances, the de minimis principle and harmless 
error doctrine preclude application of the harsh sanc- 
tion of dismissal with prejudice. 

27 

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Alabama should be reversed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD 
Acting Solicitor General 

JOHN C. KEENEY 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

MICHAEL R. DREEBEN 

Deputy Solicitor General 

JEFFREY A. LAMKEN 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

JANUARY 2001 

APPENDIX 

1. The Compact Clause of the United States Consti- 
tution, Art. 1, § 10, Cl. 3, provides: 

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, 
lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of 
War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement 
or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, 
or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of 
delay. 

2. Section 2111 of Title 28 of the United States Code 
provides: 

§ 2111. Harmless error 

On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari 
in any case, the court shall give judgment after an 
examination of the record without regard to errors 
or defects which do not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties. 

3. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Title 
18 of the United States Code Appendix 2, provides as 
follows: 

§ 1. Short title 

This Act may be cited as the “Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers Act”. 

§ 2. Enactment into law of Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers 

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is hereby 
enacted into law and entered into by the United States 

(1a) 

2a 

on its own behalf and on behalf of the District of 
Columbia with all jurisdictions legally joining in 
substantially the following form: 

“The contracting States solemnly agree that: 

“ARTICLE I 

“The party States find that charges outstanding 
against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indict- 
ments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in 
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated 
in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which ob- 
struct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilita- 
tion. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party States 
and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the 
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and 
determination of the proper status of any and all de- 
tainers based on untried indictments, informations, or 
complaints. The party States also find that proceedings 
with reference to such charges and detainers, when 
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly 
be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is 
the further purpose of this agreement to provide such 
cooperative procedures. 

“ARTICLE II 

“As used in this agreement: 
“(a) ‘State’ shall mean a State of the United States; 
the United States of America; a territory or possession 
of the United States; the District of Columbia; the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 

“(b) ‘Sending State’ shall mean a State in which a 
prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a 
request for final disposition pursuant to article III 

3a 

hereof or at the time that a request for custody or 
availability is initiated pursuant to article IV hereof. 

“(c) ‘Receiving State’ shall mean the State in which 
trial is to be had on an indictment, information, or com- 
plaint pursuant to article III or article IV hereof. 

“ARTICLE III 

“(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of 
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a 
party State, and whenever during the continuance of 
the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other 
party State any untried indictment, information, or 
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been 
lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have 
caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and 
the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s juris- 
diction written notice of the place of his imprisonment 
and his request for a final disposition to be made of the 
indictment, information, or complaint: Provided, That, 
for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his 
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of 
the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable con- 
tinuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accom- 
panied by a certificate of the appropriate official having 
custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commit- 
ment under which the prisoner is being held, the time 
already served, the time remaining to be served on the 
sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of 
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decision of the 
State parole agency relating to the prisoner. 

“(b) The written notice and request for final dis- 
position referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be 
given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, com- 

4a 

missioner of corrections, or other official having custody 
of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the 
certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and 
court by registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested. 

“(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections, or 
other official having custody of the prisoner shall 
promptly inform him of the source and contents of any 
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of 
his right to make a request for final disposition of the 
indictment, information, or complaint on which the 
detainer is based. 

“(d) Any request for final disposition made by a 
prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate 
as a request for final disposition of all untried indict- 
ments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from 
the State to whose prosecuting official the request for 
final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, 
commissioner of corrections, or other official having 
custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all ap- 
propriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several 
jurisdictions within the State to which the prisoner’s 
request for final disposition is being sent of the 
proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notifi- 
cation sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accom- 
panied by copies of the prisoner’s written notice, re- 
quest, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any 
indictment, information, or complaint contemplated 
hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original 
place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or 
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and 
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with 
prejudice. 

5a 

“(e) Any request for final disposition made by a 
prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be 
deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to 
any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or 
included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and 
a waiver of extradition to the receiving State to serve 
any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion 
of his term of imprisonment in the sending State. The 
request for final disposition shall also constitute a 
consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in 
any court where his presence may be required in order 
to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a 
further consent voluntarily to be returned to the 
original place of imprisonment in accordance with the 
provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this 
paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent 
sentence if otherwise permitted by law. 

“(f ) 
Escape from custody by the prisoner subse- 
quent to his execution of the request for final dis- 
position referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void 
the request. 

“ARTICLE IV 

“(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in 
which an untried indictment, information, or complaint 
is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against 
whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a 
term of imprisonment in any party State made available 
in accordance with article V(a) hereof upon presenta- 
tion of a written request for temporary custody or 
availability to the appropriate authorities of the State 
in which the prisoner is incarcerated: Provided, That 
the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, infor- 
mation, or complaint shall have duly approved, re- 
corded, and transmitted the request: And provided 

6a 

further, That there shall be a period of thirty days after 
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the re- 
quest be honored, within which period the Governor of 
the sending State may disapprove the request for 
temporary custody or availability, either upon his own 
motion or upon motion of the prisoner. 

“(b) Upon request of the officer’s written request as 
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate 
authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish 
the officer with a certificate stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the 
time already served, the time remaining to be served on 
the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time 
of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of 
the State parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said 
authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other 
officers and appropriate courts in the receiving State 
who has lodged detainers against the prisoner with 
similar certificates and with notices informing them of 
the request for custody or availability and of the rea- 
sons therefor. 

“(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by 
this article, trial shall be commenced within one 
hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner 
in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open 
court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 
necessary or reasonable continuance. 

“(d) Nothing contained in this article shall be con- 
strued to deprive any prisoner of any right which he 
may have to contest the legality of his delivery as 
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may 
not be opposed or denied on the ground that the execu- 

7a 

tive authority of the sending State has not affirmatively 
consented to or ordered such delivery. 

“(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, informa- 
tion, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the 
prisoner’s being returned to the original place of im- 
prisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indict- 
ment, information, or complaint shall not be of any 
further force or effect, and the court shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice. 

“ARTICLE V 

“(a) In response to a request made under article III 
or article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a 
sending State shall offer to deliver temporary custody 
of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the 
State where such indictment, information, or complaint 
is pending against such person in order that speedy and 
efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for 
final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of 
temporary custody shall accompany the written notice 
provided for in article III of this agreement. In the 
case of a Federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in 
the receiving State shall be entitled to temporary 
custody as provided by this agreement or to the pris- 
oner’s presence in Federal custody at the place of trial, 
whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by 
the custodian. 

“(b) The officer or other representative of a State 
accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present 
the following upon demand: 

“(1) Proper identification and evidence of his 
authority to act for the State into whose temporary 
custody this prisoner is to be given. 

8a 

“(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, infor- 
mation, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer 
has been lodged and on the basis of which the request 
for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 

“(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail 
to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the 
event that an action on the indictment, information, or 
complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been 
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided 
in article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate court 
of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or 
complaint has been pending shall enter an order 
dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer 
based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect. 

“(d) The temporary custody referred to in this 
agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting 
prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one 
or more untried indictments, informations, or com- 
plaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers 
or for prosecution on any other charge or charges 
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his 
attendance at court and while being transported to or 
from any place at which his presence may be required, 
the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other 
facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution. 

“(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with 
the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be 
returned to the sending State. 

“(f) During the continuance of temporary custody 
or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available 
for trial as required by this agreement, time being 
served on the sentence shall continue to run but good 
time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the 

9a 

extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction 
which imposed the sentence may allow. 

“(g) For all purposes other than that for which 
temporary custody as provided in this agreement is 
exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the 
custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending 
State and any escape from temporary custody may be 
dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the 
original place of imprisonment or in any other manner 
permitted by law. 

“(h) From the time that a party State receives 
custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until 
such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody 
of the sending State, the State in which the one or more 
untried indictments, informations, or complaints are 
pending or in which trial is being had shall be 
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs 
of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the 
prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern 
unless the States concerned shall have entered into a 
supplementary agreement providing for a different 
allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or 
among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to alter or affect any internal relationship 
among the departments, agencies, and officers of and in 
the government of a party State, or between a party 
State and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or 
responsibilities therefor. 

“ARTICLE VI 

“(a) In determining the duration and expiration 
dates of the time periods provided in articles III and IV 
of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall 
be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is 

10a 

unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having 
jurisdiction of the matter. 

“(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy 
made available by this agreement shall apply to any 
person who is adjudged to be mentally ill. 

“ARTICLE VII 

“Each State party to this agreement shall designate 
an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other 
party States, shall promulgate rules and regulations to 
carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of 
this agreement, and who shall provide, within and 
without the State, information necessary to the 
effective operation of this agreement. 

“ARTICLE VIII 

“This agreement shall enter into full force and effect 
as to a party State when such State has enacted the 
same into law. A State party to this agreement may 
withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the 
same. However, the withdrawal of any State shall not 
affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by 
inmates or by State officers at the time such with- 
drawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in 
respect thereof. 

“ARTICLE IX 

“This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to 
effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agree- 
ment shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, 
sentence, or provision of this agreement is declared to 
be contrary to the constitution of any party State or of 
the United States or the applicability thereof to any 
government, agency, person, or circumstance is held 
invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement 

11a 

and the applicability thereof to any government, 
agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected 
thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the 
constitution of any State party hereto, the agreement 
shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining 
States and in full force and effect as to the State 
affected as to all severable matters.” 

§ 3. Definition of term “Governor” for purposes of 

United States and District of Columbia 

The term “Governor” as used in the agreement on 
detainers shall mean with respect to the United States, 
the Attorney General, and with respect to the District 
of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia. 

§ 4. 

Definition of term “appropriate court” 

The term “appropriate court” as used in the agree- 
ment on detainers shall mean with respect to the 
United States, the courts of the United States, and with 
respect to the District of Columbia, the courts of the 
District of Columbia, in which indictments, informa- 
tions, or complaints, for which disposition is sought, are 
pending. 

§ 5. Enforcement and cooperation by courts, depart- 
ments, agencies, officers, and employees of United 
States and District of Columbia 

All courts, departments, agencies, officers, and 
employees of the United States and of the District of 
Columbia are hereby directed to enforce the agreement 
on detainers and to cooperate with one another and 
with all party States in enforcing the agreement and 
effectuating its purpose. 

12a 

§ 6. 

Regulations, forms, and instructions 

For the United States, the Attorney General, and for 
the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of 
Columbia, shall establish such regulations, prescribe 
such forms, issue such instructions, and perform such 
other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out the 
provisions of this Act. 

§ 7. 

Reservation of right to alter, amend, or repeal 

The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is 
expressly reserved. 

§ 8. Effective Date 

This Act shall take effect on the ninetieth day after 
the date of its enactment. 

§ 9. Special Provisions when United States is a Re- 
ceiving State 

Notwithstanding any provision of the agreement on 
detainers to the contrary, in a case in which the United 
States is a receiving State— 

(1) any order of a court dismissing any indict- 
ment, information, or complaint may be with or 
without prejudice. In determining whether to dis- 
miss the case with or without prejudice, the court 
shall consider, among others, each of the following 
factors: The seriousness of the offense; the facts and 
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; 
and the impact of a reprosecution on the admini- 
stration of the agreement on detainers and on the 
administration of justice; and 

(2) it shall not be a violation of the agreement 
on detainers if prior to trial the prisoner is returned 

13a 

to the custody of the sending State pursuant to an 
order of the appropriate court issued after reason- 
able notice to the prisoner and the United States 
and an opportunity for a hearing. 

4. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 provides: 

Rule 52. 

Harmless Error and Plain Error 

(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity 
or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded. 

(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court. 

5. Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 45 pro- 
vides: 

Rule 45. Error without injury. 

No judgment may be reversed or set aside, nor 
new trial granted in any civil or criminal case on the 
ground of misdirection of the jury, the giving or 
refusal of special charges or the improper admission 
or rejection of evidence, nor for error as to any 
matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or 
application is made, after an examination of the 
entire cause, it should appear that the error com- 
plained of has probably injuriously affected sub- 
stantial rights of the parties.