No. 99-1964 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

TIMOTHY BOOTH, PETITIONER 

v. 

C.O. CHURNER, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS 

SETH P. WAXMAN 

Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 

DAVID W. OGDEN 

Assistant Attorney General 

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD 

Deputy Solicitor General 

IRVING L. GORNSTEIN 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

BARBARA L. HERWIG 
PETER R. MAIER 

Attorneys 

Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
(202) 514-2217 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether the exhaustion provision of the Prison Liti- 
gation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 
1998), requires an inmate seeking money damages to 
exhaust prison administrative remedies that address 
the problem identified by the inmate, but do not permit 
the recovery of money damages. 

(I) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Interest of the United States ...................................................... 
1 

Statement ........................................................................................ 2 

Summary of argument .................................................................. 
6 

Argument: 

Section 1997e(a) requires an inmate to exhaust 

available administrative remedies, without regard 

to whether the administrative process permits the 

recovery of the relief that the inmate seeks in the 

judicial action ......................................................................... 

10 

A. The text of the Act requires exhaustion of 

administrative remedies without regard to 

whether the administrative process offers the 

form of relief sought by the inmate ......................... 

11 

B. The PLRA’s special exhaustion requirement 

advances Congress’s intent to deter the filing 

of frivolous complaints ............................................... 

18 

C. The PLRA’s special exhaustion requirement 

is also supported by other considerations 

that have particular force in the prison 

setting ........................................................................... 20 

D. Petitioner’s remaining contentions are 

unpersuasive ................................................................ 24 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 27 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 

1998) ......................................................................................... 16 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) .................................... 

21 

Central Bank of Denver, N.A. 
v. First Interstate 

Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) ...................... 26 

(III) 

IV 

Cases—Continued: Page 

Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 

489 U.S. 561 (1989) ................................................................ 

16 

McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) .................... 

7, 13, 

14, 15, 17 

Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2000) ...................... 

5, 6, 

12, 20, 25 

Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 182 F.3d 
532 (7th Cir. 1999) .................................................................. 

20 

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) ...................... 

21 

Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993) ................................. 

16 

Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 

155 (1993) ................................................................................. 

14 

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Army 

Corps of Engineers, No. 99-1178 (Jan. 9, 2001) ............... 

26 

Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 

(1944) ........................................................................................ 

16, 24 

Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) ........................... 

17 

Statutes and regulations: 

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 

42 U.S.C. 1997a(c)................................................................... 

17 

42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (1994) .............................. 

7, 8, 13, 14, 15 

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: 

28 U.S.C. 1915(g) (Supp. IV 1998) ................................. 

8, 20 

28 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998) .......................... 

passim 

28 C.F.R. Pt. 542 ....................................................................... 

13 

Sections 542.10 et seq. ........................................................... 

1 

Miscellaneous: 

BOP Program Statement 1330.13(6)(b)(1) (Dec. 22, 

1995) ......................................................................................... 13 

141 Cong. Rec. (1995): 

p. 4275 ...................................................................................... 

17 

p. 14,571 ................................................................................... 17 

V 

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page 

p. 14,573 ............................................................................... 17 

p. 27,042 ............................................................................... 18 

p. 35,623 ............................................................................... 18 

pp. 35,623-35,624 .................................................................. 

26 

p. 35,624 ............................................................................... 19 

65 Fed. Reg. 39,768 (2000) ....................................................... 

13 

H.R. 2468, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) ............................... 

26 

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 378, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 

(1995) ........................................................................................ 17 

H.R. Rep. No. 21, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) .................. 

17, 19 

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1993) ...................... 11 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 99-1964 

TIMOTHY BOOTH, PETITIONER 

v. 

C.O. CHURNER, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS 

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 

This case presents the question whether the exhaus- 
tion provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998), re- 
quires an inmate seeking money damages to exhaust 
prison administrative remedies that address the pro- 
blem identified by the inmate, but do not permit the 
recovery of money damages. The United States has a 
substantial interest in the resolution of that question. 
Pursuant to its authority to manage federal prisons, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has adopted an 
administrative remedy program through which inmates 
may seek review of issues relating to their confinement. 
See 28 C.F.R. 542.10 et seq. That remedy program does 

(1) 

2 

not permit the recovery of money damages. Inmates 
also frequently name BOP officials as defendants in 
actions arising from conditions of confinement in federal 
correctional institutions. The court’s decision in this 
case will affect both the efficacy of BOP’s administra- 
tive remedy program and the conduct of litigation 
against BOP officials. 

STATEMENT 

1. a. At the time of the events in question, petitioner 
was confined at the State Correctional Institution at 
Smithfield Bradford Pennsylvania (SCI Smithfield) in 
Huntington, Pennsylvania. In April 1997, petitioner 
filed suit in federal district court against four prison 
officials (respondents), complaining about his treatment 
at SCI Smithfield. In his original pleading, petitioner 
focused on four incidents that allegedly occurred at SCI 
Smithfield. J.A. 15-16. 

First, petitioner alleged that, in April 1996, he was 
assaulted by two prison guards, causing his shoulder to 
slip in and out, and that he was subsequently denied an 
operation to repair his shoulder. J.A. 15. Second, pet- 
itioner alleged that, on February 6, 1997, he threw 
water on a prison guard, and the guard retaliated by 
throwing a cup of cleaning material in his face. Ibid. 
Third, petitioner alleged that, on February 7, 1997, he 
exchanged words with respondent Rikus, who then 
shoved him into a shelf in the storage room. Another 
officer allegedly pushed petitioner into the door, and 
still another officer tightened and twisted his handcuffs. 
J.A. 15-16. Fourth, petitioner alleged that, on March 
23, 1997, respondent Churner punched him in the face 
while respondent Workensher and another officer 
looked on. J.A. 16. As a result, petitioner’s mouth was 

3 

allegedly “busted open” and required three stitches. 
Ibid. 

In subsequent pleadings, petitioner added additional 
claims. He alleged that prison officials interfered with 
his ingoing and outgoing mail, J.A. 19, prevented him 
from using the library or obtaining access to legal 
assistance, J.A. 19, 22, denied him food, J.A. 22, denied 
him due process in a misconduct hearing, J.A. 23, and 
put a sign on his door stating that he was a “cry baby.” 
Ibid. 

In his original pleading, petitioner requested that the 
court transfer him to another prison and punish each of 
the officers involved in the alleged assaults. J.A. 9, 16. 
In a subsequent pleading, petitioner sought an injunc- 
tion against further beatings, an order to obtain an 
operation, the appointment of counsel, money damages 
in various amounts, a permanent transfer, an order to 
permit inmates in segregation to use the law library, an 
order holding prison officials in contempt, and an order 
to hire a paralegal. J.A. 26-27. 

b. The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has 
a grievance system “through which resolution of spe- 
cific problems can be sought.” J.A. 40. Under that sys- 
tem, an inmate may submit a formal written complaint 
related to a problem encountered during the course of 
confinement. J.A. 41. The complaint must be sub- 
mitted for initial review within fifteen days of the 
events giving rise to the complaint. J.A. 46. The com- 
plaint is then referred to a Grievance Officer for 
investigation and resolution. J.A. 47. An inmate who 
has requested a personal interview “shall be inter- 
viewed.” Ibid. Within ten working days after the 
Grievance Officer receives the complaint, “the grievant 
shall be provided a written response to the grievance to 
include a brief rationale, summarizing the conclusions 

4 

and any action taken or recommended to resolve the 
issues raised in the grievance.” Ibid. 

An inmate may appeal the initial determination to an 
intermediate reviewing authority. J.A. 47. Such an 
appeal must be filed within five days from the date on 
which the inmate receives the initial decision. J.A. 47- 

48. Within ten working days after receiving the appeal, 
the intermediate reviewing authority must notify the 
inmate of his or her decision and supply a brief 
explanation of the basis for it. J.A. 48. 

Within seven days after receiving a decision from the 
reviewing authority, an inmate may file a final appeal. 
J.A. 48-49. The final reviewing authority may require 
additional investigation before deciding that appeal. 
J.A. 49. The final reviewing authority has 21 days to 
issue its decision, and the decision must include a brief 
statement of reasons. J.A. 49-50. At the time that peti- 
tioner filed his complaint, the State’s grievance pro- 
gram addressed complaints about the use of excessive 
force, but it did not permit the recovery of money 
damages. The State has since amended its grievance 
policy to permit the recovery of money damages. J.A. 

60. 

c. The PLRA contains a provision that requires an 
inmate to exhaust available administrative remedies 
before filing suit. That provision specifies that “[n]o 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal 
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility until such administrative remedies 
as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) 
(Supp. IV 1998). 

Before filing suit in district court, petitioner had filed 
an initial administrative grievance relating to at least 
some of the issues raised in his district court pleadings. 

5 

J.A. 10-13. Petitioner did not seek intermediate or final 
review, however, on any issue contained in his district 
court pleadings. Pet. App. 6a n.2. The district court, 
acting sua sponte, dismissed petitioner’s action without 
prejudice, on the ground that petitioner had failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies as required by Section 
1997e(a). Id. at 36a-39a. 

2. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1a-28a. 
The court rejected petitioner’s argument that exhaus- 
tion of administrative remedies was not required be- 
cause the prison’s administrative process did not permit 
the recovery of money damages. Id. at 3a. The court of 
appeals relied on its holding in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 
F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000), that the PLRA makes the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies mandatory 
“whether or not they provide the inmate-plaintiff with 
the relief he says he desires in his federal action.” Pet. 
App. 3a. 

In Nyhuis, the court based its interpretation on the 
change in the statutory language of Section 1997e(a) 
effected by the PLRA. 204 F.3d at 72. As explained in 
Nyhuis, before enactment of the PLRA, a plaintiff 
could be required to exhaust such “plain, speedy, and 
effective remedies as are available.” Id. at 70. The 
PLRA removed the qualifiers “plain, speedy, and effec- 
tive.” Id. at 72. The effect of that change, the Nyhuis 
court concluded, is that an inmate must now exhaust 
available prison remedies, without regard to whether 
they are “effective.” Ibid. 

The court in Nyhuis rejected the view that the term 
“available” in the new provision creates a futility 
exception to exhaustion. 204 F.3d at 72-73. The court 
explained that such an interpretation would reintro- 
duce the very inquiry into the effectiveness of admin- 
istrative remedies that Congress had deliberately elimi- 

6 

nated. Ibid. By using the term “available,” the court of 
appeals concluded, “Congress merely meant to convey 
that if a prison provided no internal remedies, exhaus- 
tion would not be required.” Id. at 73. 

The court in Nyhuis also emphasized that a principal 
purpose of the new exhaustion requirement was to 
reduce the volume of frivolous prison litigation in fed- 
eral courts. 204 F.3d at 73-74. That purpose would be 
thwarted, the court explained, if inmates could avoid 
the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for money 
damages. Id. at 74. The court also stressed that a 
broad exhaustion requirement would give a prison 
institution a chance to correct its own errors, reduce 
the need for judicial intervention, and improve the 
efficacy of the administrative process. Id. at 75. 

The court of appeals in this case noted that Nyhuis 
involved a claim brought by a federal inmate, rather 
than a claim brought by a state inmate like petitioner. 
Pet. App. 3a. Since the PLRA treats a Bivens action 
and an action under Section 1983 as “functional 
equivalents,” however, the court viewed the decision in 
Nyhuis as “controlling in this case.” Ibid.1 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

A. The PLRA conditions its exhaustion requirement 
on the existence of administrative “remedies” that are 
“available.” 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998). Under 
the ordinary meaning of those terms, Section 1997e(a) 
requires an inmate to exhaust administrative remedies 
as long as the administrative process will address the 
kind of problem identified by the inmate’s complaint. 

1 The court of appeals also held that a suit alleging that a prison 
guard has used excessive force is an “action . . . with respect to 
prison conditions” within the meaning of Section 1997a(e). Pet. 
App. 8a-19a. That holding is not at issue here. 

7 

Exhaustion is not excused simply because the admin- 
istrative process does not permit an inmate to recover 
the relief that the inmate would like. 

Thus, if a prison administrative process does not 
review complaints about excessive force, “administra- 
tive remedies” would not be “available” for that kind of 
complaint. If the grievance procedure addresses com- 
plaints about excessive force, however, the absence of a 
damages remedy would not show that administrative 
remedies for that kind of complaint are unavailable. A 
prison grievance procedure can offer other “remedies” 
for complaints about excessive force, such as disciplin- 
ing the officer involved, retraining the officer, transfer- 
ring the inmate involved to a different area of the 
prison, or issuing a decision that the inmate’s complaint 
is meritorious and the guard’s conduct should not be 
repeated. In such circumstances, the institution would 
have “administrative remedies” that are “available” to 
inmates who wish to complain about a guard’s use of 
excessive force, and the inmate would be required to 
exhaust the prison’s grievance process before filing a 
suit challenging a guard’s use of excessive force. 

The PLRA’s broad and categorical exhaustion re- 
quirement reflects a deliberate change from the ex- 
haustion requirement in prior legislation. Before Sec- 
tion 1997e(a) was amended by the PLRA, a court had 
discretion to require a state inmate to exhaust “such 
plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as 
are available.” 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (1994). In McCarthy 

v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150 (1992), this Court con- 
strued the term “effective” in Section 1997e(a) to 
excuse exhaustion when an inmate seeks only money 
damages and the prison’s grievance procedure does not 
offer such relief. In that legal context, Congress’s 
elimination of the term “effective” from Section 

8 

1997e(a) can have only one meaning: Congress was 
dissatisfied with the outcome in McCarthy, and it 
wished to require exhaustion of available administra- 
tive remedies, even when an inmate seeks only mone- 
tary relief and the administrative process does not offer 
such relief. 

In addition to eliminating the term “effective” from 
Section 1997e(a), Congress also (1) eliminated the terms 
plain and speedy, (2) eliminated the requirement that 
administrative procedures must satisfy certain mini- 
mum acceptable standards of fairness and effectiveness 
before inmates can be required to exhaust them, and (3) 
eliminated a court’s discretion to excuse exhaustion 
when it would not be appropriate and in the interests of 
justice. Those dramatic changes in Section 1997e(a) 
reflect one overriding theme: Congress no longer 
wanted its statutory exhaustion requirement to track 
the traditional exhaustion doctrine under which courts 
have discretion to excuse exhaustion when they con- 
clude that an administrative remedy is inadequate. In 
its place, Congress substituted a broad mandatory 
exhaustion requirement. 

B. In imposing a strict exhaustion requirement, Con- 
gress was animated in large part by a desire to arrest 
the alarming upward trend in the volume of frivolous 
prison litigation. Inmates who diligently pursue their 
claims through a prison’s entire administrative process 
are far less likely to pursue a frivolous claim in court 
than inmates who deliberately bypass the administra- 
tive process or neglect to observe the applicable admin- 
istrative deadlines for filing complaints and pursuing 
administrative appeals. The exhaustion provision also 
works in tandem with the “three strikes” provision of 
the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) (Supp. IV 1998), which 
precludes inmates from bringing suits in forma 

9 

pauperis after they have had three or more cases 
dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a 
claim. After an administrative claim has been rejected 
as insubstantial, an inmate may well refrain from filing 
suit in court on that claim when the consequence may 
be a loss of in forma pauperis status for other, more 
meritorious, complaints. 

Because Congress viewed an exhaustion requirement 
as an important means of reducing the volume of 
frivolous prison litigation, it understandably wanted to 
eliminate the exception to exhaustion that this Court 
had recognized in McCarthy. If Congress had carried 
that exception forward, inmates would have been able 
to evade the exhaustion requirement through the 
simple expedient of limiting their complaints to re- 
quests for money damages, and Congress’s purpose of 
deterring frivolous lawsuits would have been under- 
mined. 

C. Other considerations that have particular force in 
the prison setting also help to explain why Congress 
imposed a broad mandatory exhaustion requirement on 
inmates. Such a requirement gives prison authorities 
an opportunity to investigate and evaluate prisoner 
complaints in the first instance. It helps to ensure that 
inmates bring dangerous conditions or abusive prac- 
tices to the attention of responsible prison officials 
quickly, so that prison officials can take corrective 
action before the problem becomes even more serious. 
The airing of a grievance in a less adversarial setting 
can help to reduce tensions that might otherwise exist. 
In some cases, an inmate’s complaint can be resolved in 
the grievance process even when the inmate seeks only 
money damages. And even when a complaint is not 
resolved, exhaustion can lead to a fuller understanding 
of the nature of the inmate’s complaint. 

10 

ARGUMENT 

SECTION 1997e(a) REQUIRES AN INMATE TO 
EXHAUST AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REME- 
DIES, WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETHER THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS PERMITS THE 
RECOVERY OF THE RELIEF THAT THE INMATE 
SEEKS IN THE JUDICIAL ACTION 

Petitioner contends (Br. 12-13) that the PLRA’s ex- 
haustion provision, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998), 
does not require an inmate to exhaust administrative 
remedies when the inmate seeks only monetary relief 
and the grievance procedure does not offer such relief. 
In addition to seeking monetary relief, however, peti- 
tioner sought various other forms of relief in the dis- 
trict court, J.A. 9, 16, and the administrative grievance 
procedure could have provided at least some of those 
forms of relief. The question presented by petitioner’s 
complaint is therefore whether exhaustion is required 
when an inmate seeks monetary and other relief and 
the administrative grievance process does not provide 
all the relief that the inmate seeks.2 

For purposes of the analysis we present here, how- 
ever, it does not matter whether an inmate seeks only 
money damages or money damages and other forms of 
relief. As the court of appeals concluded, the PLRA’s 

2 Petitioner contends (Br. 12) that his claims for relief other 
than money damages became moot when he was transferred to 
another institution. The transfer did not moot all petitioner’s re- 
quests for relief. J.A. 26-27 (seeking, inter alia, an order to obtain 
an operation). In any event, the text of the PLRA’s exhaustion 
provision specifies that “no action shall be brought” unless admin- 
istrative remedies have been exhausted. 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. 
IV 1998). The requirement of exhaustion therefore depends on the 
circumstances that exist at the time that an inmate files a com- 
plaint, not on what transpires thereafter. 

11 

exhaustion provision requires an inmate to exhaust 
administrative remedies as long as the administrative 
process will address the kind of problem identified by 
the inmate’s complaint. Exhaustion is not excused 
simply because the administrative process does not 
permit an inmate to recover the relief that the inmate 
would like. Thus, when an administrative process will 
address the kind of problem identified by the inmate’s 
complaint, exhaustion is required even when the inmate 
seeks only money damages and the prison grievance 
procedure does not offer such relief. Under that same 
analysis, an inmate seeking money and other relief 
would also have to exhaust available administrative 
remedies. 

A. The Text Of The Act Requires Exhaustion Of Admin- 
istrative Remedies Without Regard To Whether The 

Administrative Process Offers The Form Of Relief 

Sought By The Inmate 

1. The text of the PLRA exhaustion provision sup- 
ports the court of appeals’ interpretation. That stat- 
utory text conditions the requirement of exhaustion on 
the existence of administrative “remedies” that are 
“available.” 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998). The 
term “remedy” means “the legal means to recover a 
right or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong,” Web- 
ster’s Third New International Dictionary 1920 (1993), 
and “available” means “capable of use for the accom- 
plishment of a purpose,” id. at 150. 

Under those definitions, “administrative remedies” 
are “available” when the prison grievance procedure 
provides a “means” to “obtain redress” for the kind of 
“wrong” identified by the inmate, and the administra- 
tive procedure is “capable of use” by the inmate “for the 
accomplishment of [that] purpose.” As the court of 

12 

appeals explained in Nyhuis, “the administrative pro- 
cess * * * must be capable of addressing the events 
that could generate a lawsuit.” 204 F.3d at 75 n.9. Con- 
trary to petitioner’s contention (Br. 15-16), however, 
those definitions do not suggest that administrative 
remedies are unavailable simply because the admin- 
istrative process does not offer to redress the kind of 
wrong identified by the inmate in the manner that the 
inmate desires. 

An example helps to illuminate the distinction. If a 
prison administrative process does not review com- 
plaints about excessive force, “administrative reme- 
dies” would not be “available” for that kind of complaint 
since the grievance process would not be “capable of 
use” by an inmate to “obtain redress” for the “wrong” 
of excessive force. If the grievance procedure ad- 
dresses complaints about excessive force, however, the 
absence of a damages remedy would not show that 
administrative remedies for that wrong are unavailable. 
A prison grievance procedure can offer other forms of 
“redress” for the “wrong” of excessive force, such as 
disciplining the officer involved, retraining the officer, 
transferring the inmate involved to a different area of 
the prison, or issuing a decision that the inmate’s 
complaint is meritorious and the guard’s conduct should 
not be repeated. In such circumstances, the institution 
would have “administrative remedies” that are “avail- 
able” to inmates who wish to complain about a guard’s 
use of excessive force, and the inmate would be 
required to exhaust the prison’s grievance process 
before filing a suit challenging a guard’s use of exces- 
sive force.3 

3 Under the regulations that currently govern the Bureau of 
Prison’s Administrative Remedy Program, institutions have dis- 

13 

2. The PLRA’s broad and categorical exhaustion 
requirement reflects a deliberate change from the 
exhaustion requirement that had been imposed on 
inmates by prior legislation. Before Section 1997e(a) 
was amended by the PLRA, a court had discretion to 
require a state inmate to exhaust “such plain, speedy, 
and effective administrative remedies as are available.” 
42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (1994). In McCarthy v. Madigan, 
503 U.S. 140 (1992), this Court construed that statutory 
language in the context of a case in which a federal 
inmate sought only money damages against federal 
prison officials, and the Bureau of Prison’s administra- 
tive procedure did not offer that form of relief. 
Although Section 1997e(a) did not then apply to suits 
brought against federal officials, the government ar- 
gued that the Court should create an analogous 
exhaustion requirement for Bivens actions. Id. at 149- 
150. The Court concluded that Section 1997e(a) “cut 
against” the government’s argument that exhaustion 
should be required when an inmate seeks only mone- 
tary relief and the grievance procedure does not offer 
that form of relief. Id. at 150. In reaching that 

cretion not to consider a prison grievance when “it is clear that the 
only possible relief is monetary.” BOP Program Statement 
1330.13(6)(b)(1) (Dec. 22, 1995). Under those regulations, Section 
1997e(a) requires exhaustion of money-only claims because prison 
officials may process a complaint seeking money damages based on 
the possibility that other relief could be awarded. In those circum- 
stances, the BOP has “remedies available” for inmates who seek 
only money damages. If BOP returns a grievance seeking money 
damages without processing it on the ground that no other relief is 
possible, the inmate would have exhausted administrative rem- 
edies. BOP has recently proposed new regulations that would 
require officials to consider the substance of an inmate’s grievance 
without regard to the specific form of relief sought by the inmate. 
See 65 Fed. Reg. 39,768 (2000) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 542). 

14 

conclusion, the Court relied on the language in Section 
1997e(a) that made an “effective” administrative 
remedy a precondition to exhaustion. Ibid. The Court 
specifically explained that, “in contrast to the absence 
of any provision for the award of money damages under 
the Bureau’s general grievance procedure, the statute 
conditions exhaustion on the existence of ‘effective 
administrative remedies.’ ” Ibid. Three Justices con- 
curring in the judgment agreed with the Court that “in 
cases * * * where prisoners seek monetary relief, the 
Bureau’s administrative remedy furnishes no effective 
remedy.” Id. at 156 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, 
J. and Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (empha- 
sis added). 

Thus, at the time that Congress enacted the PLRA, 
it understood that, under McCarthy, the term “effec- 
tive” in Section 1997e(a) excused a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies when an inmate sought only 
monetary relief and the administrative process did not 
offer such relief. In that legal context, Congress’s 
elimination of the term “effective” from Section 
1997e(a) can have only one meaning: Congress was 
dissatisfied with the outcome in McCarthy, and it 
wished to require exhaustion of available administra- 
tive remedies, even when an inmate seeks only mone- 
tary relief and the administrative process does not offer 
such relief. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 
U.S. 155, 174-176 (1993). 

Petitioner contends (Br. 37-38) that Congress’s elimi- 
nation of the term “effective” from Section 1997e(a) 
affected only “the procedural aspects of the administra- 
tive remedy, whereas, in contrast, Congress intended 
the words ‘such administrative remedies as are 
available’—the words it preserved—to refer to the sub- 
stantive aspect of whether the remedy could provide 

15 

the relief sought.” But, as discussed above, McCarthy 
identified the term “effective” as the basis for declining 
to require exhaustion when the administrative remedy 
does not provide the relief sought, and Congress elimi- 
nated that term based on that understanding. Peti- 
tioner’s explanation for the removal of the term 
“effective” simply ignores the decision in McCarthy and 
Congress’s response to it. 

3. The other changes in Section 1997e(a) reinforce 
the conclusion that Congress amended Section 1997e(a) 
for the express purpose of eliminating the exception to 
exhaustion proposed by petitioner. In addition to 
eliminating the term “effective” from Section 1997e(a), 
Congress also (1) eliminated the terms “plain” and 
“speedy,” (2) eliminated the requirement that admini- 
strative procedures must satisfy certain “minimum 
acceptable standards” of fairness and effectiveness 
before inmates can be required to exhaust them, and (3) 
eliminated a court’s discretion to excuse exhaustion 
when it would not be “appropriate and in the interests 
of justice.” Compare 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998) 
with 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (1994). In place of the previous 
version of Section 1997e(a), Congress substituted a 
broad and firm mandate that “[n]o action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions” by an inmate 
“until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998). 

The dramatic changes in Section 1997e(a) effected by 
the PLRA reflect one overriding theme: Congress no 
longer wanted its statutory exhaustion requirement to 
track the traditional exhaustion doctrine under which 
courts have discretion to excuse exhaustion when they 
conclude that an administrative remedy is inadequate. 
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146-149 (discussing the scope of 
that traditional doctrine). Under the traditional ex- 

16 

haustion doctrine, in the absence of a statutory direc- 
tion to the contrary, courts exercise discretion to ex- 
cuse exhaustion in a variety of circumstances, including 
when the administrative process does not establish an 
adequate time-frame for administrative action, Coit 
Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 
587 (1989), when the agency does not have the 
authority to grant the relief that is requested, Reiter v. 
Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993), and when an agency’s 
prior pronouncements demonstrate that exhaustion 
would be futile, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 
323 U.S. 192, 205-206 (1944). When Congress excised 
the terms “plain, speedy, and effective,” eliminated the 
requirement that the administrative process satisfy 
“minimum acceptable standards” of fairness and effec- 
tiveness before an inmate can be required to exhaust, 
and eliminated a court’s discretion to dispense with 
exhaustion when “appropriate and in the interests of 
justice,” it decisively rejected the traditional approach. 
As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Alexander v. 
Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 (1998), “the judicially recog- 
nized futility and inadequacy exceptions do not survive 
the new mandatory exhaustion requirement of the 
PLRA.” Instead, “Congress now has mandated ex- 
haustion in section 1997e(a),” and “courts cannot simply 
waive those requirements where they determine they 
are futile or inadequate.” Id. at 1325-1326. 

Petitioner nonetheless contends (Br. 23-27) that 
traditional exhaustion principles should be engrafted 
onto Section 1997e(a) based on a “presumption” that 
Congress intends to carry forward “traditional legal 
concepts.” Because Congress’s amendments to Section 
1997e(a) so clearly demonstrate that Congress did not 
wish to incorporate traditional exhaustion principles, 
however, petitioner’s reliance on such a presumption is 

17 

misplaced. Instead, the principle that is controlling here 
is that “[w]here Congress specifically mandates, ex- 
haustion is required.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144. As 
the Court explained in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 
749, 766 (1975), when exhaustion is statutorily man- 
dated as a precondition to suit, “[t]he requirement 

* * * may not be dispensed with merely by a judicial 
conclusion of futility.” 

4. In sum, as the text of the Act makes clear, an 
inmate must exhaust available administrative remedies 
even when a grievance procedure does not provide the 
remedy that the inmate seeks. As long as the grievance 
process addresses the kind of problem identified by the 
inmate, exhaustion is mandatory.4 

4 All of the legislative history, including the one statement 
identified by petitioner, is consistent with that interpretation. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 378, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. 166 (1995) (“Sec- 
tion 803 amends the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1997a(c)) to require that administrative remedies be ex- 
hausted prior to any prison conditions action being brought under 
any federal law by an inmate in federal court.”); H.R. Rep. No. 21, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1995) (The exhaustion provision “requires 
that all administrative remedies be exhausted prior to a prisoner 
initiating a civil rights action in court.”); 141 Cong. Rec. 4275 (1995) 
(Rep. Canady) (“Title II of the bill will * * * forc[e] prisoners to 
exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing suit in Federal 
court.”); id. at 14,571 (Sen. Dole) (“The act also requires State 
prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a 
lawsuit in Federal court.”); id. at 14,573 (Sen. Kyl) (“Section 7 will 
make the exhaustion of administrative remedies mandatory. Many 
prisoner cases seek relief for matters that are relatively minor and 
for which the prison grievance system would provide an adequate 
remedy.”). 

18 

B. The PLRA’s Special Exhaustion Requirement Advances 

Congress’s Intent To Deter The Filing Of Frivolous 

Complaints 

In imposing a strict exhaustion requirement, Con- 
gress was animated in large part by a desire to arrest 
the alarming upward trend in the volume of frivolous 
prison litigation. Congress was deeply concerned that 
inmates were overwhelming the courts with frivolous 
complaints. As one supporter of the PLRA explained, 
Congress was faced with a “flood of frivolous lawsuits 
brought by inmates. In 1994, over 39,000 lawsuits were 
filed by inmates in Federal courts, a staggering 15 per- 
cent over the number filed the previous year. The vast 
majority of these suits are completely without merit.” 
141 Cong. Rec. 27,042 (1995) (Sen. Hatch). 

Congress believed that one important reason that 
frivolous prisoner litigation was increasing was that 
this Court in McCarthy had excused inmates from 
exhausting administrative remedies when they sought 
only money damages. As one member of Congress 
explained: 

The real problem with these cases came with the 
Court’s decision in 1992 that an inmate need not 
exhaust the administrative remedies available prior 
to proceeding with a Bivens action for money 
damages only. * * * Since 1993 there has been a 
total of 1,365 new Bivens cases filed in Federal court 
tying up the time of Federal judges and lawyers for 
the Bureau of Prisons at a time when we already 
have overcrowded dockets. 

141 Cong. Rec. at 35,623 (Rep. LoBiondo). By “forcing 
prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies before 
bringing suit in Federal court,” Congress sought to 
“significantly curtail the ability of prisoners to bring 

19 

frivolous and malicious lawsuits.” Id. at 35,624 (Rep. 
Canady); ibid. (Rep. LoBiondo) (an exhaustion require- 
ment “would aid in deterring frivolous claims”); see also 
H.R. Rep. No. 21, supra, at 7 (“The title addresses the 
problem of frivolous lawsuits in three significant ways. 
First, it requires that all administrative remedies be 
exhausted prior to a prisoner initiating a civil rights 
action in court.”). 

Congress’s judgment that exhaustion would reduce 
the volume of frivolous prison litigation is supported by 
the special features of prison grievance procedures. 
Prison administrative procedures ordinarily require 
inmates to file their grievances within a short time 
after the incident giving rise to the complaint; inmates 
also must observe strict deadlines for processing 
appeals; and inmates who deliberately abuse a prison’s 
grievance process may be subject to disciplinary action. 
J.A. 44-48. In light of those features of prison grievance 
procedures, inmates who diligently pursue their claims 
through a prison’s entire administrative process are far 
less likely to pursue a frivolous claim in court than 
inmates who deliberately bypass the administrative 
process or neglect to observe the applicable administra- 
tive deadlines. See 141 Cong. Rec. at 35,624 (Rep. 
LoBiondo) (An exhaustion requirement “would aid in 
deterring frivolous claims: by raising the cost, in time/ 
money terms, of pursuing a Bivens action, only those 
claims with a greater probability/magnitude of success 
would, presumably, proceed.”). 

A requirement of administrative exhaustion helps to 
reduce the volume of frivolous litigation for a second 
reason. When an inmate receives an administrative 
response rejecting a claim and explaining the reasons 
why, J.A. 47, the inmate may well be persuaded that 
the claim lacks sufficient merit to pursue in court. In 

20 

that respect, the exhaustion provision works in tandem 
with the “three strikes” provision of the PLRA, 28 
U.S.C. 1915(g) (Supp. IV 1998), to deter the filing of 
frivolous complaints. The “three strikes” provision pre- 
cludes inmates from bringing suits in forma pauperis 
after they have had three or more cases dismissed as 
frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. 
28 U.S.C. 1915(g) (Supp. IV 1998). After an administra- 
tive claim has been rejected as insubstantial, an inmate 
may well refrain from filing suit in court on that claim 
when the consequence may be a loss of in forma 
pauperis status for other, more meritorious, com- 
plaints. 

Because Congress viewed an exhaustion requirement 
as an important means of reducing the volume of 
frivolous prison litigation, it understandably wanted to 
eliminate the exception to exhaustion that this Court 
had recognized in McCarthy. As the Third Circuit 
explained in Nyhuis, if Congress had carried that 
exception forward, inmates would have been able “to 
evade the exhaustion requirement, merely by limiting 
their complaints to requests for money damages,” and 
Congress’s purpose of deterring frivolous lawsuits 
would have been “undermined.” 204 F.3d at 74. The 
Seventh Circuit similarly has explained that “Section 
1997e would not be worth much if prisoners could evade 
it simply by asking for relief that the administrative 
process is unable to provide.” Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t 
of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 537 (1999). 

C. The PLRA’s Special Exhaustion Requirement Is Also 

Supported By Other Considerations That Have Par- 
ticular Force In The Prison Setting 

1. Other considerations that have particular force in 
the prison setting also help to explain why Congress 

21 

imposed a broad mandatory exhaustion requirement on 
inmates. First, prison authorities are in the best 
position to investigate and evaluate prisoner complaints 
in the first instance and to decide what corrective 
action, if any, to take. Courts are “ill suited to act as 
the front-line agencies for the consideration and resolu- 
tion of the infinite variety of prisoner complaints.” 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 n.9 (1974). 
The proper response to prison grievances falls squarely 
within the expertise of prison officials, and, in general, 
courts owe deference to the solutions chosen by those 
officials. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 n.29 (1979). 
Thus, it is appropriate for courts to exercise jurisdiction 
only after prison officials have had the opportunity to 
address the problem raised by an inmate’s complaint. 

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies helps 
to ensure that inmates bring dangerous conditions or 
abusive practices to the attention of responsible prison 
officials quickly, so that prison officials can take correc- 
tive action before the problem becomes even more 
serious. An inmate who has been abused by a prison 
guard may only be interested in money damages or 
some other remedy that the institution does not offer. 
But the institution has an overriding interest in 
learning about that incident quickly so that it can make 
sure that the guard does not abuse that inmate or any 
other inmate again. The PLRA’s exhaustion require- 
ment promotes that interest. 

Third, a prison grievance process has the potential to 
be a far less adversarial and far more cooperative 
means for resolving inmate complaints than litigation in 
federal court. When inmates can bypass the admin- 
istrative process and immediately name their guards as 
defendants in lawsuits, it can needlessly exacerbate the 
tensions that exist in a prison. Even when the inmate 

22 

is only interested in a remedy that the institution does 
not offer, airing the grievance in a less adversarial 
setting can help to reduce the tensions that might 
otherwise exist. 

Fourth, in some cases in which inmates seek a 
remedy that the grievance process does not offer, ex- 
haustion of that grievance process can still lead to a 
resolution of the complaint. Sometimes, the opportu- 
nity to air a grievance and to receive a response may 
turn out to be all that the inmate really wanted. 
Sometimes the institution may take corrective action 
that satisfies the inmate, even if it is not the action that 
the inmate would have preferred. And, as noted above, 
sometimes the administrative rejection of a claim may 
persuade the inmate that the claim is not worth 
pursuing in court. 

Finally, when exhaustion of the administrative pro- 
cess does not lead to a resolution of the complaint, it 
nonetheless can lead to the development of a factual 
record and a fuller understanding of the nature of the 
inmate’s complaint. In general, complaints filed by 
inmates in court are notoriously difficult to decipher. 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies may help 
inmates to make their complaints more understandable. 
Even if exhaustion does not have that effect, the 
administrative record may help the court to understand 
the nature of the inmate’s complaint. The administra- 
tive process may also put the government in a much 
better position to move for summary judgment based 
on qualified immunity or on other grounds and to avert 
the extraordinary costs of discovery that may arise 
when an inmate is free to question prison officials. 
Congress thus had numerous reasons to require an 
inmate to exhaust available administrative remedies 

23 

without regard to whether the administrative process 
offers the precise remedy that the inmate seeks. 

2. Petitioner contends (Br. 27-34) that exhaustion 
should not be required when an inmate seeks only 
monetary relief because the burden of exhaustion in 
that context outweighs its benefits. For the most part, 
however, petitioner either ignores the benefits that we 
have identified or asserts without support that those 
benefits do not arise when an inmate seeks only money 
damages. Petitioner’s evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of exhaustion therefore greatly understates 
the benefits. 

Nor is petitioner correct in asserting (Br. 29, 32) that 
an institution waives the important interests in ex- 
haustion we have identified by failing to offer monetary 
relief. The question whether to offer money damages 
as a component of a prison grievance procedure raises 
fundamental policy questions that must be initially 
addressed by the legislative branches of government. 
Some States may believe that an offer of money 
damages will make a prison grievance procedure more 
effective. Others may conclude that including money 
damages as an element of relief would be counter- 
productive. A State that makes the latter choice does 
not waive the important interests in exhaustion that we 
have identified. 

Petitioner’s effort to seek an exception to the ex- 
haustion requirement based on a balancing of its costs 
and benefits is subject to an even more fundamental 
objection. Under Section 1997e(a), a court no longer 
has discretion to weigh the costs and benefits of requir- 
ing an inmate to exhaust administrative remedies. 
Congress has weighed the costs and benefits itself and 
has mandated exhaustion in all cases in which a 

24 

grievance procedure addresses the kind of problem 
identified in an inmate’s complaint. 

D. Petitioner’s Remaining Contentions Are Unpersuasive 

Petitioner advances several additional arguments in 
support of his contention that exhaustion is not 
required when the administrative process does not 
offer the remedy that the inmate seeks. None of those 
arguments is persuasive. 

1. Petitioner first contends (Br. 17-18) that Steele v. 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944), 
interpreted “available remedies” to mean that the 
administrative process must supply the very remedy 
sought. Petitioner further argues (Br. 17-18) that the 
PLRA should be interpreted to conform to that “well 
known” meaning. In Steele, however, the Court held 
only that an individual union member did not have an 
administrative remedy available from an adjustment 
board when “[t]he Adjustment Board ha[d] consistently 
declined in more than 400 cases to entertain grievance 
complaints by individual members of a craft repre- 
sented by a labor organization.” 323 U.S. at 205. We 
have acknowledged that when an administrative 
agency fails “to entertain grievance complaints” of a 
particular kind, an administrative remedy is not “avail- 
able.” That is very different, however, from saying that 
a remedy is unavailable when an administrative body 
will “entertain grievance complaints,” but will not pro- 
vide the precise relief that is requested. 

Petitioner also attempts to read far too much into 
several sentences in an opinion written 50 years before 
the enactment of the PLRA. Steele did not purport to 
apply a well-established meaning of the term “available 
remedies,” and that decision did not purport to 
establish a definition of those terms. The meaning of 

25 

those terms in the PLRA exhaustion provision there- 
fore cannot reasonably be drawn from that decision. 
Regardless of how the Court used those terms in 1944, 
the Congress that enacted the PLRA in 1995 did not 
use those terms to excuse exhaustion any time an 
administrative procedure does not offer the remedy 
preferred by an inmate. As we have explained, any 
such interpretation would reintroduce into the statute 
the very inquiry into the “effectiveness” of a prison 
institution’s administrative remedies that Congress 
deliberately eliminated. 

2. Petitioner argues (Br. 19-21) that the court of 
appeals has rendered the terms “available” and “reme- 
dies” superfluous because it has equated them with any 
existing grievance procedure. That argument rests on 
a misreading of the court of appeals’ decision. The 
Third Circuit carefully explained in its decision in 
Nyhuis that “for the administrative process to consti- 
tute a bar, it must be capable of addressing the events 
that could generate a lawsuit.” 204 F.3d at 75 n.9. The 
court added that “[i]f, for example, the only grievance 
procedure available dealt exclusively with work 
assignments, it would not have to be exhausted unless 
the subsequent lawsuit was related thereto.” Ibid. The 
court of appeals’ interpretation of available remedies 
therefore gives content to those terms. Petitioner’s 
interpretation, on the other hand, gives them a meaning 
that cannot be reconciled with the statutory text as a 
whole or with Congress’s intent. 

3. Finally, petitioner seeks to derive support for his 
interpretation from Congress’s failure to enact a 
different bill that contained an exhaustion requirement. 
That bill provided in part that “[t]he fact that the 
administrative remedies do not include all the possible 
procedures and forms of recovery that are available in 

26 

the civil action does not render such administrative 
remedies inadequate or excuse the failure to exhaust 
them.” Br. 39-40 (quoting Prisoner Lawsuit Efficiency 
Act of 1995, H.R. 2468, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4048 
(1995)). Failed legislative proposals, however, are 
almost always an unreliable basis for discerning Con- 
gress’s intent in enacting a different bill. Central Bank 
of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994). “A bill can be proposed 
for any number of reasons, and it can be rejected for 
just as many others.” Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
County v. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 99-1178 (Jan. 
9, 2001), slip op. 9. 

The only evidence from the legislative history con- 
cerning why Congress did not enact the language 
identified by petitioner is that it regarded it as super- 
fluous. 141 Cong. Rec. at 35,623-35,624 (Rep. LoBiondo) 
(explaining that the bill Congress enacted imposed the 
same exhaustion requirement as the bill identified by 
petitioner). Congress may also have been concerned 
that the language identified by petitioner might sug- 
gest by negative implication that a court could excuse 
exhaustion in other circumstances. The reason that 
Congress did not include the language identified by 
petitioner, however, is ultimately unknowable. That is 
why Congress’s intent must be derived from the 
language that Congress enacted, and not from the 
language that it did not enact. Here, the language that 
Congress enacted mandates exhaustion of available 
remedies without regard to whether the grievance 
process offers the remedy that the inmate seeks. 

27 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

SETH P. WAXMAN 

Solicitor General 

DAVID W. OGDEN 

Assistant Attorney General 

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD 

Deputy Solicitor General 

IRVING L. GORNSTEIN 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

BARBARA L. HERWIG 
PETER R. MAIER 

Attorneys 

JANUARY 2001