No. 99-1434 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER 

v. 

THE MEAD CORPORATION 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 

NEAL S. WOLIN 

General Counsel 
Department of the Treasury 
Washington, D.C. 20220 
SETH P. WAXMAN 

Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 

DAVID W. OGDEN 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE 

Deputy Solicitor General 

KENT L. JONES 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

WILLIAM KANTER 
BRUCE G. FORREST 

Attorneys 

Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
(202) 514–2217 

2 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 

1. Whether classification rulings issued by the 
Customs Service are entitled to deference in deter- 
mining the proper tariff classification of imported 
goods. 

2. Whether the Customs Service reasonably inter- 
preted the statutory phrase “diaries, notebooks and 
address books, bound” in Subheading 4820.10.20 of the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States to 
include the spiral-bound and ring-bound day planners 
imported by respondent. 

(I) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Opinions below ............................................................................... 
1 

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 1 

Statutory and regulatory provisions involved ......................... 
2 

Statement ........................................................................................ 5 

Summary of argument .................................................................. 
15 

Argument: 

I. The classification rulings issued by the customs 
service are entitled to deference from the courts 

in determining the proper tariff classification of 

imported goods ................................................................ 

19 

II. The customs service reasonably interpreted the 

statutory classification of “bound” “diaries” to 

include the spiral and ring-bound day planners 

imported by respondent ................................................ 

34 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 39 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Brooks Bros. v. United States, 68 Cust. Ct. 91 

(1972) ........................................................................................ 

11, 35 

Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568 (1885) .................... 

19 

Central Prods. Co. v. United States, 936 F. Supp. 

1002 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996) ................................................... 

11 

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ...... 

19, 22, 24, 27, 29, 37, 38 

Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 

(2000) ................................................................... 

16, 17, 27, 32, 33 

Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967) ................. 

25 

Crystal Clear Indus. v. United States, 44 F.3d 

1001 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ............................................................. 

22 

DAL-Tile Corp. v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 394 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 1993), aff ’d, 26 F.3d 139 (Fed. Cir. 

1994) ......................................................................................... 21-22 

(III) 

IV 

Cases—Continued: Page 

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 

(1991) ........................................................................................ 28 

Edwards’s Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 

(1827) ........................................................................................ 19 

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 

(1980) ......................................................................... 

16, 23, 24, 29 

Fred Baumgarten v. United States, 49 Cust. Ct. 

275 (1962) ................................................................................. 

11, 35 

General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) .............. 

29 

Generra Sportswear Co. v. United States, 905 F.2d 

377 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ............................................................... 

21 

Goodman Mfg., L.P. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505 

(Fed. Cir. 1995) ....................................................................... 

22 

Guess? Inc. v. United States, 944 F.2d 855 (Fed. 

Cir. 1991) ................................................................................ 

21 

IKO Indus. v. United States, 105 F.3d 624 (Fed. 

Cir. 1997) ................................................................................. 

22 

Lynteq, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 693 (Fed. 

Cir. 1992) ................................................................................. 

36 

Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 

Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) ............................................. 

28, 30 

McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477 (1921) ....................... 

19, 21 

Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. 

Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923) .............................................. 

34 

Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 21 F.3d 1079 

(Fed. Cir. 1994) ....................................................................... 

36 

Mitsui Foods, Inc. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1401 

(Fed. Cir. 1989) ....................................................................... 

21 

NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) ........... 

32 

NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 

(1944) ........................................................................................ 31 

National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 

440 U.S. 472 (1979) ................................................................ 

25 

Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life 

Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) ............................... 

18, 22, 37, 38 

Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995) .............................. 28, 32-33 

V 

Cases—Continued: Page 

Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481 

(Fed. Cir. 1997) ....................................................... 

13, 22-23, 32 

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ...................... 

32 

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) ............ 

17, 31, 33 

Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 

735 (1996) ............................................................ 

17, 19, 20, 27, 34 

Train v. Natural Resouces Defense Council, Inc., 

421 U.S. 60 (1975) ................................................................... 

30 

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) ................................... 

19, 21 

Unemployment Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 

(1946)......................................................................................... 21 

United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 

725 (1977) ................................................................................. 

37 

United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967) ............. 13, 16, 24, 

25, 31, 34, 38 
United States v. 

Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 
(1999) .............................................................. 

12, 15, 20, 21, 22, 32 

United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368 (1809) ... 

15, 20 

Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) ............... 

26 

Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 

(1978) ................................................................... 

15, 21, 23, 31, 38 

Statutes and regulations: 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(b) ................. 

26 

Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States: 

19 U.S.C. 66 ........................................................................ 

2, 20 

19 U.S.C. 1202 (Supp. I 1995) .......................................... 

2, 4 

19 U.S.C. 1202 (Supp. IV 1998) ....................................... 

7 

19 U.S.C. 1500(a) ............................................................... 

20 

19 U.S.C. 1500(b) ............................................................... 

20 

19 U.S.C. 1502(a) ...................... 

2, 5, 15, 16, 19, 23, 27, 30, 31 

19 U.S.C. 1515(a) ............................................................... 

6, 20 

19 U.S.C. 1624 .................................................................... 

3, 20 

19 U.S.C. 1625(a) ............................................................... 

3 

19 U.S.C. 1625(c) ............................................................... 

3, 6 

19 U.S.C. 1625(c)(1) ........................................................... 3, 32 

VI 

Statutes and regulations—Continued: 
Page 

19 U.S.C. 1625(c)(2) ........................................................... 
3 

26 U.S.C. 7805(a) ....................................................................... 
16 

28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(5) .................................................................. 
11 

28 U.S.C. 1581(a) ....................................................................... 

10 

28 U.S.C. 2643(b) ....................................................................... 

32 

19 C.F.R.: 

Section 177.9(a) ..................................................... 

4, 6, 12, 30, 31 

Section 177.9(b)(2) ................................................................. 
30 

Section 177.9(c) ....................................................................... 

30 

Section 177.10 ......................................................................... 

5 

Section 177.10(a) .................................................................... 
6, 12 

Section 177.10(c) .................................................................... 
6, 13 

Section 177.11(a) .................................................................... 
6 

Miscellaneous: 

Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, 

Guidance, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal 
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke 
L.J. 1311 (1992) ....................................................................... 

26 
Chief Judge Edward D. Re., Litigation Before the 

United States Court of International Trade, 19 
U.S.C.A. § § 1-1300 (West Supp. 1998) .............................. 

21 
29 Cust. Bull. 17 (May 31, 1995) ............................................. 
32 

29 Cust. Bull. 23 (Apr. 12, 1995) ............................................. 
32 

31 Cust. Bull. 7 (Oct. 22, 1997) ................................................ 
32 

31 Cust. Bull 14 (Aug. 27, 1997) .............................................. 
32 

Customs Service Ruling, HQ No. 955199, 1994 WL 
85353 (Jan. 24, 1994) .............................................................. 

1 Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Admin- 
istrative Law Treatise (3d. ed. 1994) .................................. 
16, 28 

Headquarters Ruling Letters: 

No. 955636, 1994 WL 220733 (Customs Apr. 6, 1994) ..... 

8 

No. 955637, 1994 WL 220734 (Customs Apr. 6, 1994) ..... 
8 

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1988) ................................................................................ 
20, 27, 36 

Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 
83 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1983) ................................................... 24, 27 

VII 

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page 

Pierce, Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 

Geo. L.J. 2225 (1997) ............................................................. 
33 

Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. 

L. Rev. 1175 (1989) ................................................................ 
26 

Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some 

Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Re- 
sources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 
Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987) ................................................. 25-26 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 99-1434 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER 

v. 

THE MEAD CORPORATION 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 

OPINIONS BELOW 

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-16a) 
is reported at 185 F.3d 1304. The opinion of the Court 
of International Trade (Pet. App. 19a-27a) is reported 
at 17 F. Supp. 2d 1004. The Customs Service ruling 
(Pet. App. 28a-47a) that applies to this case is cited as 
HQ No. 955937 and is reported unofficially at 1994 WL 
712863 (Customs). 

JURISDICTION 

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on 
July 28, 1999. A petition for rehearing was denied on 
November 1, 1999 (Pet. App. 17a). On January 19, 2000, 
the Chief Justice extended the time for filing a petition 

(1) 

2 

for a writ of certiorari to March 1, 2000. The petition 
for a writ of certiorari was filed on February 29, 2000, 
and was granted on May 30, 2000. The jurisdiction of 
this Court rests upon 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). 

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 

1. General Note 20 of the Harmonized Tariff Sched- 
ules of the United States, 19 U.S.C. 1202 (Supp. I 1995), 
provides in relevant part: 

The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby author- 
ized to issue rules and regulations governing the 
admission of articles under the provisions of the 
tariff schedules. * * * 

2. 19 U.S.C. 1502(a) provides in relevant part: 

The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish and 
promulgate such rules and regulations not incon- 
sistent with the law (including regulations estab- 
lishing procedures for the issuance of binding rul- 
ings prior to the entry of the merchandise con- 
cerned), and may disseminate such information as 
may be necessary to secure a just, impartial, and 
uniform appraisement of imported merchandise and 
the classification and assessment of duties thereon 
at the various ports of entry. * * * 

3. 19 U.S.C. 66 provides in relevant part: 

The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe 
forms of entries, oaths, bonds, and other papers, and 
rules and regulations not inconsistent with law, to 
be used in carrying out the provisions of law relat- 
ing to raising revenue from imports, or to duties on 
imports * * * and shall give such directions to 
customs officers and prescribe such rules and forms 

3 

to be observed by them as may be necessary for the 
proper execution of the law. 

4. 19 U.S.C. 1624 provides: 

In addition to the specific powers conferred by 
this chapter the Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorized to make such rules and regulations as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
chapter. 

5. 19 U.S.C. 1625 provides in relevant part: 

(a) Within 90 days after the date of issuance of 
any interpretive ruling (including any ruling letter, 
or internal advice memorandum) or protest review 
decision under this chapter with respect to any 
customs transaction, the Secretary shall have such 
ruling or decision published in the Customs Bulletin 
or shall otherwise make such ruling or decision 
available for public inspection. 

* * * * * 

(c) A proposed interpretive ruling or decision 
which would— 

(1) modify (other than to correct a 
clerical error) or revoke a prior interpretive 
ruling or decision which has been in effect for 
at least 60 days; or 

(2) have the effect of modifying the treat- 
ment previously accorded by the Customs 
Service to substantially identical transac- 
tions; 

shall be published in the Customs Bulletin. The 
Secretary shall give interested parties an opportu- 
nity to submit, during not less than the 30-day 

4 

period after the date of such publication, comments 
on the correctness of the proposed ruling or de- 
cision. After consideration of any comments re- 
ceived, the Secretary shall publish a final ruling or 
decision in the Customs Bulletin within 30 days 
after the closing of the comment period. The final 
ruling or decision shall become effective 60 days 
after the date of its publication. 

6. For the period that this case involves, Subheading 
4820.10.20 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the 
United States, 19 U.S.C. 1202 (Supp. I 1995), provides a 
rate of duty of 3.2% for: 

Diaries, notebooks and address books, bound; 
memorandum pads, letter pads and similar articles 

* * * . 

7. 19 C.F.R. 177.9(a) provides in relevant part: 

Effect of ruling letters generally. A ruling letter 
issued by the Customs Service under the provisions 
of this part represents the official position of the 
Customs Service with respect to the particular 
transaction or issue described therein and is binding 
on all Customs Service personnel in accordance 
with the provisions of this section until modified or 
revoked. In the absence of a change of practice or 
other modification or revocation which affects the 
principle of the ruling set forth in the ruling letter, 
that principle may be cited as authority in the dis- 
position of transactions involving the same circum- 
stances. Generally, a ruling letter is effective on the 
date it is issued and may be applied to all entries 
which are unliquidated, or other transactions with 
respect to which the Customs Service has not taken 
final action on that date. * * * 

5 

8. 19 C.F.R. 177.10 provides in relevant part: 

(a) Generally. Within 120 days after issuing any 
precedential decision under the Tariff Act of 1930, 
as amended, relating to any Customs transaction 
(prospective, current, or completed), the Customs 
Service shall publish the decision in the Customs 
Bulletin or otherwise make it available for public 
inspection. For purposes of this paragraph a pre- 
cedential decision includes any ruling letter, in- 
ternal advice memorandum, or protest review 
decision. * * * 

* * * * * 

(c) Changes of practice or position. 

(1) Before the publication of a ruling which has 
the effect of changing a practice and which results 
in the assessment of a higher rate of duty, notice 
that the practice (or prior ruling on which the 
practice is based) is under review will be published 
in the Federal Register and interested parties 
given an opportunity to make written submissions 
with respect to the correctness of the contemplated 
change. This procedure will also be followed when 
the contemplated change of practice will result in 
the assessment of a lower rate of duty and the 
Headquarters Office determines that the matter is 
of sufficient importance to involve the interests of 
domestic industry. 

STATEMENT 

This case concerns whether judicial deference is 
owed to the tariff classification rulings issued by the 
Customs Service under 19 U.S.C. 1502(a). That statute 

6 

authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to adopt 
“rules and regulations” providing for the issuance of 
such “binding rulings prior to the entry of the mer- 
chandise” as may “be necessary to secure a just, impar- 
tial, and uniform appraisement of imported merchan- 
dise and the classification and assessment of duties 
thereon * * * .” 19 U.S.C. 1502(a). Pursuant to that 
authority, the Secretary has provided for the issuance 
of tariff classification rulings by the Customs Service 
which are “binding on all Customs Service personnel” 
and which, “[i]n the absence of a change of practice or 
other modification or revocation which affects the 
principle of the ruling set forth in the ruling letter 

* * * may be cited as authority in the disposition of 
transactions involving the same circumstances.” 19 
C.F.R. 177.9(a). In addition, the Customs Service is 
authorized to issue classification rulings in connection 
with specific merchandise already imported, 19 C.F.R. 
177.11(a), and to rule on protests from customs classifi- 
cation determinations, 19 U.S.C. 1515(a). The classifi- 
cation determinations set forth in such rulings and 
protest review decisions are also “precedential” in 
effect. 19 C.F.R. 177.10(a).1 

1 All “binding rulings” and other “precedential” actions of the 
Customs Service are published in the Customs Bulletin or other- 
wise made available for public inspection “[w]ithin 120 days after” 
they are issued. 19 C.F.R. 177.10(a). If a proposed ruling would 
have the “effect of changing a practice and * * * result[] in the 
assessment of a higher rate of duty,” notice of the proposed change 
of practice is to “be published in the Federal Register and inter- 
ested parties given an opportunity to make written submissions 
with respect to the correctness of the contemplated change.” 19 
C.F.R. 177.10(c). See also 19 U.S.C. 1625(c). Such notice and 
opportunity for comment is also afforded when the contemplated 
change would “result in the assessment of a lower rate of duty and 
the Headquarters Office determines that the matter is of sufficient 

7 

In the present case, the Federal Circuit held that 
these tariff classification rulings of the Customs Service 
are to be given no judicial deference, and are instead to 
be disregarded utterly in interpreting the customs 
provisions. Pet. App. 6a-7a. Having elected to dis- 
regard the agency’s interpretive “binding rulings,” the 
court then concluded that the particular items imported 
by respondent were subject to no duty under the pro- 
visions of the Tariff Act involved in this case. That 
holding is incorrect and the judgment of the court of 
appeals should be reversed. 

1. Respondent imports “daily planners,” which are 
“loose-leaf books containing calendars, room for daily 
notes, telephone numbers, addresses and notepads. 
This sort of product originated in England and is pro- 
bably best known under the trademark of Filofax.” 
Pet. App. 19a. Under Subheading 4820.10.20 of the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
(HTSUS), 19 U.S.C. 1202 (Supp. I 1995), if such items 
are properly classified as “bound” “diaries,” they are 
subject to an import duty of 3.2% of their value.2 If, 
however, these items are not “bound” or are not 
“diaries,” they would then fall under Subheading 
4820.10.40 of the HTSUS as “[o]ther” items for which 
no duty applies. Pet. App. 20a-21a, 24a. 

In 1993, when respondent imported its daily planners 
into the United States, they were classified as “bound” 
“diaries” to which the 3.2% duty then applied. Respon- 

importance to involve the interests of domestic industry.” 19 
C.F.R. 177.10(c). 

2 The rate of duty on these items has been reduced since this 
case arose. For importations occurring after 1998, the rate was 
reduced to 1.6% of value. HTSUS Subheading 4820.10.20, 19 
U.S.C. 1202 (Supp. IV 1998). 

8 

dent filed an administrative protest of that classifi- 
cation. On October 21, 1994, the Customs Service 
issued a detailed denial of that protest in Headquarters 
Ruling Letter (HQ) No. 955937, 1994 WL 712863 
(Customs). Pet. App. 28a-47a. That ruling noted that 
the issue presented by respondent “has been addressed 
in several rulings by this office” (id. at 31a-32a, citing, 

e.g., Headquarters Ruling Letters (HRL) Nos. 955636, 
1994 WL 220733 (Customs Apr. 6, 1994) and 955637, 
1994 WL 220734 (Customs Apr. 6, 1994)): 

In these rulings this office has consistently deter- 
mined that articles similar in design and/or function 
to the instant merchandise are classifiable as diaries. 
The rationale for this determination was based on 
lexicographic sources, as well as extrinsic evidence 
of how these types of articles are treated in the 
trade and commerce of the United States. 

The agency noted that the text of Subheading 4820.10, 
“the common dictionary definition of ‘diary’, and past 
Customs rulings” all reflect that such daily planners are 
properly “classifiable as a bound diary.” Pet. App. 32a. 
See note 1, supra. 

The Customs Service explained that the daily plan- 
ners imported by respondent “fit squarely” within one 
of the definitions of the word “diary” contained in the 
Oxford English Dictionary—as “[a] book prepared for 
keeping a daily record, or having spaces with printed 
dates for daily memoranda and jottings.” Pet. App. 
32a-33a. The Service rejected respondent’s assertion 
that the agency should base its classification of such 
merchandise solely on the first enumerated definition of 
“diary” in one dictionary as “[a] daily record of events 
or transactions, a journal.” Id. at 33a. The agency 
explained that “[m]any words have several definitions 

9 

and Customs may consider any or all of them when 
making a classification determination.” Ibid. The 
agency concluded that the broader definition of the 
term “diary” adopted in its rulings “reflects the com- 
mon and commercial identity of these items in the 
marketplace”—a fact evidenced by the common usage 
of the term “desk diary” to describe the imported mer- 
chandise. Id. at 34a. 

Noting that customs provisions commonly incor- 
porate prevailing commercial usages, the agency 
concluded that “there are many forms of ‘diaries’ ” and 
that “the determinative criteria as to whether these 
types of articles are deemed ‘diaries’ for classification 
purposes is whether they are primarily designed for use 
as, or primarily function as, articles for the receipt of 
daily notations, events and appointments.” Pet. App. 
39a-40a. Since the daily planners imported by respon- 
dent are designed for those exact functions, the agency 
concluded that they constitute “diaries” within the 
meaning of HTSUS 4820.10.20. Id. at 34a, 43a. 

The Customs Service further concluded that the daily 
planners imported by respondent are “bound” within 
the meaning of the statutory classification provision. 
Pet. App. 44a-47a. The agency emphasized that, in 
determining what constitutes a “bound” “diary,” the 
traditional elements of formal “bookbinding” are not 
applicable. “The issue is not what constitutes a bound 
book, and there is no requirement that a diary be in the 
format of a book.” Id. at 44a. Instead, the agency noted 
that the official explanation of the term “bound” in the 
notes of the Harmonized System Committee—the 
international authority that had drafted the terminol- 
ogy employed in this customs provision—states that 
the term “bound” includes “reinforcements or fittings of 
metal, plastics, etc.” Id. at 45a. The Customs Service 

10 

noted that the explanation of the Harmonized System 
Committee “represent[s] the official interpretation of 
the [Harmonized Tariff System] at the international 
level” and that the Committee’s explanation of “this 
language [is] indicative of the drafters’ intent to include 
as bound any articles possessing ring binders or spiral 
binders.” Ibid. The agency thus concluded that, 
“whether a ring binder or spiral” binder is used, 
“[p]ages held together in this manner” are “bound” for 
the purposes of this customs provision. Id. at 46a. 

Since respondent’s daily planners are bound in this 
very manner, the Customs Service ruled that these 
articles are “bound” “diaries” to which the 3.2% duty 
applied under HTSUS 4820.10.20. Pet. App. 46a-47a. 

2. Six months after this ruling was issued, re- 
spondent again imported additional articles of the same 
type. When the agency again ruled that these daily 
planners are subject to duty as “bound” “diaries,” re- 
spondent then raised exactly the same protest that the 
agency had just reviewed and rejected in HQ No. 
955937. When that protest was again denied by the 
agency, respondent brought this action in the United 
States Court of International Trade to seek review of 
the agency’s classification determination. Pet. App. 
19a. 

3. The Court of International Trade has exclusive 
jurisdiction to review the denial of a protest from a 
Customs Service classification decision. 28 U.S.C. 
1581(a). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
court upheld the agency’s determination in this case. 
The court noted that respondent’s daily planners 
were “designed for notations concerning the full range 
of daily experience” and that any “supplementary 
material” they contain does not alter their primary 
character as business diaries. Pet. App. 25a. The court 

11 

explained that its prior decisions in Fred Baumgarten 

v. United States, 49 Cust. Ct. 275 (1962), and Brooks 
Bros. v. United States, 68 Cust. Ct. 91 (1972), indicate 
that when, as here, “the diary portion was the essential 
or indispensable part of the importation,” that is “con- 
trolling of its classification.” Pet. App. 22a. The court 
noted that the current “tariff language” in the HSTUS 
was “adopted with knowledge of these judicial pre- 
cedents.” Id. at 23a (citing Central Prods. Co. v. 
United States, 936 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-1007 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 1996)).3 
The court also upheld the conclusion of the Customs 
Service that respondent’s diaries were “bound” for 
purposes of HTSUS 4820.10.20. The court explained 
that “[t]he common meaning of ‘bound’ is fastened. The 
irrevocability of the fastening is not important so long 
as it goes beyond the transitory role of packaging.” 
Pet. App. 26a. 

4. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to 
review decisions of the Court of International Trade. 
28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(5). On appeal from the decision in this 
case, the Federal Circuit reversed. Pet. App. 1a-16a. 

a. The court of appeals first addressed whether it 
would afford deference to the classification rulings of 

3 The Court of International Trade did not cite or rely upon 
the Headquarters Rulings (HQ No. 955937 and HRL Nos. 955636 
& 955637) that the Customs Service issued to respondent in 
resolving this same issue in 1994. See page 8, supra. The court 
did, however, find support for its interpretation in a different 
Customs Service ruling, HQ No. 955199, 1994 WL 85353 (Customs 
Jan. 24, 1994), in which the agency explained the distinction 
between items that are “similar” to diaries (for which a duty 
applies) and “other” items (for which no duty is applicable). 
Pet. App. 24a (“The rationale used in that ruling is persuasive 

* * * .”). 

12 

the Customs Service in determining the proper 
“meaning and scope of the tariff terms.” Pet. App. 4a. 
The court noted that, in United States v. Haggar 
Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 391 (1999), this Court held 
that (Pet. App. 5a): 

if an HTSUS provision is ambiguous and Customs 
promulgates a regulation that “fills a gap or defines 
a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the 
legislature’s revealed design,” courts should give 
that judgment “controlling weight” as articulated in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 [1984]. 

The Federal Circuit reasoned, however, “that Haggar, 
and thus Chevron deference, does not extend to 
ordinary classification rulings [of the Customs Serv- 
ice].” Ibid. The court stated that deference is inappro- 
priate for tariff classification rulings because those rul- 
ings are issued without the benefit of public comment, 
“do not carry the force of law and are not, like regu- 
lations, intended to clarify the rights and obligations of 
importers beyond the specific case under review.”4 Id. 
at 6a. The court stated that the “significant differences 
between Customs regulations and Customs rulings 
convince this court that Haggar’s reach does not extend 
to standard Customs rulings.” Id. at 6a-7a.5 The court 

4 In so stating, the court of appeals failed to consider or 
address the express language of the regulations which makes such 
rulings “binding on all Customs Service personnel” and which 
specifies that “the principle” of the rulings “may be cited as 
authority in the disposition of transactions involving the same cir- 
cumstances.” 19 C.F.R. 177.9(a). See also 19 C.F.R. 177.10(a) (pro- 
test review decisions are “precedential”). 

5 The court compared Customs Service classification rulings to 
IRS interpretive rulings, which the court stated have no “binding 

13 

of appeals concluded that it would therefore “continue[] 
to adhere to its [pre-Haggar] precedent giving no 
deference to such rulings.” Id. at 7a (citing Rollerblade, 
Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 484 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)).6 

b. Having thus chosen simply to disregard the inter- 
pretive classification rulings of the Customs Service, 
the Federal Circuit found it unnecessary to address or 
consider the detailed reasoning adopted by the Cus- 
toms Service in issuing the Headquarters Rulings that 
apply to the facts of this case. See pages 7-10, supra. 
The court instead looked primarily to what it regarded 
as an appropriate dictionary definition of the term 
“diary” in the Oxford English Dictionary and con- 
cluded that, to be a “diary,” an item of merchandise 
must have “relatively extensive” space for the record- 
ing not only “of the events themselves, but also a 
person’s observations, thoughts, or feelings about 
them.” Pet. App. 12a. Giving no weight to the common 
commercial use of the term “diary,” the court expressed 
the view that a daily planner that contains “a place to 
jot down the date and time” of future appointments 

effect” on the courts. Pet. App. 7a. Although an interpretive 
ruling is not “binding” in the sense that it is a part of the positive 
law that applies in courts, it is well established that courts are to 
defer to Treasury rulings that represent a “reasonable” elabora- 
tion of the statute. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306- 
307 (1967); pages 24-27, infra. 

6 Under Customs Service regulations, a new interpretation 
that would increase the duty from that applicable under a prior 
interpretation may not be adopted without prior Federal Register 
notice and opportunity for public comment. 19 C.F.R. 177.10(c); 
see note 1, supra. The court of appeals reserved the question 
whether such revocation decisions would be entitled to deference 
under Chevron. Pet. App. 6a n.1. 

14 

cannot qualify as a “diary” because the very essence of 
a “diary” is to be “retrospective, not prospective.” Id. 
at 12a-13a. 

Applying “the above principles,” the court concluded 
that respondent’s daily planners are not “diaries” with- 
in the meaning of HTSUS Subheading 4820.10.20 be- 
cause (i) “the space provided” in those planners 
“would not permit a diarist to record relatively exten- 
sive notations about events, observations, feelings, or 
thoughts” and, (ii) while “[t]hese pages facilitate 
advance planning and scheduling[,] * * * a diary is not 
for planning.” Pet. App. 13a-14a. 

c. The court of appeals further concluded that re- 
spondent’s daily planners are not “bound” within the 
meaning of the HTSUS 4208.10.20. To determine the 
meaning of this customs provision, the court looked to a 
book publishing industry definition of a “bound book” as 
a book that is “sewn, glued, or stapled into permanent 
bindings.” Pet. App. 15a. The court stated that a diary 
may be considered as “bound” under this book pub- 
lishing definition only if a “permanent” binding has 
been employed. Ibid. Because respondent’s product is 
“contained in ringed loose-leaf binders” that lack the 
“permanent” character of a “bound book,” the court 
held that these items are not “bound” within the mean- 
ing of the tariff provision. Id. at 15a-16a. 

In reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals did 
not address the reasoning of the applicable Head- 
quarters Rulings or of the authorities cited therein. In 
particular, the court of appeals did not acknowledge or 
discuss the official interpretive statements of the 
Harmonized System Committee (which drafted these 
tariff provisions) which explain that the term “bound” 
“diaries” as used in HTSUS 4820.10.20 includes diaries 

15 

that are bound with metal or plastic fittings, such as 
rings or spirals. See Pet. App. 45a; page 10, supra. 

d. The court of appeals held that, since respondent’s 
daily planners are similar to, but are not, “bound” 
“diaries” within the meaning of this tariff provision, 
they are to be “classified under the ‘other’ subheading 
of [HTSUS] 4820.10.40,” for which no duty applies. Pet. 
App. 16a. The United States filed a timely petition for 
rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc. A 
response to the petition was requested by the court 
from respondent. The court thereafter denied the peti- 
tion without a published vote. Id. at 17a. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

I. The court of appeals erred in refusing to afford 
any deference to the formal “binding ruling” of the 
Customs Service adopted to apply and enforce the 
customs laws pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1502(a). Decisions 
of this Court affording broad deference to the views of 
the federal officials who administer tariff legislation 
date to the very beginning of the Republic. United 
States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368, 372 (1809). 
This Court has long held that the agency’s formal 
interpretations of the customs provisions—whether 
announced in an interpretive ruling or in a regulation— 
are to be sustained if they reflect a “reasonable” ela- 
boration of the statutory scheme. Zenith Radio Corp. 

v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (interpretive 
rulings); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 
380, 391 (1999) (interpretive regulations). 

The conclusion of the court of appeals that deference 
is due only to “regulations” and not to “rulings” of the 
Customs Service (Pet. App. 6a-7a) is thus plainly in 
error. When, as here, Congress has expressly author- 
ized an agency to adopt “such rules and regulations 

16 

* * * as may be necessary” for the implementation and 
enforcement of a statutory scheme (19 U.S.C. 1502(a)), 
this Court has made clear that the agency’s inter- 
pretive rulings are “dispositive” “[u]nless demonstrably 
irrational.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 
U.S. 555, 565 (1980). Indeed, this Court has long held 
that the similar interpretive rulings of the Treasury 
that implement and enforce the revenue laws must be 
sustained when “reasonable” because “Congress has 
delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the 
task of prescribing ‘all needful rules and regulations for 
the enforcement’ of the Internal Revenue Code.” 
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-307 (1967) 
(quoting 26 U.S.C. 7805(a)). 

This is not a case like Christensen v. Harris County, 
120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000), in which the Court recently con- 
cluded that a lesser standard of deference applies to an 
agency opinion issued in an informal format that 
“Congress has not authorized for that purpose.” 1 
Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Administrative 
Law Treatise § 3.5, at 120 (3d ed. 1994), cited with 
approval at 120 S. Ct. at 1663. In the present case, 
the format selected by the agency—the formal adoption 
and issuance of binding interpretive rulings—is 
precisely the format authorized by Congress for this 
purpose. Affording deference to the agency’s formal 
interpretations which are adopted in the precise man- 
ner that Congress has directed is necessary to “honor 
that congressional choice.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 568. 

The holding of the court of appeals that “no de- 
ference” would be accorded to the agency’s “binding 
rulings,” and the court’s refusal to consider or address 
the reasoning set forth in those rulings, also cannot be 
reconciled with the holding in Christensen that even 

17 

informally stated agency opinions would be entitled to 
“some deference” and “respect” and should, at a bare 
minimum, be reviewed to determine if they have the 
“power to persuade.” 120 S. Ct. at 1663 (quoting Skid- 
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). Even 
under the Skidmore standard, the court of appeals 
erred in flatly stating that the agency’s “binding ruling” 
was entitled to “no deference” in this case. 

II. Under the proper standard of deference that 
applies to agency interpretations of the “statutes 
that they are charged with administering” (Smiley v. 
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 
(1996)), the Customs Service classification ruling should 
have been sustained in this case. The tariff classifi- 
cation issue in this case requires interpretation of 
two terms in Subheading 4820.10.10 of the 
HTSUS—“diaries” and “bound.” In numerous rulings, 
the agency has “consistently determined that articles 
similar in design and/or function to the instant 
merchandise are classifiable as diaries.” Pet. App. 31a. 
In rejecting the narrowly selected definitions offered 
by respondent, the Service has explained that business 
“diaries” are a recognized commercial product and that 
the “broader concept of diary” applied in the agency’s 
rulings not only “reflects the common and commercial 
identity of these items in the marketplace” but is also 
supported by dictionary sources. Id. at 34a. 

The Customs Service has also properly concluded 
that these daily planners are “bound” for purposes of 
HTSUS 4820.10.20. The Service relied on the Har- 
monized Commodity Description and Coding System 
Explanatory Notes—“which represent the official 
interpretation of the HTS at the international 
level”—which state that such goods may be regarded as 
“bound” if they “have reinforcements or fittings of 

18 

metal, plastics, etc.” Pet. App. 45a. This official ex- 
planation makes it “clear that the Harmonized System 
Committee contemplated metal binders as being within 
this headings’s definition of bound articles.” Ibid. 
Because the day planners imported by respondent 
are bound in precisely this manner, the agency properly 
concluded that these products represent “bound” 
“diaries” to which the tariff of HTSUS 4820.10.20 
applies. 

The agency’s well-formulated analysis of this classifi- 
cation provision constitutes a “reasonable” interpreta- 
tion of the statute. The court of appeals erred by 
simply displacing the agency’s reasonable interpreta- 
tion with another, perhaps plausible, interpretation of 
its own. The question in cases of this type is not 
whether the agency’s interpretation is the only reason- 
able choice. When, as here, the agency’s interpretation 
“defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of 
the legislature’s revealed design,” the agency’s judg- 
ment is to be given “controlling weight.” Nationsbank 
of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. 
Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995). 

19 

ARGUMENT 

I. THE CLASSIFICATION RULINGS ISSUED BY 
THE CUSTOMS SERVICE ARE ENTITLED TO 
DEFERENCE FROM THE COURTS IN DETER- 
MINING THE PROPER TARIFF CLASSIFICA- 
TION OF IMPORTED GOODS 

1. It has long been a bedrock legal principle that 
courts are to accord deference to the formal interpreta- 
tions of a statute adopted by the agency that has been 
“charged with responsibility for administering the 
provision” by Congress. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865 (1984). See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (South 
Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (“It is our 
practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of 
agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous 
terms in statutes that they are charged with 
administering.”); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 
(1965); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921); 
Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 570-571 (1885); 
Edwards’s Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 
209-210 (1827). The deference that this Court has 
consistently accorded to formal agency interpretations 
of the statutes they administer in decisions such as 
Chevron is fully applicable here. 

Congress has authorized the agency to adopt such 
“binding rulings prior to the entry of the merchandise” 
as may “be necessary to secure a just, impartial, and 
uniform appraisement of imported merchandise and the 
classification and assessment of duties thereon.” 19 
U.S.C. 1502(a). Congress has further specified that, 
under the “rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary,” the Customs Service is to determine “the 

20 

final appraisement of merchandise” and “fix the final 
classification and rate of duty applicable to such mer- 
chandise,” 19 U.S.C. 1500(a),(b), and is then to issue 
decisions on any protests from such classification deter- 
minations, 19 U.S.C. 1515(a). “In addition to the speci- 
fic powers” conferred on the agency under these pro- 
visions, Congress further broadly empowered the 
agency “to make such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions” of the Tariff Act. 
19 U.S.C. 1624. See also 19 U.S.C. 66. In view of these 
broad delegations of authority, Congress emphasized in 
enacting the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States in 1988 that “[t]he Customs Service will be re- 
sponsible for interpreting and applying” this statute. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 549-550 
(1988). 

The reasoning of Chevron thus applies directly here. 
Courts are to defer to the agency’s reasonable inter- 
pretation of the statute it administers because of the 
“presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a 
statute meant for implementation by an agency, under- 
stood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and 
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather 
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of dis- 
cretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley v. Citibank 
(South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. at 740-741. 

2. Decisions of this Court affording such broad 
deference to the views of the federal officials who 
administer tariff legislation date to the very beginning 
of the customs laws and are thus as old as the Republic 
itself. United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368, 
372 (1809), cited in United States v. Haggar Apparel 
Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999). The Court has long 
made clear that the agency’s formal interpretations of 
the customs provisions—whether announced in an 

21 

interpretive ruling or in a regulation—are to be 
sustained if they reflect a “reasonable” elaboration of 
the statutory scheme. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (giving deference to 
interpretive rulings contained in Treasury Decisions); 
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. at 391 
(giving deference to interpretive regulations).7 Afford- 
ing such deference to agency interpretations of the 
detailed customs laws is required to ensure that this 
complex statutory scheme “is applied in a consistent 
and proper manner.” Id. at 392. See also note 11, infra. 

Until quite recently, the Federal Circuit had con- 
sistently applied this Court’s longstanding precedent to 
give deference to the interpretive rulings and regula- 
tions formally adopted by the Customs Service under 
the Tariff Act. See, e.g., Guess? Inc. v. United States, 
944 F.2d 855, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Generra Sportswear 
Co. v. United States, 905 F.2d 377, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 
Mitsui Foods, Inc. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1401, 1403 
& n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The Court of International 
Trade had similarly acknowledged that it must “defer 
to the agency’s interpretation of the statute” if it is 
“sufficiently reasonable,” regardless whether “the court 
might have reached a different result on its own” (Chief 
Judge Edward D. Re., Litigation Before the United 
States Court of International Trade, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1- 
1300, at XLI (West Supp. 1998)). See DAL-Tile Corp. 

7 Under this standard, the court “need not find that [the 
agency’s] construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is 
the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the 
first instance in judicial proceedings.” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 
at 16 (quoting Unemployment Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 
153 (1946)). See also McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. at 480- 481 
(“If not the only reasonable construction of the act, it is at least an 
admissible one.”). 

22 

v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 394 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1993), 
aff ’d, 26 F.3d 139 (Fed. Cir. 1994); note 7, supra. 

3. The Federal Circuit has recently refused, how- 
ever, to apply these principles of judicial deference to 
cases involving the collection of customs duties. In a 
line of decisions that began in dicta in Crystal Clear 
Industries v. United States, 44 F.3d 1001, 1003* (Fed. 
Cir. 1995), and culminated in Rollerblade, Inc. v. United 
States, 112 F.3d 481, 484 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the Federal 
Circuit held that it would give no deference whatever 
to the agency’s interpretations of the customs laws.8 In 
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. at 391- 
392, however, this Court unanimously rejected those 
recent decisions and held that, when “the agency’s 
statutory interpretation ‘fills a gap or defines a term in 
a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature’s 
revealed design, we give [that] judgment “controlling 
weight.” ’ ” 

Id. at 392 (quoting NationsBank of North 
Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 
U.S. 251, 257 (1995) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844)). 

In the present case, however, instead of following the 
directives of Chevron, Zenith and Haggar, the court of 
appeals stated that it would “continue[] to adhere to its 
precedent giving no deference to such rulings.” Pet. 
App. 7a (citing Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 

8 Paradoxically, the Federal Circuit continued to accord 
Chevron deference to Treasury interpretations of the Tariff Act in 
customs valuation cases. Goodman Mfg., L.P. v. United States, 69 
F.3d 505, 508 (1995). In IKO Industries v. United States, 105 F.3d 
624, 626 (1997), the court distinguished those cases on the ground 
that they “did not involve a classification dispute but rather a 
dispute regarding the proper valuation.” This describes rather 
than explains the court’s inconsistency in establishing an artificial 
distinction between these two “traditional categor[ies] of [customs] 
litigation” (Re, supra, at XXIV). 

23 

F.3d at 484). The court stated that Haggar involved 
only the deference owed to “regulations” and that the 
“reach” of that decision thus “does not extend to 
standard Customs rulings.” Pet. App. 6a-7a. Failing to 
cite or address the decision of this Court in Zenith 
Radio, the court of appeals stated that the interpreta- 
tions of the tariff provisions adopted by the agency in 
the “binding rulings” authorized by 19 U.S.C. 1502(a) 
are entitled to “no deference” simply because they are 
interpretive “rulings” rather than “regulations.” Pet. 
App. 7a. 

That holding is flatly inconsistent with the decisions 
of this Court. When, as in this case, Congress has 
expressly authorized an agency to adopt “such rules 
and regulations * * * as may be necessary” for the 
implementation and enforcement of a statutory scheme 
(19 U.S.C. 1502(a)), the Court has made clear that the 
agency’s interpretive rulings “should be dispositive” 
“[u]nless demonstrably irrational.” Ford Motor Credit 
Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980). Writing for a 
unanimous Court in the Milhollin case, Justice Brennan 
explained that this standard of deference for inter- 
pretive rulings adopted pursuant to delegated author- 
ity from Congress exists “for several reasons.” Ibid. 
First, such deference is required by “the general 
proposition that considerable respect is due ‘the inter- 
pretation given [a] statute by the officers or agency 
charged with its administration.’ ” 

Id. at 566 (quoting 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. at 450). 
Second, by empowering the agency to issue inter- 
pretive rulings, Congress has “specifically designated” 
the agency “as the primary source for interpretation 
and application of the * * * law.” Ibid. The Court 
noted that the legislative history of the statute involved 
in Milhollin revealed “a decided preference for re- 

24 

solving interpretive issues by uniform administrative 
decision, rather than piecemeal through litigation” and 
concluded that courts must give deference to the 
agency’s interpretive rulings to “honor that con- 
gressional choice.” Id. at 568. In sustaining the 
interpretive ruling at issue in that case, the Court 
emphasized that, “while not abdicating their ultimate 
judicial responsibility to determine the law, * * * 
judges ought to refrain from substituting their own 
interstitial lawmaking for that of the [agency]” so long 
as the agency’s interpretation “is not irrational.” Ibid.9 

The decisions in Milhollin and Zenith Radio were 
the direct precursors of the decision of this Court in 
Chevron. 

10 The reasoning of Chevron was also presaged 
by the long line of decisions which have held that the 
Treasury’s formal interpretations of the revenue laws 
are entitled to this same high degree of judicial de- 
ference. In United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 
(1967), the Court applied this established principle in 
holding that an interpretive ruling adopted by the 
Treasury under the Internal Revenue Code must 
be upheld so long as it represents a “reasonable” 
interpretation of the statute. Id. at 307. The Court ex- 
plained that, although “[a]lternatives to the Commis- 
sioner’s * * * rule are of course available,” the 

9 Professor Monaghan has stated that “[t]he court’s task” in 
such cases “is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an 
inquiry that includes defining the range of permissible criteria. In 
such an empowering arrangement, responsibility for meaning is 
shared between court and agency; the judicial role is to specify 
what the statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but 
not all that it does mean.” Monaghan, Marbury and the Admini- 
strative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27-28 (1983). 

10 Indeed, the Court cited and relied on Zenith Radio in both 
Chevron and Milhollin. See 467 U.S. at 843 n.11; 444 U.S. at 566. 

25 

agency’s interpretative rulings are to be upheld when 
“reasonable” because “Congress has delegated to the 
Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing 
‘all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement’ of 
the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a).” 389 
U.S. at 306-307. The Court concluded that “we do not 
sit as a committee of revision to perfect the admini- 
stration of the tax laws,” and that, “[i]n this area of 
limitless factual variations, ‘it is the province of Con- 
gress and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make 
the appropriate adjustments.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Com- 
missioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 296 (1967)). 

11 See 

11 The Court has often stated that such deference is warranted 
by the greater familiarity, and resulting expertise, of the agency in 
interpreting and applying such complex statutory schemes. See, 

e.g., National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 
477 (1979) (deference to agency interpretations “helps guarantee 
that the rules will be written by ‘masters of the subject,’ United 
States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1878), who will be responsible for 
putting the rules into effect”). Commentators have observed that 
such deference to an agency’s interpretive rules is necessary “to 
ensure effective enforcement of complex statutes. * * * [O]ne can 
compare the sporadic and case-specific character of judicial 
encounters with issues of statutory meaning, with an agency’s 
continuing responsibilities and policy-implementing perspectives. 

* * * The more complex the statutory scheme and the more 
intricate the interrelationships, the larger the risks detailed 
judicial involvement will present. * * * In such cases, a judge’s 
limited resources, his only occasional opportunities to seek under- 
standing, and the often distorting character of the litigation 
perspective relative to administration, can lead him to fear that his 
decision will be more disruptive than helpful to the statutory 
scheme.” Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some 
Implications Of The Supreme Court’s Limited Resources For 

26 

also Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) 
(an “interpretive regulation * * * is entitled to 
deference unless it can be said not to be a reasoned and 
supportable interpretation of the Act”). 

12 

In Correll, as in Chevron and the cases following it, 
the Court has made clear that the deference accorded 
to the formal interpretations of the agency charged 
with enforcement of a statute need not be premised on 

Judicial Review Of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1126- 
1127 (1987). 

The deference to agency interpretations required in cases such 
as Milhollin, Correll, and Chevron, “preserve[s] uniformity in 
federal law” by providing for national determinations made by the 
administering agency rather than the potentially splintering effect 
of regional determinations made by lower federal courts. Strauss, 
supra, 87 Colum. L. Rev. at 1126. See also Scalia, The Rule of Law 
As a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1178 (1989) (“The 
common-law, discretion-conferring approach is ill-suited * * * to 
a legal system in which the supreme court can review only an 
insignificant proportion of the decided cases.”). 

12 An agency may “make a substantive [but] nonlegislative 
[ruling] binding on private parties” by adopting an “interpretive 
rule”—a format that Congress has exempted from the notice and 
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 
U.S.C. 553(b)). Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, 
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use 
Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311, 1313 (1992). Such 
“interpretive rules” “interpret statutory language which has some 
tangible meaning, rather than empty or vague language like ‘fair 
and equitable’ or ‘in the public interest.’ An agency may non- 
legislatively announce or act upon an interpretation that it intends 
to enforce in a binding way, so long as it stays within the fair 
intendment of the statute and does not add substantive content of 
its own. Because Congress has already acted legislatively, the 
agency need not exercise its own delegated legislative authority. 
Its attempts to enforce an interpretation can be viewed as simply 
implementing existing positive law previously laid down by Con- 
gress.” Ibid. 

27 

the existence of the sort of express evidence in the 
legislative history cited by the Court in the Milhollin 
case. See page 23, supra. Instead, such deference 
arises from the “presumption” that, when Congress has 
“left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation 
by an agency,” Congress “desired the agency (rather 
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of 
discretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley v. Citibank 
(South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. at 740-741. 

13 See also 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (the delegation may be 
“implicit rather than explicit”). In the present case, the 
accuracy of the “presumption” described in Smiley and 
Chevron is, in any event, manifestly borne out in the 
text and history of the statute. By authorizing the 
agency to adopt “binding rulings prior to the entry of 
the merchandise” in order “to secure a just, impartial, 
and uniform appraisement of imported merchandise and 
the classification and assessment of duties thereon” (19 
U.S.C. 1502(a)), Congress stated its plain intention that 
“[t]he Customs Service will be responsible for 
interpreting and applying” this statute (H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 576, supra, at 549-550). 

4. This is thus not a case like Christensen v. Harris 
County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000), in which the Court 

13 “[T]he degree of deference that a court should give any 
agency interpretation of law is properly, within broad consti- 
tutional limits, entirely a matter of legislative intent. Recognizing 
that fact, however, will not generally prove very helpful, for 
legislatures do not often provide much evidence of their intention 
to delegate law-making power. Consequently, rules tying the 
degree of deference to be accorded agency action to the type of 
agency action involved may become necessary. * * * Any such 
rules, however, remain residual rules: they may not trump evi- 
dence of a contrary legislative intent.” Monaghan, supra, 83 
Colum. L. Rev. at 31 n.184. 

28 

recently concluded that a lesser standard of deference 
applies to an agency opinion issued in an informal 
format (such as correspondence or agency manuals) 
that “Congress has not authorized for that purpose” (1 
Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Administrative 
Law Treatise § 3.5, at 120 (3d ed. 1994), cited with 
approval at Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. at 
1663). 

14 In the Christensen decision, the Court stated 
that informal agency rulings “contained in formats 
such as opinion letters[,]” “policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines” are only “ ‘en- 
titled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)” and “do not war- 
rant Chevron-style deference.” 120 S. Ct. at 1662, 
1663. 

15 In the present case, the format selected by the 

14 The respondent in Christensen quoted this extract from the 
Davis treatise in arguing that “the informal, private Opinion 
Letter” involved in that case was entitled to less force “than the 
Secretary’s published, formal interpretations of the FLSA” be- 
cause it was issued in a format that Congress had not authorized. 
Resp. Br. No. 98-1167 at 31-32. In holding that the private opinion 
letter at issue in that case was “entitled to respect” but did not 
“warrant Chevron-style deference,” the Court cited (but did not 
quote) the portion of the Davis treatise on which respondent 
relied. 120 S. Ct. at 1663. 

15 The Court stated in Christensen that “interpretations 
contained in formats such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect’ 
under * * * Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 * * * 
(1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the 
‘power to persuade,’ ibid.” 120 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court cited 
three decisions in support of the proposition that informal agency 
interpretations such as private opinion letters, guidelines and 
manuals are entitled only to the “respect” warranted under the 
Skidmore opinion. 120 S. Ct. at 1662-1663, citing Reno v. Koray, 
515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 256-258 (1991); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991). None of the cited 

29 

agency—the formal adoption and issuance of binding 
interpretive rulings—is precisely the format authorized 
by Congress for this purpose. As this Court held in 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 568, by 

decisions, however, concerned an interpretive rule (such as the 
rule involved in the present case) that was adopted by an agency in 
the very format that Congress has expressly authorized for that 
purpose. 

For example, in Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. at 61, the agency had 
adopted “an internal agency guideline” rather than a formal 
interpretive rule. The Court nonetheless cited and relied on 
Chevron in holding that the agency’s views were entitled to “some 
deference” as a “permissible construction of the statute.” Ibid. 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). In EEOC v. Arabian 
American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 257, the Court declined to afford 
Chevron deference to an interpretive rule issued by the EEOC 
expressly because “Congress, in enacting [the relevant statute,] 
did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or 
regulations.” Ibid. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
125, 141 (1976) (emphasis added)). The interpretation involved in 
the EEOC case, like the interpretation involved in Christensen, 
had thus not been made in a “format” that Congress had 
authorized. The Court therefore afforded the EEOC’s ruling the 
deference owed under Skidmore, rather than deference required 
by Chevron. Ibid. Finally, in Martin v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. at 157, the Court stated that 
“informal interpretations” and enforcement guidelines would be 
entitled only “to some weight on judicial review” unless “the 
interpretation assumes a form expressly provided for by 
Congress.” Ibid. (emphasis added). 

None of these cases supports the contention of respondent that 
interpretive rulings that are formally adopted in a format that 
Congress has prescribed are not entitled to Chevron deference. 
Numerous decisions of this Court—including Zenith Radio, 
Milhollin and Correll—reflect that agency interpretive rulings 
adopted in a format that Congress has prescribed are to be 
sustained if they represent a “reasonable” interpretation of the 
statute. See pages 23-27, note 11, supra. 

30 

affording deference to the agency’s formal interpre- 
tations, the Court “honor[s] that congressional choice.” 
See also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (deferring to 
an agency interpretation when issued in “a form 
expressly provided for by Congress”); Train v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 70, 75 
(1975) (deferring to formally adopted “guidelines” 
applied in agency determination). 

In 19 U.S.C. 1502(a), Congress expressly authorized 
the Customs Service to adopt and issue “binding rul- 
ings” to address and resolve tariff classification issues. 
See page 2, supra. Pursuant to that statute, the agency 
has specified that a (19 C.F.R. 177.9(a)): 

ruling letter [thus] issued by the Customs Service 

* * * represents the official position of the 
Customs Service with respect to the particular 
transaction or issue described therein and is binding 
on all Customs Service personnel * * * until 
modified or revoked. In the absence of a change of 
practice or other modification or revocation which 
affects the principle of the ruling set forth in the 
ruling letter, that principle may be cited as author- 
ity in the disposition of transactions involving the 
same circumstances. 

Respondent errs in suggesting (Br. in Opp. 9) that the 
“binding rulings” adopted under this statute are not 
really binding because the regulations caution that they 
are “subject to modification or revocation without 
notice” (19 C.F.R. 177.9(c)) and apply “only with respect 
to transactions involving articles identical” to those 
addressed in the ruling request (19 C.F.R. 177.9(b)(2)). 
Respondent fails to note that the regulations make 
clear that, unless modified or revoked, the classification 

31 

rulings adopted by the agency under these procedures 
are “precedential” and “may be cited as authority in the 
disposition of transactions involving the same circum- 
stances.” 19 C.F.R. 177.9(a). 

Because the agency’s interpretive rulings were 
issued in the format that Congress authorized for this 
specific purpose, the courts below should have deferred 
to these rulings and upheld them if they “implement the 
congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.” 
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. at 307. 

16 See also 
Zenith Radio v. United States, 437 U.S. at 450. 

17 

Otherwise, the legislative intent that the agency em- 
ploy such “binding rulings” to ensure that “the statute 
is applied in a consistent and proper manner” to all 

16 The agency has followed the format prescribed by Congress 
for issuing “binding” interpretive rulings in this case. See 19 
U.S.C. 1502(a); 19 C.F.R. 177.9(a). When, as here, “the question is 
one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding 
in which the agency administering the statute must determine it 
initially, the reviewing court’s function is limited.” NLRB v. 
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). The agency’s 
interpretation of the statutory term is to be accepted in this 
context if it has “a reasonable basis in law.” Ibid. 

17 Nothing in the Christensen decision purported to overrule 
these longstanding precedents that accord a high degree of 
deference to the interpretations of the revenue laws set forth in 
Treasury Department rulings. In Skidmore, the Court had 
emphasized that it “has long given considerable and in some cases 
decisive weight to Treasury Decisions and to interpretative 
regulations of the Treasury and of other bodies that were not of 
adversary origin.” 323 U.S. at 140. And in Correll, which was 
decided twenty years after Skidmore, the Court held that Trea- 
sury rulings are to be sustained when they set forth a “reasonable” 
interpretation of the statute. 389 U.S. at 307. 

32 

taxpayers (United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 
U.S. at 392) would be defeated. 

18 

5. The holding of the court of appeals that “no de- 
ference” would be accorded to the agency’s “binding 
rulings,” and the court’s refusal to consider or address 
the reasoning set forth in those rulings, 

19 also cannot be 
reconciled with the holding in Christensen that even 
informally stated agency opinions are entitled to “some 
deference” (120 S. Ct. at 1662 (quoting Reno v. Koray, 

18 While the Court in Christensen noted that substantive 
regulations issued under the notice and comment procedures of the 
APA are the paradigmatic example of agency action for which 
judicial deference is required (120 S. Ct. at 1662), this Court has 
long made clear that, when Congress has authorized the agency to 
act by alternative methods, the route selected is a matter com- 
mitted to the agency’s discretion. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace 
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-293 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194, 202 (1947). Congress has, in fact, directed the Customs 
Service to employ notice and comment procedures for “binding 
rulings” only when the ruling would “modify * * * or revoke a 
prior interpretive ruling or decision which has been in effect for at 
least 60 days” or would “have the effect of modifying the treatment 
previously accorded by the Customs Service to substantially 
identical transactions.” 19 U.S.C. 1625(c)(1),(2). Pursuant to that 
statute, the interpretive issues involved in this case have been 
aired before the public in several precedential Customs Service 
rulings. See 31 Cust. Bull. 14 (Aug. 27, 1997)(proposing to issue 
HQ 960542, 960762, 960763 & 960764); 31 Cust. Bull. 7 (Oct. 22, 
1997) (adopting those rulings); 29 Cust. Bull. 23 (Apr. 12, 1995) 
(proposing to issue HQ 957667); 29 Cust. Bull. 17 (May 31, 1995) 
(adopting that ruling). 

19 In holding that “no deference” is to be given to the agency’s 
interpretive rulings, the court of appeals relied (Pet. App. 6a-7a) 
on Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 483-484 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). The Rollerblade decision, however, had based its “no 
deference” conclusion on an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. 2643(b) 
which this Court unanimously rejected in United States v. Haggar 
Apparel Co., 526 U.S. at 390-392. 

33 

515 U.S. at 61)), are “entitled to respect” from the 
courts, and should therefore, at a bare minimum, be 
reviewed to determine if they have the “power to 
persuade” (120 S. Ct. at 1663 (quoting Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. at 140)). The conclusion of the 
Federal Circuit in the present case that no considera- 
tion whatever should be given to the content or 
reasoning of the agency’s binding rulings (Pet. App. 7a) 
is thus squarely inconsistent with all of the standards 
of deference described in this Court’s decisions. 

In particular, even an informally announced agency 
interpretation which (unlike the “binding rulings” 
involved in this case) has not been issued in a format 
that Congress has prescribed for interpretive pro- 
nouncements would still warrant “some deference” 
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. at 140. The 
deference afforded to such informal pronouncements 
would be based upon (ibid.): 

the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] con- 
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis- 
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
of those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control. 

The open-ended list of factors described in Skidmore, of 
course, provides only limited guidance to the parties or 
to the courts. 

20 Because the outcome of each dispute 
would be relatively unpredictable under that formula- 
tion, a broad application of that approach would neces- 
sarily magnify the volume and cost of administrative 

20 “Prior to Chevron, courts had frequently done what Chevron 
prohibited: they imposed their own constructions on ambiguous 
agency-administered statutes.” Pierce, Reconciling Chevron and 
Stare Decisis, 85 Geo. L.J. 2225, 2225 (1997). 

34 

21 See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 
at 306-307; note 11, supra. It would also undercut the 
traditional choice that agencies possess in selecting the 
“format” in which they elect to issue statutory inter- 
pretations. See note 18, supra. Nonetheless, even 
under the Skidmore standard, the court of appeals 
erred in flatly holding that the agency’s “binding rul- 
ing” was entitled to “no deference” in this case. 

II. THE CUSTOMS SERVICE REASONABLY INTER- 
PRETED THE STATUTORY CLASSIFICATION 
OF “BOUND” “DIARIES” TO INCLUDE THE 
SPIRAL AND RING-BOUND DAY PLANNERS 
IMPORTED BY RESPONDENT 

Under the proper standard of deference that applies 
to agency interpretations of the “statutes that they 
are charged with administering” (Smiley v. Citibank 
(South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. at 739), the Customs 
Service classification ruling should have been sustained 
in this case. The Headquarters Rulings involved here 
were not sparsely explained or hidden from public view. 
See Pet. App. 28a-47a; note 1, supra. To the contrary, 
the agency’s rulings set forth a significantly more 
refined, and less wooden, interpretation of the statu- 
tory language than is manifested in the decision of the 
court of appeals. 

The tariff classification issue in this case requires 
interpretation of two terms in Subheading 4820.10.20 
of the HTSUS—“diaries” and “bound.” The court of 

21 When courts apply a standard that “directs [the] considera- 
tion of so many elements, * * * almost any result may be 
justified.” Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 292, 298 (1923) (opinion of Brandeis and 
Holmes, JJ.). 

litigation. 

35 

appeals refused to consider the detailed Headquarters 
Rulings (HQ No. 955937 and HRL Nos. 955636, 955637) 
issued by the Customs Service that have “consistently 
determined that articles similar in design and/or 
function to the instant merchandise are classifiable as 
diaries.” Pet. App. 31a. In these rulings, the Service 
has rejected respondent’s reliance on narrowly selected 
dictionary definitions, noting that “[m]any words have 
several definitions and Customs may consider any or all 
of them when making a classification determination.” 
Id. at 33a. 

22 In particular, the Customs Service has ex- 
plained that reliance on any single, narrow definition is 
inconsistent with the commercial context in which the 
tariff provisions apply: business “diaries” are a re- 
cognized commercial product and this “broader concept 
of diary * * * reflects the common and commercial 
identity of these items in the marketplace.” Id. at 34a. 

23 

The Customs Service has also properly concluded 
that these daily planners are “bound” for purposes of 
HTSUS 4820.10.20. Pet. App. 44a-46a. The Customs 
Service disagreed with respondent’s contention that a 
definition of a “bound book” from the publishing 
industry controls in determining whether a “diary” is 
“bound” under this Subheading. “The issue is not what 
constitutes a bound book, and there is no requirement 

22 The Customs Service correctly noted that “the narrower 
definition of ‘diary’, as set forth in the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
first definition, connotes an article containing blank pages used to 
record extensive notations of one’s daily activities. This is not the 
sole format for a diary.” Pet. App. 33a. 

23 The Customs Service found additional support for this func- 
tional approach in the precedents of the former Customs Court. 
Pet. App. 36a-40a (citing Fred Baumgarten v. United States, 49 
Cust. Ct. 275 (1962), and Brooks Bros. v. United States, 68 Cust. 
Ct. 91 (1972)). 

36 

that a diary be in the format of a book.” Id. at 44a. The 
Service instead relied on the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes— 
“which represent the official interpretation of the HTS 
at the international level”—which state that “goods of 
this heading may be bound with materials other than 
paper (e.g., leather, plastics or textile material) and 
have reinforcements or fittings of metal, plastics, etc.” 
Id. at 45a. 

24 The agency concluded that this official ex- 
planation makes it “clear that the Harmonized System 
Committee contemplated metal binders as being within 
this heading’s definition of bound articles.” Ibid. The 
conclusion that respondent’s daily planners are “bound” 
under this Subheading not only comports with the 
official interpretation of the drafting authority, it also 
makes “semantic” sense: “[A] binder, whether a ring 
binder or spiral, is that which binds pages together in a 
fixed order. Pages held together in this manner are 
bound, and the diary is therefore deemed a bound 
article.” Id. at 46a. 

The court of appeals did not suggest that the 
agency’s thorough, well-formulated interpretation of 
the statute is not a reasonable elaboration of its 

24 The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Sys- 
tem Explanatory Notes set forth the official interpretation of the 
international organization that drafted the nomenclature that 
serves as the basis of the HTSUS. These Explanatory Notes “are 
intended to clarify the scope of HTSUS subheadings and to offer 
guidance in interpreting subheadings.” Mita Copystar Am. v. 
United States, 21 F.3d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994). While the 
Explanatory Notes are not “legally binding on the United States,” 
they are “generally indicative of proper interpretation of the 
various provisions of the [HTSUS].” Lynteq, Inc. v. United States, 
976 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 549 (1988)). 

37 

provisions. Instead, the court of appeals simply dis- 
placed the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the 
Tariff Act with another, perhaps plausible, interpreta- 
tion of its own. See pages 8-10, 12-15, supra. 

25 That 
action by the court of appeals was in error: “the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. When, as in this case, the 
agency’s interpretation “defines a term in a way that 
is reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed de- 
sign,” the agency’s judgment is to be given “controlling 
weight.” Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Vari- 
able Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. at 257. See also 
note 7, supra. 

Even under the Skidmore formulation, the decision 
of the court of appeals would have erred by failing to 
give the agency’s interpretation “great deference.” 
United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 
751-752 (1977). Moreover, the refusal of the court of 
appeals to defer to the agency’s interpretations of the 
detailed classification provisions of the Tariff Act has 
substantial practical importance. The agency routinely 
employs “binding rulings,” rather than regulations, to 
address the proper application of the detailed customs 
provisions to the “limitless factual variations” created 

25 In view of the fact that the court of appeals declined to con- 
sider industry usage, and failed to address the official inter- 
pretation of the tariff provision by the international drafting 
authority, it could fairly be questioned whether the decision of the 
court of appeals itself bears the indicia of a “reasonable” 
elaboration of the statute. See pages 12-15, supra. Moreover, in 
insisting that a diary must be retrospective rather than pro- 
spective in nature, the court of appeals ignored the fact that 
notations of forthcoming appointments or engagements also serve 
as a retrospective record of those events after they have occurred. 

38 

by modern commerce (United States v. Correll, 389 
U.S. at 307). 

26 By denying deference to the agency’s 
interpretations of these intricate statutory provisions, 
the Federal Circuit has left both importers and the 
Customs Service without effective guidance for a wide 
range of transactions. The result of the ad hoc ap- 
proach adopted by the court of appeals is expensive 
customs litigation and unpredictable outcomes. 

Indeed, this Court has previously rejected the in- 
efficiency and uncertainty that would result from the 
non-deferential approach adopted by the court of 
appeals in holding in Zenith Radio, 437 U.S. at 450, that 
the agency’s “reasonable” interpretive rulings under 
the Tariff Act are to be sustained by a reviewing court. 
When, as here, “the administrator’s reading fills a gap 
or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of 
the legislature’s revealed design,” the administrative 
interpretation should be given “controlling weight.” 
Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable 
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. at 257 (quoting Chev- 
ron, 467 U.S. at 844). 

26 The agency advises us that its Headquarters Office issues an 
average of more than 1000 “binding rulings” each year involving 
tariff classification, customs valuation and country of origin 
determinations. 

39 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the court of appeals should be re- 
versed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

NEAL S. WOLIN 

General Counsel 
Department of the Treasury 
SETH P. WAXMAN 

Solicitor General 

DAVID W. OGDEN 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE 

Deputy Solicitor General 

KENT L. JONES 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

WILLIAM KANTER 
BRUCE G. FORREST 

Attorneys 

JULY 2000