No. 99-1426 

IN THE 

Supreme Court of the 
United States 

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL., 

Cross-Petitioners, 

v. 

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., 

Cross-Respondents. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR 
REGULATORY STUDIES, KENNETH J. ARROW, 
ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, 

JAGDISH BHAGWATI, MICHAEL J. BOSKIN, 
DAVID F. BRADFORD, ROBERT W. CRANDALL, 
MAUREEN L. CROPPER, CHISTOPHER C. DEMUTH, 
GEORGE C. EADS, MILTON FRIEDMAN, JOHN D. GRAHAM, 
WENDY L. GRAMM, ROBERT W. HAHN, PAUL L. JOSKOW, 
ALFRED E. KAHN, PAUL R. KRUGMAN, LESTER B. LAVE, 
ROBERT E. LITAN, RANDALL W. LUTTER, PAUL W. MACAVOY, 
PAUL W. MCCRACKEN, JAMES C. MILLER III, 
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, 
WALLACE E. OATES, PETER PASSELL, SAM PELTZMAN, 
PAUL R. PORTNEY, ALICE M. RIVLIN, MILTON RUSSELL, 
RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, 

V. KERRY SMITH, ROBERT M. SOLOW, ROBERT N. STAVINS, 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LAURA D’ANDREA TYSON, 
W. KIP VISCUSI, MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, JANET L. YELLEN, 
AND RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER IN SUPPORT OF 
CROSS-PETITIONERS 

ROBERT E. LITAN 

Counsel of Record 
AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER 
FOR REGULATORY STUDIES 
1150 17 

th St., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 797-6120 

July 21, 2000 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .................... 1 

BACKGROUND ................................ 3 

A. Procedural History ............................ 3 

B. Nature and Importance of Benefit-Cost Analysis ..... 4 

C. Evolution of the Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis 
in Regulatory Decisionmaking ................... 5 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................... 7 

ARGUMENT .................................. 7 

I. A GROUP OF ECONOMISTS DEVELOPS A 
CONSENSUS ON THE USE OF BENEFIT-COST 
ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION. .............................. 9 

II. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE GIVEN THE RELEVANT 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES, THE COURT SHOULD 
HOLD THAT SECTION 109(B) ALLOWS 
CONSIDERATION OF BOTH BENEFITS AND 
AND COSTS WHEN SETTING NAAQS. ......... 11 

CONCLUSION ................................ 12 

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE ....................... 13 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 
499 U.S. 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1980) .................. 3 

State of Michigan v. EPA, 
2000 WL 180650 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ................ 6 

Statutes: 

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) ...................... 7, 8, 11 

62 FED. REG. 38,856 (July 18, 1997) 
............... 11 

Executive Order 12291, 
46 FED. REG. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) 
............ 5, 6 

Executive Order 12866, 
58 FED. REG. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) 
..... 2, 5, 6, 11, 12 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (Codified in 15 
U. S. C. § 601 et seq.) .......................... 6 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 
109 Stat. 48 (Codified in 2 U. S. C. § 1535) ........... 6 

ii 

Miscellaneous: 

KENNETH J. ARROW, MAUREEN L. CROPPER, 

GEORGE C. EADS, ROBERT W. HAHN, LESTER B. LAVE, 
ROGER G. NOLL, PAUL R. PORTNEY, MILTON RUSSELL, 
RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, V. KERRY SMITH, AND 

ROBERT N. STAVINS, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN 

ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: 
A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1996) 
............ 4, 9 

ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH, 

ROBERT W. HAHN, ROBERT E. LITAN, 
PIETRO S. NIVOLA, AND PAUL R. PORTNEY, AN AGENDA 

FOR FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM (1997) 
........ 4 

ROBERT H. FRANK AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT 

ANALYSIS AND RELATIVE POSITION (2000) 
.......... 7 

Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, 

Reinventing the Regulatory State, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995) ..................... 5 

Tammy O. Tengs and John D. Graham, 

The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments 
in Life-saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: 
GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 
(Robert W. Hahn ed. 1996) ..................... 2 

iii 

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 

This brief is being submitted on behalf of a group of 
economists.1 The purpose of the brief is not to attempt to guide 
the Court on legal issues but to inform it on economic ones. To 
put ourselves in the best possible position to offer the Court our 
expertise, we have tried to understand, in light of the legal task 
confronting the Court, where our own economic expertise might 
have a useful role to play. 

To that end, we understand that the lawyers who 
brought this case framed the following question for the Court’s 
consideration: “Whether the Clean Air Act requires that the 
Environmental Protection Agency ignore all factors ‘other than 
health effects relating to pollutants in the air’” when setting 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). We also 
understand that this question has arisen in part because the 
United States Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., whose 
responsibility it is to review air quality standards issued by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has interpreted the 
Clean Air Act as barring the EPA from even considering the 
potential costs of its air quality regulations. 

The merits of this legal debate between the D.C. Circuit 
and the counsel who have contested the D.C. Circuit’s views are 
beyond the scope of our economic expertise and hence of this 
brief. Nonetheless, we respectfully offer the following 
observations with hopes that they may ultimately prove useful. 

The importance of this issue cannot be overstated. Both 
the direct benefits and costs of environmental, health, and safety 
regulations are substantial–estimated to be several hundred 

1 No counsel for any party to this case authored this brief in whole or 

in part; and no person other than the amici, their members, or their counsel 
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this 
brief. The signatories express their appreciation for the assistance of 
Jason K. Burnett and Erin M. Layburn, both of the AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, with the preparation of this brief. 

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billion dollars annually. If these resources were better allocated 
with the objective of reducing human health risk, scholars have 
predicted that tens of thousands more lives could be saved each 
year.2 All presidents since Nixon–both Democratic and 
Republican–have attempted to make environmental, health, and 
safety regulations more efficient by requiring some form of 
oversight attempting to balance benefits and costs. President 
Reagan and President Clinton each crafted an executive order 
that required an explicit balancing of benefits and costs for 
major regulations to the extent permitted by law. A 
comprehensive regulatory impact analysis (RIA) prepared in 
conformance with President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 
was done for the ozone and particulate matter rulemaking, but 
it played no official or overt part in the decision in this case 
because of the D.C. Circuit’s view that costs must not be 
considered. 

The issue presented in this case is of great significance 
to amici curiae. In 1998, the American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI) and the Brookings Institution established the AEI- 
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (Joint Center) to 
help improve regulation and the regulatory process. A principal 
focus of the Joint Center is to analyze the economic benefits and 
costs of regulations, such as the ones being considered here, and 
to explore the implications of court decisions involving 
regulation. The Joint Center and the economists submitting this 
brief have a substantial interest in seeing that the Court 

2 See Tammy O. Tengs and John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs 

of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND 

LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 
(Robert W. 

Hahn ed. 1996). (The authors, from the Harvard School of Public Health, 
calculated that improved priority setting across federal agencies could 
provide either savings of $31.1 billion from current cost levels with no 
additional loss of life or savings of 60,200 lives at current cost levels.) 

-3- 

interprets the Clean Air Act in a manner that encourages sound 
decisions and in a way that is consistent with the law as 
established by Congress. 

To that end the Joint Center asked the economists who 
are signatories to this brief to identify principles that are 
appropriate for setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
as well as for making other important regulatory decisions. The 
Joint Center and these economists are accordingly submitting 
this brief in the interest of improving regulatory decisionmaking 
as well as making it more transparent. All parties have 
consented to the filing of this brief. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural History 

In 1996, the EPA initiated rulemakings to revise the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone and 
particulate matter (PM). The EPA prepared an RIA that 
suggested that the costs of the ozone standards would exceed 
the benefits while the benefits of the particulate matter standards 
would exceed the costs. The Joint Center strongly favors using 
such RIAs in decisionmaking and, without endorsing the quality 
of all aspects of the RIA here, believes that the ozone and PM 
RIA should have been considered in setting the standards. The 
D.C. Circuit ruled, however, that Lead Industries barred any 
consideration of costs and hence was unwilling to consider 
whether a balancing of benefits and costs might provide the 
requisite “intelligible principle” needed to resolve the 
constitutional problems that it found with EPA’s interpretation 
of the statute.3 

3 See Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 499 U.S. 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

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B. Nature and Importance of Benefit-Cost 

Analysis 

The concern of the Joint Center along with that of the 
other signatories is how analytical methods, such as benefit-cost 
analysis, should be used in regulatory decisionmaking.4 These 
methods can help promote the design of better regulations by 
providing a sensible framework for comparing the alternatives 
involved in any regulatory choice. Such analysis improves the 
chances that regulations will be designed to achieve a particular 
social goal specified by legislators at a lower cost.5 In addition, 
they can make the regulatory process more transparent by 
providing an analytical basis for a decision. Greater transparency 
in the process, in turn, will help hold regulators and lawmakers 
more accountable for their decisions. 

These analytical methods are neither anti- nor 
proregulation; they can suggest reasons why it would be 
desirable to have tighter or more lenient standards depending on 
the results of an analysis. For example, the benefit-cost analyses 
in the RIA on particulate matter and ozone could be interpreted 
as suggesting that the ozone standard should not be lowered 
while a new PM standard for fine particles should be introduced 
to protect public health. 

4 See KENNETH J. ARROW, MAUREEN L. CROPPER, GEORGE C. EADS, 

ROBERT W. HAHN, LESTER B. LAVE, ROGER G. NOLL, PAUL R. PORTNEY, 
MILTON RUSSELL, RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, V. KERRY SMITH, AND 

ROBERT N. STAVINS, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, 
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1996) 
(“Arrow et al.”); see also ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH, 
ROBERT W. HAHN, ROBERT E. LITAN, PIETRO S. NIVOLA, AND 

PAUL R. PORTNEY, AN AGENDA FOR FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM 
(1997). 

5 See ARROW et al. 

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C. Evolution of the Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis 
in Regulatory Decisionmaking 

Over the past two decades, support has been growing 
for the proposition that weighing of benefits and costs should 
play a more central role in regulatory decisionmaking. All three 
branches of government have recognized the importance of 
considering benefits and costs in designing regulation.6 

To address the increase in regulatory activity over the 
past three decades, the past five presidents and President 
Clinton have introduced different analytical requirements and 
oversight mechanisms with varying degrees of success. A 
central component of later oversight mechanisms was formal 
economic analysis, which included benefit-cost analysis and 
cost-effectiveness analysis. Since 1981, presidents have required 
the preparation of RIAs for a predefined class of significant 
regulations.7 President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 
required an RIA for each significant regulation whose annual 
impact on the economy was estimated to exceed $100 million. 
President Bush used the same executive order. President 
Clinton’s and President Reagan’s executive orders require a 
benefit-cost analysis for significant regulations as well as an 

6 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the 

Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1995). 

7 While the definition of a “significant” regulation has changed 
somewhat over time, it is generally a regulation that is expected to have 
one or more of the following characteristics: an annual impact on the 
economy of $100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices for 
consumers or business; or significant effects on competition, employment, 
investment, productivity, or innovation. President Reagan’s Executive 
Order 12291 described such regulations as “major,” while President 
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 described them as “significant.” We will 
use the term significant because it is used by the most recent executive 
order. 

-6- 

assessment of reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned 
regulation.8 

Congress has also shown increasing interest in 
emphasizing the balancing of benefits and costs in regulatory 
decisions. The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996 requires agencies to submit final regulations to 
Congress for review.9 The regulatory accountability provisions 
of 1996, 1997, and 1998 require the Office of Management and 
Budget to assess the benefits and costs of existing federal 
regulatory programs and to recommend programs or specific 
regulations to reform or eliminate. The Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies, unless prohibited by law, 
to choose the most cost-effective regulatory approach or 
otherwise explain why they have not chosen this alternative. 

10 

The courts have also been receptive to the use of 
benefit-cost analysis in decisionmaking. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit 
recently held in State of Michigan v. EPA, 2000 WL 180650, at 

*12 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that “[i]t is only where there is ‘clear 
congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost’ that we 
find agencies barred from considering costs.” The court went on 
to cite various cases and legal authorities for the “general view 

8 The language in those two executive orders is very similar, suggesting 

bipartisan presidential support for benefit-cost analysis. See Executive 
Order 12291, 46 FED. REG. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). “Regulatory action 
shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the 
regulation outweigh the potential costs to society. . . . Regulatory objectives 

shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society.” Id. at § 2. See 
also Executive Order 12866, 58 FED. REG. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). “In 
deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and 
benefits of available regulatory alternatives. . . . Further, in choosing 

among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those 
approaches that maximize net benefits . . ., unless a statute requires another 
approach.” Id. at § 1. 

9 15 U. S. C. § 601 et seq. 

10 2 U. S. C. § 1535. 

-7- 

that preclusion of cost consideration requires a rather specific 
congressional direction.” Id. This case and others led Professors 
Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein to conclude that 
“[f]ederal law now reflects a kind of default principle: Agencies 
will consider costs, and thus undertake cost-benefit analysis, if 
Congress has not unambiguously said that they cannot.” 

11 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

As we understand it, the D.C. Circuit did not allow the 
EPA to consider the costs of complying with ozone and PM 
NAAQS. As we further understand it, this legal ruling can be 
overturned only by this Court. As economists, we believe that 
the D.C. Circuit’s ruling not allowing the EPA to consider 
important information relating to the consequences of its 
regulatory actions is economically unsound. Without delving 
into the legal aspects of the case, we present below why we 
think the Court should allow the EPA to consider costs in 
setting standards. In particular, we believe that, as a general 
principle, regulators should be allowed to consider explicitly the 
full consequences of their regulatory decisions. These 
consequences include the regulation’s benefits, costs, and any 
other relevant factors. 

ARGUMENT 

We approach the question presented in this case from 
the perspective of the “default principle” summarized by 
Professors Frank and Sunstein. 

Nothing in the following statutory text of section 109(b) 
of the Clean Air Act precludes consideration of costs: 

National primary ambient air quality standards 

. . . shall be ambient air quality standards the 

11 ROBERT H. FRANK AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 

AND RELATIVE POSITION, (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies Working Paper 00-5, 2000), at 8. 

-8- 

attainment and maintenance of which in the 
judgment of the Administrator, based on such 
criteria and allowing a margin of safety, are 
requisite to protect the public health. 

12 

Indeed, the plain aim of this provision is protecting the “public 
health,” and that aim is unlikely to be achieved without, at least, 
an implicit balancing of benefits and costs. 

Benefit-cost analysis is simply a tool that can aid in 
making decisions. Most people do a kind of informal 
benefit-cost analysis when considering the personal pros and 
cons of their actions in everyday life–more for big decisions, like 
choosing a college or job or house, than for little ones, like 
driving to the grocery store. Where decisions, such as federal 
environmental regulations, are by their nature public rather than 
private, the government, as a faithful agent of its citizens, should 
do something similar. 

Carefully considering the social benefits and social costs 
of a course of action makes good sense. Economists and other 
students of government policy have developed ways of making 
those comparisons systematic. Those techniques fall under the 
label benefit-cost analysis. Benefit-cost analysis does not 
provide the policy answer, but rather defines a useful framework 
for debate, either by a legislature or, where the legislature has 
delegated to a specialized agency the responsibility of pursuing 
a general good, by that agency. 

12 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 

-9- 

I. A GROUP OF ECONOMISTS DEVELOPS A 
CONSENSUS ON THE USE OF BENEFIT-COST 
ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION. 

Economists, other policy experts, and the regulatory 
agencies themselves have produced a large literature on the 
methods and applications of benefit-cost analysis. There are, and 
always will be, many uncertainties and disagreements about 
those methods and their application in particular cases. 
Nevertheless, a wide consensus exists on certain fundamental 
matters. In 1996, a group of distinguished economists, including 
Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, were assembled to develop 
principles for benefit-cost analysis in environmental, health, and 
safety regulation. 

13 Here, we summarize and paraphrase for the 
Court a number of principles that we think could be helpful in 
this case, which involves the review of the EPA’s NAAQS 
standard-setting decisions. 

A benefit-cost analysis is a useful way of organizing 
a comparison of the favorable and unfavorable effects of 
proposed policies. Benefit-cost analysis can help the 
decisionmaker better understand the implications of a decision. 
It should be used to inform decisionmakers. Benefit-cost 
analysis can provide useful estimates of the overall benefits and 
costs of proposed policies. It can also assess the impacts of 
proposed policies on consumers, workers, and owners of firms 
and can identify potential winners and losers. 

In many cases, benefit-cost analysis cannot be used to 
prove that the economic benefits of a decision will exceed or fall 
short of the costs. Yet benefit-cost analysis should play an 
important role in informing the decisionmaking process, even 
when the information on benefits, costs, or both is highly 
uncertain, as is often the case with regulations involving the 

13 See ARROW et al. 

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environment, health, and safety. 

Economic analysis can be useful in designing 
regulatory strategies that achieve a desired goal at the 
lowest possible cost. Too frequently, environmental, health, 
and safety regulation has used a one-size-fits-all or 
command-and-control approach. Economic analysis can 
highlight the extent to which cost savings can be achieved by 
using alternative, more flexible approaches that reward 
performance. 

Benefit-cost analysis should be required for all major 
regulatory decisions. The scale of a benefit-cost analysis should 
depend on both the stakes involved and the likelihood that the 
resulting information will affect the ultimate decision. 

Agencies should not be bound by a strict benefit-cost 
test, but should be required to consider available 
benefit-cost analyses. There may be factors other than 
economic benefits and costs that agencies will want to weigh in 
decisions, such as equity within and across generations. 

Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or 
expressed in dollar terms. Care should be taken to ensure 
that quantitative factors do not dominate important 
qualitative factors in decisionmaking. A common critique of 
benefit-cost analysis is that it does not emphasize factors that are 
not easily quantified or monetized. That critique has merit. 
There are two principal ways to address it: first, quantify as 
many factors as are reasonable and quantify or characterize the 
relevant uncertainties; and second, give due consideration to 
factors that defy quantification but are thought to be important. 

-11- 

II. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE GIVEN THE RELEVANT 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES, THE COURT SHOULD 
HOLD THAT SECTION 109(B) ALLOWS 
CONSIDERATION OF BOTH BENEFITS AND 
COSTS WHEN SETTING NAAQS. 

We believe all of the available information should be 
considered in making any important decision. If costs or other 
types of data are deliberately left out, the quality of 
decisionmaking is likely to suffer. In particular, we make one 
recommendation, closely related to the Arrow et al. principles: 
The Court should allow the EPA to consider costs in setting 
NAAQS, so that these costs can then be assessed along with 
benefits and any other important information. 

We believe that it would be imprudent for the EPA to 
ignore costs totally, particularly given their magnitude in this 
case. Together, the EPA estimates that those standards could 
cost on the order of $50 billion annually. Not considering costs 
makes it difficult to set a defensible standard, especially when 
there is no threshold level below which health risks disappear. 
The EPA acknowledges that exposure to ozone presents a 
“continuum” of risk, as opposed to a threshold below which 
adverse health effects cease to occur. 

14 If the EPA is required to 
set a standard “to protect the public health” with an “adequate 
margin of safety,” then ignoring costs could lead to a decision 
to set the standard at zero pollution. 

15 That alternative, however, 
would be self-defeating–it would harm public health by 
threatening the very economic prosperity on which public health 
primarily depends. 

Once the Court allows the EPA to consider costs, 
Executive Order 12866 will require the EPA to consider the full 
range of benefits and costs in setting NAAQS. We think that 

14 62 FED. REG. 38,856, 38,863 (July 18, 1997). 

15 Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 

-12- 

considering such information could improve both the regulatory 
decisionmaking process by making it more transparent and the 
regulatory decision by allowing all relevant information to be 
considered explicitly. 

CONCLUSION 

We believe that this Supreme Court case involving the 
setting of National Ambient Air Quality Standards could be a 
historic moment in the making of regulatory policy. This brief 
has argued that it would be imprudent not to consider costs in 
the setting of standards. In accordance with Executive Order 
12866, we also believe that the full range of benefits and costs 
should be considered in decisionmaking. Accordingly, this Court 
should allow the Environmental Protection Agency to consider 
costs in setting nationwide air quality standards, so that this 
information can be considered along with benefits and any other 
relevant factors in setting a standard. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Robert E. Litan 

Counsel of Record 
AEI-BROOKINGS 
JOINT CENTER FOR 
REGULATORY STUDIES 
1150 17 

th St., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 797-6120 

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The amici curiae are: 

AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 

Kenneth J. Arrow 
Professor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford University 
Nobel Laureate in Economics 

Elizabeth E. Bailey 
John C. Hower Professor of Public Policy, Wharton School, 

University of Pennsylvania 
Former Commissioner, Civil Aeronautics Board 

William J. Baumol 
Professor of Economics Emeritus, Princeton University 
Director, C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York 

University 

Jagdish Bhagwati 
Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics and Professor of Political 

Science, Columbia University 
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations 

Michael J. Boskin 
T. M. Friedman Professor of Economics, Stanford University 
Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

David F. Bradford 
Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, Princeton University 
Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

Robert W. Crandall 
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution 
Fellow, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 

-14- 

Maureen L. Cropper 
Professor of Economics, University of Maryland 
Chair, EPA Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis 

Christopher C. DeMuth 
President, American Enterprise Institute 
Former Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and Budget 

George C. Eads 
Vice President, Charles River Associates 
Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

Milton Friedman 
Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University 
Nobel Laureate in Economics 

John D. Graham 
Professor of Policy and Decision Sciences, Harvard School of 

Public Health, Harvard University 
Director, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis 

Wendy L. Gramm 
Director, Regulatory Studies Program, Mercatus Center, George 

Mason University 
Former Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and Budget 

Robert W. Hahn 
Director, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 

-15- 

Paul L. Joskow 
Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Director, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy 

Research 

Alfred E. Kahn 
Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy 

Emeritus, Cornell University 
Former Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board 

Paul R. Krugman 
Professor of Economics, Princeton University 

Lester B. Lave 
University Professor and Higgins Professor of Economics, 

Carnegie Mellon University 
Member, EPA Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance 

Analysis 

Robert E. Litan 
Vice President and Director, Economic Studies Program, 

Brookings Institution 
Codirector, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 

Randall W. Lutter 
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 
Fellow, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 

Paul W. MacAvoy 
Williams Brothers Professor of Management Studies, Yale School 
of Management, Yale University 
Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

-16- 

Paul W. McCracken 
Edmund Ezra Day Distinguished University Professor Emeritus of 

Business Administration, Economics, and Public Policy, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

James C. Miller III 
John M. Olin Distinguished Fellow, Citizens for a Sound Economy 

Foundation 
Former Director, Office of Management and Budget 

William A. Niskanen 
Chairman, Cato Institute 
Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

William D. Nordhaus 
Griswold Professor of Economics, Yale University 
Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

Wallace E. Oates 
Professor of Economics, University of Maryland 
University Fellow, Resources for the Future 

Peter Passell 
Senior Fellow, Milken Institute 

Sam Peltzman 
Sears, Roebuck Professor of Economics and Financial Services, 

Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago 
Director, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy 
and the State, University of Chicago 

-17- 

Paul R. Portney 
President, Resources for the Future 
Former Chief Economist, President’s Council on Environmental 

Quality 

Alice M. Rivlin 
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution 
Former Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Milton Russell 
Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Tennessee 
Former Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning, and 

Evaluation, Environmental Protection Agency 

Richard L. Schmalensee 
Dean, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology 
Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

Charles L. Schultze 
Senior Fellow Emeritus, Brookings Institution 
Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

V. Kerry Smith 
University Distinguished Professor, North Carolina State 
University 
Director, Center for Environmental and Resource Economics 
Policy, North Carolina State University 

Robert M. Solow 
Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Nobel Laureate in Economics 

-18- 

Robert N. Stavins 
Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, John F. 

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 
Chairman, EPA Environmental Economics Advisory Committee 

Joseph E. Stiglitz 
Professor of Economics, Stanford University 
Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

Laura D'Andrea Tyson 
Dean, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley 
Former Chair, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

W. Kip Viscusi 
John F. Cogan, Jr., Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard 

Law School, Harvard University 

Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Chairman, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington 

University, St. Louis 
Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

Janet L. Yellen 
Eugene E. and Catherine M. Trefethen Professor of Business 

Administration and Professor of Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley 
Former Chair, President’s Council of Economic Advisers 

Richard J. Zeckhauser 
Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy, John F. Kennedy 

School of Government, Harvard University