No. 99-1132 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER 

v. 

CHARLES MCARTHUR 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 

SETH P. WAXMAN 

Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 

JAMES K. ROBINSON 

Assistant Attorney General 

MICHAEL R. DREEBEN 

Deputy Solicitor General 

MATTHEW D. ROBERTS 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

DEBORAH WATSON 

Attorney 

Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
(202) 514-2217 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether police officers who have probable cause to 
believe that a residence contains incriminating evidence 
may temporarily prevent entry in order to preserve the 
evidence while they seek a search warrant. 

(I) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Interest of the United States ...................................................... 
1 

Statement ........................................................................................ 1 

Summary of argument .................................................................. 
4 

Argument: 

Police officers who have probable cause to believe 

that a residence contains incriminating evidence 

may temporarily prevent entry in order to pre- 
serve the evidence while they seek a warrant ................. 

6 

A. By preventing entry into respondent’s 

trailer, the police officers seized the trailer 

but did not seize respondent .................................... 

8 

B. The temporary seizure of respondent’s trailer 

was reasonable because the officers had prob- 
able cause to believe that it contained incrimi- 
nating evidence ........................................................... 

11 

C. Individualized suspicion that evidence would 

be destroyed was not necessary to support the 

temporary seizure ...................................................... 

19 

D. This case involves neither a constructive 

eviction nor a search without a warrant or 

consent ......................................................................... 24 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 26 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) .......................... 

14 

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) ........ 

5, 13, 15, 20 

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) ............ 

14-15, 20 

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) ................... 

8, 9 

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ................ 

5, 13 

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) .................... 

20, 21 

Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) ............................. 10 

(III) 

IV 

Cases—Continued: Page 

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) .................... 

13, 22 

Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) .......................... 

9 

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) ..................... 

25 

Flippo v. West Virginia, 120 S. Ct. 7 (1999) ........... 

17, 18, 22 

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) .............................. 

9 

G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 

(1987) ........................................................................................ 16 

Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) .................... 

9 

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) ................. 

5, 9, 13, 

15, 21 

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) ......................... 
25 

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) .................. 

14, 16 

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ........................ 

24 

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) .................................. 

12 

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1987) .......................... 

11 

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) ............. 

10, 12, 14 

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) .............................. 

13 

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) ......................... 

17, 22 

New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) ........................ 

16, 26 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) ....................... 

5, 16 

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) ................. 

12, 13 

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) ............ 

passim 

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 

385 (1920) ................................................................................. 

11 

Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992) ................... 

13, 14 

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 

(1975) ........................................................................................ 14 

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) ....... 

13, 14, 21 

United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) ................ 

11, 26 

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) ............. 

8, 13 

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 

510 U.S. 43 (1993) .................................................................. 

17 

United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) ........... 

13, 17, 22 

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) ....................... 8 

V 

Cases—Continued: Page 

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 

(1980) ....................................................................................... 9 

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) .............. 

5, 8, 13, 

14, 15, 17, 21 

United States v. Rosi, 27 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 
1994) ........................................................................................ 26 

United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) ............ 

6, 13, 24 

United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 

(1970) ........................................................................................ 14 

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) ......... 

21-22, 23 

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) ............................. 

13 

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) ..................... 

23 

Constitution and statutes: 

U.S. Const. Amend. IV ...................................................... 

passim 

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. (West 1993 & Supp. 2000): 

§ 5/31-4(a) ................................................................................ 

11 

§ 550/4 ....................................................................................... 

10 

§ 600/3.5 (Supp. 2000) ............................................................ 

10 

Miscellaneous: 

2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1856) .............. 

8 

Erwin Griswold, Criminal Procedure, 1969—Is It a 

Means or an End?, 29 Md. L. Rev. 307 (1969) ................. 

12 

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: 

Vol. 1 (3d ed. 1996) ........................................................... 

8-9, 24 

Vol. 3 (1978) ............................................................................ 
14 

Vol. 3 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999) ........................... 
3, 8, 19, 22 

2 NoahWebster, An American Dictionary of the 

English Language (1828) .................................................... 

8 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(1981) ....................................................................................... 8 

S. Rep. No. 2464, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) ...................... 22 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 99-1132 

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER 

v. 

CHARLES MCARTHUR 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 

This case presents the question whether police 
officers who have probable cause to believe that a 
residence contains incriminating evidence may tem- 
porarily prevent entry while they seek a search war- 
rant. The United States has a significant law enforce- 
ment interest in ensuring that police officers may take 
that reasonable step in order to preserve the evidence 
that is the object of the warrant. 

STATEMENT 

On April 2, 1997, respondent’s wife went to the 
trailer she shared with respondent to remove her 
property from the residence. At her request, two police 
officers accompanied her. Pet. App. 2. The officers 
remained outside the trailer while she removed her 
belongings. J.A. 25-26. Afterwards, she told the 

(1) 

2 

officers that respondent had marijuana hidden under 
the couch. An officer then knocked on the door and, 
when respondent answered, informed him of his wife’s 
accusation and asked for permission to search the 
trailer. Respondent denied that he had drugs in the 
trailer but refused to consent to a search. Pet. App. 2. 

Within earshot of respondent, who had come out on 
the porch in front of the trailer, one of the officers asked 
respondent’s wife if she would accompany the other 
officer to a magistrate to obtain a search warrant. J.A. 
26; Pet. App. 2. She agreed and departed with one of 
the officers. The other officer told respondent what 
was happening. From that time until the officers ob- 
tained the warrant, they did not allow respondent to 
enter the trailer unless he agreed to be accompanied by 
an officer. Respondent, so accompanied, entered the 
trailer two or three times to obtain cigarettes and to 
make telephone calls. At those times, the officer stood 
just inside the doorway. Pet. App. 2-3. Following one 
of the phone calls, respondent’s mother arrived at the 
residence. She too was told that she was not permitted 
to enter unless accompanied by an officer. J.A. 17-18. 

While the police officers awaited the arrival of the 
warrant, no officer told respondent that he was under 
arrest, threatened or restrained him, placed him in 
handcuffs, or told him he was not free to leave. Pet. 
App. 3. In less than two hours, an officer returned with 
the warrant, at which time the officers entered the 
trailer, located the marijuana and drug paraphernalia, 
and placed respondent under arrest. Ibid.; J.A. 27. 

Respondent was charged with possession of cannabis 
and drug paraphernalia, in violation of Illinois law. He 
filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence on the 
ground that the police officers had violated the Fourth 
Amendment by preventing him from entering his 

3 

trailer while they obtained the search warrant. Pet. 
App. 1-2. He did not contest the validity of the warrant 
or that the officers had probable cause to believe the 
residence contained marijuana and to secure the 
residence. Id. at 4. At the suppression hearing, respon- 
dent testified that he would have destroyed the mari- 
juana if he had been permitted to enter the trailer 
alone. J.A. 27. 

The trial court granted respondent’s motion to sup- 
press, and the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed. Pet. 
App. 1-14. The appellate court noted that, in Segura v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), “the Court seemed 
to agree that the seizure of a residence and its contents 
is permissible absent exigent circumstances if there is 
probable cause, but that entry into the residence when 
securing it requires probable cause and exigent circum- 
stances.” Pet. App. 8. The appellate court opined, how- 
ever, that Segura did not address whether police offi- 
cers, while securing a dwelling, may “limit the freedom 
of movement of persons within, into or out of the 
secured premises.” Ibid. (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 6.5(c) at 366 (3d ed. 1996)) (inter- 
nal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that 
Segura did not address cases in which “police enter and 
incident to the entry either keep persons entitled to be 
in the premises under close scrutiny or else require 
such persons to leave or not enter those premises.” 
Ibid. (quoting 3 LaFave, supra, § 6.5(c) at 365). 

The court concluded that “[t]his case represents a 
situation that Segura did not address” and that “there 
was no authority for the police action in this case.” Pet. 
App. 12. The court recognized that “there is no evi- 
dence the police affirmatively ordered [respondent] out 
of the trailer.” Id. at 11-12. The court nonetheless held 
that “the police conduct amounted to a constructive 

4 

eviction of [respondent] from his residence” because 
respondent was on “the front porch when police told 
him he had to remain outside the trailer” and he was 
thus “still on his premises.” Id. at 12. The court further 
concluded that the police officers “secured the dwelling 
from the inside” because an officer accompanied respon- 
dent when he went inside to obtain cigarettes and to 
make phone calls. Ibid. That entry, the court held, was 
illegal because, in the court’s view, it was not justified 
by exigent circumstances. The court concluded that 
“the police conduct in securing [respondent’s] residence 
while awaiting the search warrant was an unreasonable 
seizure (and probably an unreasonable search) under 
the fourth amendment so that the evidence discovered 
in the residence upon execution of the search warrant 
was properly suppressed.” Id. at 13.1 The Supreme 
Court of Illinois denied petitioner leave to appeal. Id. 
at 15. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

Although the police officers seized respondent’s 
trailer when they temporarily prevented his entry, that 
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
To determine the reasonableness of a seizure, the Court 
balances the government’s law enforcement interests 
against the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests. 
That analysis indicates that police officers who have 
probable cause to believe that a residence contains 

1 The court speculated that the police officers may also have 
unlawfully seized respondent, but it did not decide that issue. Pet. 
App. 13-14. The court did not address petitioner’s argument 
(Illinois Br. 18, 35-37) that, even if securing respondent’s residence 
was unlawful, the contraband discovered later during the search 
pursuant to a valid, untainted warrant was admissible because it 
had an independent source. 

5 

evidence may temporarily prevent entry in order to 
preserve the evidence while they seek a warrant. 

The Court has repeatedly recognized that there is a 
strong law enforcement interest in preventing tamper- 
ing with evidence. On the other side of the balance, the 
intrusion caused by a seizure, which invades only pos- 
sessory and not privacy interests, is limited. Moreover, 
the seizure here—a bar on entry pending issuance of a 
warrant—is temporary and restricts only immediate 
use of the property. 

The Court’s precedents confirm that the interest in 
preserving evidence can temporarily supercede an 
individual’s possessory interest in property when there 
is probable cause to believe that the property contains 
incriminating evidence. Police officers may make such 
warrantless seizures of evidence in plain view; they 
may also seize containers and vehicles based on prob- 
able cause to believe that they are associated with 
criminal activity. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 
128, 136-137 (1990); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 701-702 (1983); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 
761 (1979); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 
(1925). In dicta, the Court has approved the conduct at 
issue here—securing premises from the outside to pre- 
vent destruction of evidence within. See, e.g., Segura v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). Because securing a 
dwelling from the outside by preventing entry does not 
invade the physical integrity of the residence or the 
privacy of the occupants, the rule that a warrant or a 
valid exception is required when police officers enter or 
search a home is not implicated. Cf. Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 

Although the police officers had particularized suspi- 
cion that respondent would destroy evidence if he was 
allowed to enter his trailer unaccompanied, the Fourth 

6 

Amendment does not require such individualized suspi- 
cion before officers may secure a residence from the 
outside while seeking a warrant. The inherent risk of 
tampering with evidence justifies that limited interfer- 
ence with the owner’s use of his property. Requiring 
individualized suspicion would impose unwarranted 
impediments to law enforcement and generate unnec- 
essary litigation. 

The Appellate Court of Illinois erred in concluding 
that the police officers constructively evicted respon- 
dent and entered his trailer without his consent or a 
warrant. Respondent was on his front porch when the 
officers prevented his entry into the trailer, and that 
location, which is exposed to and used by the visiting 
public, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment from 
government intrusion. See United States v. Santana, 
427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). An officer entered the trailer 
without a warrant only to accompany respondent when 
he made phone calls and obtained cigarettes. Respon- 
dent, who had lawfully been instructed that he could 
only enter if he agreed to be accompanied, consented to 
those entries. 

ARGUMENT 

POLICE OFFICERS WHO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO BELIEVE THAT A RESIDENCE CONTAINS 
INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE MAY TEMPORARILY 
PREVENT ENTRY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE 
EVIDENCE WHILE THEY SEEK A WARRANT 

In Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule did not require the suppression of evidence seized 
from a residence pursuant to a valid search warrant 
even though federal agents had earlier entered illegally 
and then remained inside to prevent destruction of 

7 

evidence. Id. at 799, 813-816. Five Justices agreed that 
the exclusionary rule did not apply. Ibid. Two Justices 
also addressed whether the agents’ securing of the 
premises complied with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 
805-813 (Burger, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J.). Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice O’Connor concluded that, 
when police officers have probable cause to believe that 
a residence contains evidence of criminal activity, they 
may temporarily secure the dwelling to prevent re- 
moval or destruction of evidence. Ibid. 

This case poses a question similar to the one ad- 
dressed by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O’Connor 
in Segura: whether police officers may, while they seek 
a search warrant, secure a residence (in this case, from 
the outside) when they have probable cause to believe 
that it contains incriminating evidence. As the Appel- 
late Court of Illinois recognized, “[a]t the heart of this 
issue is the preservation of evidence. Clearly, if police 
secure a dwelling they prohibit the destruction of the 
sought-after evidence. On the other hand, if police do 
not secure a dwelling, they risk losing the evidence.” 
Pet. App. 11. Contrary to the conclusion of the appel- 
late court, however, the Fourth Amendment does not 
prevent police officers from guarding against that risk. 
Police officers who have probable cause to believe that 
a residence contains incriminating evidence may tem- 
porarily prevent entry in order to preserve the status 
quo while they seek a warrant.2 

2 Respondent has contested neither the existence of probable 
cause to believe that his trailer contained marijuana nor the valid- 
ity of the search warrant obtained by the police officers. Pet. App. 

4. This case therefore does not present the question whether a 
temporary prohibition on entry into a residence requires suppres- 
sion when police officers reasonably believe that they have prob- 
able cause but a magistrate or a reviewing court ultimately 

8 

A. By Preventing Entry Into Respondent’s Trailer, The 

Police Officers Seized The Trailer But Did Not Seize 

Respondent 

“From the time of the founding to the present, the 
word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking possession.’ ” Califo- 
nia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (quoting 2 
Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English 
Language 67 (1828); 2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 
510 (6th ed. 1856); Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 2057 (1981)). A seizure of property thus 
occurs “when there is some meaningful interference 
with an individual’s possessory interests in that pro- 
perty.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 
(1984). Therefore, the police officers “seized” respon- 
dent’s trailer when they interfered with his possessory 
interests by temporarily preventing his unaccompanied 
entry.3 

determines that their belief was mistaken. Cf. United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). Nor does the case present the ques- 
tion whether preventing entry may be justified in some circum- 
stances when police officers have only reasonable suspicion that 
the premises contain incriminating evidence. Cf. United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983). Finally, as we explain at pp. 24-26, 
infra, this case does not present the question whether police 
officers can either enter the premises or order the occupants to 
leave in order to secure the premises. See generally 3 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.5(c) at 361-373 (3d ed. 1996 & 
Supp. 1999). 

3 The seizure of the trailer was not, however, also a seizure of 
the contraband that the officers discovered only when they later 
searched the trailer pursuant to a warrant. Police officers seize a 
tangible, movable object only when they take it under their physi- 
cal control. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624 (“For most purposes at 
common law, [“seizure”] connoted not merely grasping, or applying 
physical force to, the animate or inanimate object in question, but 
actually bringing it within physical control.”); 1 LaFave, supra, 

9 

Although the officers seized respondent’s residence 
by securing it and preventing unaccompanied entries, 
they did not seize respondent. A seizure of a person 
occurs only when “a reasonable person would believe 
that he or she is not ‘free to leave.’ ” Florida v. Bostick, 
501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991); see also Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 
627-628. Circumstances that “might indicate a seizure 

* * * [include] the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some 
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use 
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer’s request might be compelled.” United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion 
of Stewart, J.). 

The only restriction on respondent’s movements was 
that he was not allowed to enter his trailer (unless 
accompanied by an officer) for less than two hours while 
the police obtained a search warrant. He was not 
threatened or physically restrained; he was not hand- 
cuffed; he was not told that he was under arrest or 
given Miranda warnings. J.A. 29-30; Pet. App. 14. 
Under those circumstances, a reasonable person would 

§ 2.1, at 375-376 (3d ed. 1996) (defining seizure as the “act of physi- 
cally taking and removing tangible personal property”). Police 
officers therefore do not seize evidence until they actually discover 
it and assert control over it, even if they have secured the prem- 
ises where the evidence is located. For that reason, the Court has 
given detailed consideration to the circumstances in which police 
officers may seize evidence found in plain view while executing a 
warrant, even though the area being searched is already under 
their custody and control. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 
128 (1990). And the Court has characterized the taking of individ- 
ual items from an automobile as a seizure even when police officers 
had previously seized the automobile. See, e.g., Colorado v. 
Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 
234, 236 (1968). 

10 

not have believed that he was unable to go anywhere 
else he desired. Indeed, respondent agreed that the 
officers never indicated that he was not free to leave. 
J.A. 29. Thus, he was not seized within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. 

A contrary conclusion could cast doubt on the validity 
of well-established law enforcement practices that are 
commonly recognized as constitutional. Police officers 
often must cordon off an area during an investigation, 
for example, to apprehend a fugitive or to investigate a 
bomb threat. When they do so, they do not thereby 
seize the persons whom they prevent from entering the 
area. Cf. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 69 (1999) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (discussing with approval situations in which 
“the police tell a pedestrian not to enter a building and 
the reason is to avoid impeding a rescue team, or to 
protect a crime scene, or to secure an area for the 
protection of a public official”).4 

4 In any event, seizure of respondent would have been justified 
because police officers had probable cause to believe he had com- 
mitted a crime based on his wife’s statement that he had marijuana 
hidden under his couch. See J.A. 15, 19; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 550/4 
(West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (criminalizing possession of marijuana); 
id. 600/3.5 (West 2000) (criminalizing possession of drug para- 
phernalia). This case does not present the question whether, 
absent probable cause, seizure of respondent would have been 
justified as incident to the temporary seizure of his trailer pending 
issuance of a warrant. Cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 
(1981) (“a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable 
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”) 
(footnote omitted); id. at 702 n.17 (suggesting that the Court would 
reach the same result with regard to a lawful search without a 
warrant). 

11 

B. The Temporary Seizure Of Respondent’s Trailer Was 

Reasonable Because The Officers Had Probable Cause 

To Believe That It Contained Incriminating Evidence 

1. The essential requirement of the Fourth Amend- 
ment is that searches and seizures be reasonable. See 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997). To deter- 
mine the reasonableness of a search or seizure, the 
Court balances the government’s law enforcement 
interests against the intrusion on Fourth Amendment 
interests. Ibid. Application of that analysis here indi- 
cates that the police officers acted reasonably in tem- 
porarily preventing entry into respondent’s trailer, 
which they had probable cause to believe contained 
incriminating evidence, in order to preserve that 
evidence while they sought a warrant.5 

5 Even if the seizure of respondent’s residence had been unlaw- 
ful, the Illinois courts should not have excluded the evidence, 
which was seized in a lawful search pursuant to a valid, untainted 
warrant. The warrant, the validity of which respondent does not 
contest, Pet. App. 4, was supported by information that the officers 
obtained from respondent’s wife before any interference with 
respondent’s Fourth Amendment interests. As we noted at pp. 6- 
7, supra, the Court held in Segura that evidence obtained pursuant 
to such a warrant is admissible based on the “independent source” 
rule regardless of whether unlawful police action preserved the 
evidence. See 468 U.S. at 813-816; see generally Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). That hold- 
ing applies here. The only sense in which the seized evidence could 
be viewed as “in some sense the product of illegal governmental 
activity,” United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980), is 
because respondent would have illegally destroyed the evidence if 
the officers had not prevented his entry into the trailer. See J.A. 
27; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/31-4(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) 
(criminalizing destruction of evidence to prevent apprehension). 
The Court rejected that reasoning in Segura, explaining that there 
is no “ ‘constitutional right’ to destroy evidence.” 468 U.S. at 816. 
As we explained at note 1, supra, the appellate court did not 

12 

a. Law enforcement has a strong interest in preven- 
ing tampering with evidence pending the issuance and 
execution of a warrant to search for and seize that 
evidence. “Unless there is some kind of a power to 
prevent removal of material from the premises, or 
destruction of material during this time, the search 
warrant will almost inevitably be fruitless.” Segura, 
468 U.S. at 809 n.7 (Burger, C.J., joined by O’Connor, 
J.) (quoting Erwin Griswold, Criminal Procedure, 1969 
—Is It a Means or an End?, 29 Md. L. Rev. 307, 317 
(1969)). That interest is particularly pronounced in the 
case of evidence that is capable of ready destruction, 
such as narcotics. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 
385, 391 (1997) (drug investigations frequently present 
the risk that evidence will be destroyed if occupants 
have advance notice of a search); Michigan v. Sum- 
mers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (search for narcotics 
likely to trigger “frantic efforts to conceal or destroy 
evidence”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 28 n.3 (1963) 
(likely that suspects will attempt to dispose of drugs 
before police seize them). Indeed, respondent acknowl- 
edged that he would have destroyed the marijuana if he 
had been allowed to reenter his trailer unaccompanied 
by an officer. J.A. 27. 

This Court has recognized the importance of the 
interest in preventing tampering with evidence in a 
variety of contexts. A limited search incident to an 
arrest is permitted in part because of the danger of 
destruction of evidence, even when police officers have 

address the independent-source issue in its opinion in this case, 
although petitioner raised the issue. In their briefs before the 
appellate court, the parties disputed whether petitioner had prop- 
erly preserved the issue. See Defendant-Appellee Br. 3; Illinois 
Reply Br. 12-16. 

13 

no individualized suspicion that the person arrested is 
concealing evidence or intends to destroy it. See 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The risk 
of losing evidence likewise supports the rules that in- 
criminating evidence found in plain view, and contain- 
ers and vehicles linked with criminal activity, may be 
seized without a warrant. See United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 701-702 (1983); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U.S. 753, 761 (1979); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 153 (1925). The danger that evidence may be lost 
also underlies the authority of firefighting officials to 
remain in a building for a reasonable time and search it 
after extinguishing a fire. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 
499, 510 (1978). Indeed, when police officers have in- 
dividualized suspicion that evidence will be destroyed, 
they may make intrusions as significant as entering a 
dwelling without knocking and announcing their 
presence or obtaining a warrant. See, e.g., Richards, 
520 U.S. at 395; United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 
43 (1976); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 
(1951). 

b. The intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests at 
issue here—temporarily preventing entry into a resi- 
dence while police officers seek a warrant—is limited. 
Unlike a search, which invades privacy interests, a sei- 
zure affects only possessory interests. See Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Soldal v. Cook 
County, 506 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1992); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 
113 & n.5, 122, 126 (1983); United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U.S. 1, 13-14 & n.8 (1977). Seizures of property, 
such as the prohibition on entry here, are thus gener- 
ally less intrusive than searches, because privacy is the 
“principal object” protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). See 
Segura, 468 U.S. at 806 (Burger, C.J., joined by 

14 

O’Connor, J.); Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13-14 n.8. See also 
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (“The 
decisions of this Court have time and again underscored 
the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment to 
shield the citizen from unwarranted invasions into his 
privacy.”). Cf. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 62-66 (rejecting 
contention that seizures involving no intrusion on 
privacy or personal liberty are immune from scrutiny 
under the Fourth Amendment). 

The intrusion on respondent’s Fourth Amendment 
interests was particularly limited because the police 
officers prohibited entry into his trailer only temporar- 
ily (for less than two hours while they obtained a search 
warrant) and because they did not infringe his other 
possessory interests—such as the right to sell or to 
encumber the property. See J.A. 27. This Court has 
repeatedly recognized that temporary seizures are less 
intrusive than permanent ones. See, e.g., Place, 462 
U.S. at 705-706, 709; Summers, 452 U.S. at 701, 705 

n.21; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 
(1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); 
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-253 
(1970). 

Moreover, the intrusiveness of a seizure to preserve 
evidence while police officers seek a warrant is further 
reduced because there should be a prompt judicial 
determination whether there is probable cause to 
search the house and seize evidence within it. See 
Place, 462 U.S. at 709; Summers, 452 U.S. at 701 n.14 
(quoting with approval 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 9.2, at 40 (1978) (reasonableness of a 
detention may be determined in part by “whether the 
police are diligently pursuing a means of investigation 
which is likely to resolve the matter one way or another 
very soon”)); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 575 

15 

(1991) (“we can assume that a warrant will be routinely 
forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases”).6 

2. The Court’s precedents confirm that “society’s 
interest in the discovery and protection of incriminating 
evidence from removal or destruction can supersede, at 
least for a limited period, a person’s possessory interest 
in property, provided that there is probable cause to 
believe that that property is associated with criminal 
activity.” Segura, 468 U.S. at 808 (Burger, C.J., joined 
by O’Connor, J.). For example, as we discussed above, 
if police officers have probable cause to believe that a 
container holds evidence, they may seize the container 
while they secure a warrant. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 
U.S. at 575; Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761. Indeed, they may 
seize it pending investigation based upon reasonable 
suspicion. See Place, 462 U.S. at 706. Further, when 
police officers are lawfully present in a particular place, 
they may seize evidence in plain view provided they 
have probable cause to believe that it is associated with 
criminal activity. See, e.g., Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-137; 
Place, 462 U.S. at 701-702. These precedents reflect 
the principle that, because of the general risk of 
tampering with or loss of evidence, police officers may 
take reasonable measures to preserve the status quo 
pending issuance of a search warrant. 

That principle also applies when, as in this case, 
police officers have probable cause to believe that evi- 
dence is contained in a dwelling. They may secure the 
dwelling to preserve the evidence by preventing entry 
for a reasonable period while they seek a warrant to 
search for and seize the evidence. 

6 The intrusion on respondent’s Fourth Amendment interests 
was even more limited because the police allowed him to enter his 
trailer accompanied by an officer. J.A. 22, 27-28, 30. 

16 

a. Absent consent or exigent circumstances, a war- 
rant is generally necessary to enter a dwelling whether 
to make an arrest or to search for and seize evidence 
that may be inside. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 586-590 (1980); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977). “But the home is 
sacred in Fourth Amendment terms not primarily be- 
cause of the occupants’ possessory interests in the 
premises, but because of their privacy interests in the 
activities that take place within.” Segura, 468 U.S. at 
810 (Burger, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J.). 

As the Court made clear in Payton, “the physical 
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” 445 
U.S. at 585. Entry into a dwelling invades the privacy 
interests that lie at the heart of the Fourth Amend- 
ment. See id. at 587-588 & n.26; Jones, 357 U.S. at 498. 
Therefore, “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm 
line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent cir- 
cumstances [or consent], that threshold may not reason- 
ably be crossed without a warrant.” 445 U.S. at 590. 
See also New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990) (ex- 
plaining that “the rule in Payton was designed to pro- 
tect the physical integrity of the home”) (emphasis 
added). 

When police officers temporarily secure a dwelling 
from the outside, as they did here, they do not make an 
entry or otherwise invade the occupant’s privacy inter- 
ests in the home. The considerations that justify the 
warrant requirement are therefore absent, and the 
general rule permitting temporary seizures to preserve 
evidence based on probable cause applies.7 

7 Of course, a temporary seizure that would otherwise be lawful 
may be rendered unlawful by the manner in which it is executed, 

17 

b. The Court’s opinions reflect the understanding 
that a temporary seizure of a dwelling to preserve evi- 
dence pending issuance of a warrant is reasonable un- 
der the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Jeffers, 
342 U.S. at 52, the Court held that a warrantless entry 
into a hotel room was unconstitutional because there 
were no exigent circumstances, such as “imminent 
destruction, removal, or concealment of the property 
intended to be seized.” The Court reasoned that police 
officers “could have easily prevented any such destruc- 
tion or removal by merely guarding the door.” Ibid. 
Similarly, in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 
(1978), the Court held unconstitutional a warrantless 
search of an apartment in which a homicide had been 
committed. The Court noted approvingly, however, the 
use of a police guard to prevent destruction of evidence. 
Id. at 394. And, in Flippo v. West Virginia, 120 S. Ct. 7 
(1999) (per curiam), the Court reaffirmed that a war- 
rantless search of a dwelling in which a homicide has 
occurred is not permitted, but did not suggest that 
police officers acted improperly in “clos[ing] off the 
area” (ibid.) and “secur[ing]” the scene (id. at 8). 
Indeed, in rejecting the contention that the trial court 
had found the search justified by exigent circum- 

including its duration. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707-710. And a total, 
permanent seizure of a dwelling may so significantly intrude on the 
occupant’s possessory interests that even a warrant is not 
sufficient. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 
510 U.S. 43 (1993) (due process requires notice and hearing before 
seizure of real property for forfeiture because such a seizure gives 
government the right to prohibit sale, to evict occupants, to modify 
the property, to condition occupancy, and to receive rents). The 
seizure for the purposes of preserving evidence that occurred here, 
however, lasted less than two hours and involved only a limited 
restriction on respondent’s right to use his property. 

18 

stances, the Court reasoned that “[i]t seems implausible 
that the court found that there was a risk of intentional 
or accidental destruction of evidence at a ‘secured’ 
crime scene.” Id. at 8 n.2. 

In Segura, the Court addressed the securing of a 
dwelling from the inside. As noted above, in that case, 
federal agents entered an apartment, arrested the occu- 
pants, and then remained on the premises to preserve 
evidence until they obtained a warrant. 468 U.S. at 
800-801. The government conceded that the entry was 
illegal but argued that the subsequent securing of the 
premises was lawful and that evidence obtained in a 
search pursuant to the warrant was admissible. Id. at 
804. The Court upheld the admissibility of the evi- 
dence. See id. at 798-799. 

Chief Justice Burger, in a portion of the opinion 
joined by Justice O’Connor, concluded that a temporary 
warrantless seizure of property is reasonable when 
police officers have probable cause to believe the pro- 
perty contains evidence of a crime and a seizure will 
preserve the status quo and the availability of the 
evidence. See 468 U.S. at 805-813. Applying that con- 
clusion to the securing of premises, the Chief Justice 
approved of a course of action by which police officers 
would “secure the premises from the outside by a 
‘stakeout’ once the security check revealed that no one 
other than those taken into custody w[as] in the 
apartment.” Id. at 811. Five Justices joined the 
remainder of the opinion, which held that, regardless of 
the legality of the initial entry, the evidence was 
lawfully seized pursuant to an untainted warrant and 
should not be suppressed. Id. at 813-814. The Court 
indicated that the agents lawfully could have secured 
the premises from the outside. See id. at 814 (“Had 
police never entered the apartment, but instead con- 

19 

ducted a perimeter stakeout to prevent anyone from 
entering the apartment and destroying evidence, the 
contraband now challenged would have been discovered 
and seized precisely as it was here.”). Indeed, even the 
dissenters apparently agreed that the authorities could 
have sealed off the premises from the outside without 
violating the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 824 n.15 
(dissenting opinion) (“I assume impoundment would be 
permissible even absent exigent circumstances when it 
occurs ‘from the outside’—when the authorities merely 
seal off premises pending the issuance of a warrant but 
do not enter.”). Thus, all of the Justices in Segura ap- 
pear to have endorsed the external securing of a dwell- 
ing while the police seek a warrant. See 3 LaFave, 
supra, § 6.5(c) at 366. 

C. Individualized Suspicion That Evidence Would Be 

Destroyed Was Not Necessary To Support The Tem- 
porary Seizure 

In this case, the police officers had reasonable suspi- 
cion that respondent would destroy evidence if he was 
allowed to enter his trailer alone.8 The Fourth 

8 Respondent’s awareness of the police presence outside his 
residence (J.A. 25-26) was sufficient grounds for a reasonable of- 
ficer to suspect that respondent would destroy narcotics that he 
had hidden inside. The reasonableness of that suspicion was 
strengthened here by several other circumstances: First, respon- 
dent knew that police officers were assisting his wife while she 
moved out (ibid.), and respondent might therefore have suspected 
that she would tell the officers about his drugs in order to get him 
into trouble (see J.A. 20). Second, after respondent’s wife told the 
officers about the contraband, they confronted him with her 
accusation and sought his consent to a search. J.A. 16. Finally, 
after he refused, respondent overheard his wife’s conversation 
with the officers in which she agreed to accompany an officer to 
seek a search warrant. J.A. 26. 

20 

Amendment, however, does not require such indi- 
vidualized suspicion before police officers may prevent 
entry into a residence while seeking a warrant. The 
inherent risk that evidence will be destroyed, altered, 
or concealed is sufficient to justify that limited inter- 
ference with the owner’s use of the property.9 

1. The cases in which the Court has approved tem- 
porary seizures based on probable cause have not 
involved particularized suspicion that evidence would 
be destroyed or damaged. As Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice O’Connor noted in Segura, the Court in Sanders 
approved the warrantless seizure of a suitcase from a 
car even though police officers could have followed the 
car until a warrant issued in order to ensure that evi- 
dence would not be lost. 468 U.S. at 808; see Sanders, 
442 U.S. at 761. See also Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575 (not- 
ing that “[l]aw enforcement officers may seize a con- 
tainer and hold it until they obtain a search warrant” 
without indicating that there is any requirement of 
particularized suspicion that the container will be 
moved or its contents disturbed). Likewise, in 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court 
held that, because police officers had probable cause to 
search an automobile, they could seize and impound it 

9 As we noted at p. 12, supra, that risk is especially prevalent 
when the evidence for which the officers are seeking a warrant is 
narcotics or another readily destructible material. Nonetheless, 
almost all evidence is subject to tampering that may impair its 
usefulness to police investigators; for example, the serial numbers 
on stolen merchandise can be removed or obscured even if the 
merchandise is too large to destroy. The possibility that there may 
be a few situations in which there is no danger of tampering with 
evidence does not justify a general requirement of individualized 
suspicion, which would pose impediments to law enforcement and 
could consume significant judicial resources, see pp. 22-23, infra. 

21 

“for whatever period [was] necessary to obtain a 
warrant for the search” (id. at 51), even though “there 
was no immediate fear that the evidence was in the 
process of being destroyed or otherwise lost.” Segura, 
468 U.S. at 807 (Burger, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J.). 

10 

Similarly, individualized suspicion that the evidence 
will be destroyed is not required to justify the seizure 
of evidence in plain view, see Horton, 496 U.S. at 136- 
137, even though the Court has explained that seizure 
of such evidence without a warrant is reasonable be- 
cause of the “risk of the item’s disappearance.” Place, 
462 U.S. at 701. 

11 Nor is a particularized suspicion that 
a wanted felon will flee necessary to justify a public 
arrest without a warrant. See United States v. Watson, 

10 The Court went on to hold that the car could be searched 
immediately because “there is little to choose in terms of practical 
consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and 
the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained.” Chambers, 
399 U.S. at 52. The Court noted that the same reasoning would not 
necessarily support immediate search of a house based on probable 
cause alone but explained that “there is a constitutional difference 
between houses and cars.” Ibid.; see also Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 
12-13 (noting lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles). 

11 Our rule is thus consistent with the Court’s statement in 
Place that temporary seizures do not require a warrant “if the exi- 
gencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement is present.” 462 U.S. at 701. 
Because there is generally a risk that evidence will be destroyed or 
tampered with while police officers are seeking a warrant, “the 
exigencies of the circumstances demand” (ibid.) that a seizure 
based on probable cause be permitted, at least where, as here, the 
seizure involves no concomitant invasion of privacy. Thus, the 
Court in Place identified the seizure of weapons or contraband in 
plain view as an example of when the exigencies of the circum- 
stances justify seizure without a warrant even though the Court 
has not required individualized suspicion that evidence in plain 
view will be destroyed to support its warrantless seizure. 

22 

423 U.S. 411, 423-424 (1976). Rather, “it is recognized 
that in any felony case the person to be arrested may 
attempt to flee.” Chimel, 395 U.S. at 780 (White, J., dis- 
senting, joined by Black, J.) (quoting S. Rep. No. 2464, 
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950)). 

Most to the point, the Court has signaled its approval 
of the external securing of a dwelling in cases in which 
there was no particularized reason to believe that evi- 
dence would be damaged or destroyed. For example, in 
Mincey, in which the Court approved stationing the 
guard at the entrance to the apartment, “[t]here was no 
indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or 
removed during the time required to obtain a search 
warrant.” 437 U.S. at 394. See also Flippo, 120 S. Ct. 
at 8 n.2; Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 52. And, in Segura, “[a]ll 
members of the Court appear[ed] to agree that the 
mere seizure of the premises and contents (that is, a 
mere interference with possessory interests) is per- 
missible on probable cause even absent exigent circum- 
stances.” 3 LaFave, supra, § 6.5(c) at 366 (emphasis 
added). 

2. Law enforcement would be impeded if police 
officers were required to develop particularized suspi- 
cion that each person whose entry they sought to 
prevent was likely to tamper with evidence. If there 
were such a requirement, an officer could not prevent 
someone’s entry into a residence even if the officer had 
probable cause to believe that the residence contained 
evidence of a crime, unless he also had specific reason to 
suspect that the particular person was implicated in the 
illegal conduct. 

Yet entry by an individual whom the evidence does 
not incriminate may pose a significant (if unknown) risk 
that evidence will be removed or destroyed. Although 
such an individual may not have a direct interest in 

23 

tampering with the evidence, he may nonetheless be 
willing to destroy evidence to assist others whom the 
evidence does incriminate, or even to avoid suspicion 
being cast on him. His willingness to do so will depend 
on a wide array of facts that will be difficult for police 
officers to ascertain, including whether he knows that 
the evidence exists, whether he knows that the officers 
are planning to seize it, whether he knows that the evi- 
dence is incriminating, whether he knows whom it 
incriminates, his relationship to the individuals whom it 
incriminates, and his willingness to obstruct justice in 
order to aid those individuals. 

In this case, for example, respondent’s mother 
arrived at the trailer after a phone conversation with 
respondent. J.A. 17-18. The police officers could not 
know whether she was involved in, or even aware of, 
her son’s possession of marijuana. Further, they could 
not be sure whether respondent had informed her of 
the events unfolding at the trailer. And the officers 
could not know whether she was willing to destroy the 
evidence to protect her son. 

A requirement of individualized suspicion not only 
would impede law enforcement but also would consume 
judicial resources with litigation over the reasonable- 
ness of police judgments in particular cases. The Court 
has relied on the prospect of such litigation in declining 
to require an inquiry into individualized suspicion in 
other Fourth Amendment contexts. See, e.g., Wyoming 

v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305 (1999); Watson, 423 U.S. 
at 423-424. That consideration also supports rejection 
of a case-by-case inquiry into the danger of evidence 
tampering here. 

24 

D. This Case Involves Neither A Constructive Eviction 

Nor A Search Without A Warrant Or Consent 

The Appellate Court of Illinois held that the police 
officers violated the Fourth Amendment in this case for 
two reasons: First, the court concluded that the 
officers “contructive[ly] evict[ed] [respondent] from his 
residence” because he was on his front porch when they 
told him he could not enter his trailer alone while they 
sought a warrant. Pet. App. 12. Second, the court 
concluded that the officers conducted an unjustified, 
warrantless search when an officer accompanied re- 
spondent into the trailer while he made telephone calls 
and obtained cigarettes. Id. at 12-13. Both conclusions 
are incorrect. 

1. The appellate court found no evidence that the 
officers ordered respondent to leave his trailer. Pet. 
App. 11-12. Nonetheless, because respondent was on 
the front porch and thus “still on his premises” when 
the officers prevented his reentry into the trailer, the 
court determined that the police conduct amounted to a 
“constructive eviction” of respondent. Id. at 12. 

That determination was mistaken. “What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house 
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec- 
tion.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
Although, as a matter of property law, respondent’s 
front porch, like the threshold of his trailer and the 
yard surrounding it, is private, “it is nonetheless clear 
that under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amend- 
ment [respondent] was in a ‘public’ place.” See San- 
tana, 427 U.S. at 42. See also 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3(f ) 
at 506-507 (“places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., 
walkways, driveways, porches)” are not curtilage 
protected by the Fourth Amendment from intrusion) 

25 

(footnotes omitted). Just as the officers in Santana did 
not invade any privacy interest when they sought to 
arrest the defendant as she stood on her threshold, the 
officers here did not invade respondent’s privacy inter- 
ests or “constructive[ly] evict[]” him “from his resi- 
dence” (Pet. App. 12) when they prevented his entry 
into the trailer from his front porch. 

2. The appellate court also erred in concluding that 
the police officers “secured the dwelling from the 
inside” and “probably” conducted “an unreasonable 
search” (Pet. App. 12-13) when an officer accompanied 
respondent into the trailer while he made telephone 
calls and obtained cigarettes. The Fourth Amend- 
ment’s prohibition against warrantless searches does 
not apply when voluntary consent has been obtained. 
See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). In 
this case, respondent consented to the officer’s entry. 
As we have explained, the police officers could 
constitutionally have denied respondent all access to 
the trailer, in order to preserve evidence while they 
obtained a warrant. See pp. 11-19, supra. Therefore, 
the officers could constitutionally condition respon- 
dent’s access to the trailer on his agreement that an 
officer could accompany him, because the officer’s pre- 
sence was a reasonable means to neutralize the risk 
that respondent would destroy evidence if he entered. 
Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385, 391 
(1994) (the government may condition a benefit on the 
relinquishment of a constitutional right if the waiver of 
the right is reasonably related to the benefit). 

The police officers advised respondent that he could 
enter the trailer only if he was accompanied by an 
officer. J.A. 22, 27, 30. By choosing to enter under that 
reasonable condition, respondent consented to the 

26 

12 Cf. United States v. Rosi, 27 F.3d 409, 
412 (9th Cir. 1994) (by asking the FBI agents who had 
arrested him for permission to change his clothes and 
providing them with a key to his condominium, the 
defendant consented to their accompanying him inside 
the residence). 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois 
should be reversed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

SETH P. WAXMAN 

Solicitor General 

JAMES K. ROBINSON 

Assistant Attorney General 

MICHAEL R. DREEBEN 

Deputy Solicitor General 

MATTHEW D. ROBERTS 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

DEBORAH WATSON 

Attorney 

JULY 2000 

12 When the officer entered the trailer on those occasions, he 
“just stepp[ed] right inside the door and just stood by the door- 
way.” J.A. 18. He did not “conduct any search while he was in 
there” (J.A. 30) and therefore did not discover any of the evidence 
that the police officers found when they later searched the trailer 
pursuant to the warrant. Thus, even if respondent had not con- 
sented to the entry, the Illinois courts should not have excluded 
the evidence based on that entry, because it was not “the product 
of illegal governmental activity.” Harris, 495 U.S. at 19 (quoting 
Crews, 445 U.S. at 471). 

officer’s entry.