No. 00-927 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

ELAINE L. CHAO, SECRETARY OF LABOR, 
PETITIONER 

v. 

MALLARD BAY DRILLING, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER 

HOWARD M. RADZELY 

Acting Solicitor of Labor 
Department of Labor 
Washington, D.C. 20210 
ROSALIND A. KNAPP 

Acting General Counsel 
RADM ROBERT F. DUNCAN 

Chief Counsel 
United States Coast Guard 
Department of 

Transportation 
Washington, D.C. 20590 
THEODORE B. OLSON 
Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
(202) 514–2217 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: Page 

American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 
452 U.S. 490 (1981) ................................................................ 
19 

Association of Am. R.R. v. Department of Transp., 
38 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ................................................. 
7 

Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. OSHRC, 548 F.2d 1052 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ....................................................................... 
6 

Donovan v. Red Star Marine Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 
774 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 
(1985) ................................................................................ 
6, 10, 15 

Donovan v. Texaco, Inc., 720 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 
1983) ......................................................................................... 17 

Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 
(1982) ........................................................................................ 10 

Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1997) .......... 

11 

Herman v. Tidewater Pac., Inc., 160 F.3d 1239 
(9th Cir. 1998) ................................................ 

6, 8, 10, 13, 16-17 

Inspection of Norfolk Dredging Co., In re, 783 F.2d 
1526 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986) ........... 
15 

Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S. 96 (1984) ................... 
19 

Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) ............................. 
10 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 
367 (1996) ................................................................................. 
16 

Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 
(1998) ........................................................................................ 19 

Organized Migrants in Cmty. Action, Inc. v. 

Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ......................... 
7 

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) .......... 
5 

Secretary of Labor v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries Inc., 
15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1699 (1992) ................................ 
10, 15 

Secretary of Labor v. Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp., 
10 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1859 (1982) ...................................... 
10 

Secretary of Labor v. Tidewater Pac. Inc., 17 O.S.H. 

Cas. (BNA) 1920 (1997), aff ’d, 160 F.3d 1239 
(9th Cir. 1998) ..................................................................... 10, 13 

(I) 

II 

Cases—Continued: Page 

Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) ............. 
6 

Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) ............... 
15 

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) ............... 
18 

United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) ........................ 
5, 16 

United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) .............. 
17, 18 

United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504 (1985) ................. 
16, 18 

United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001) ....... 
7 

Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 
199 (1996) ................................................................................. 18-19 

Statutes, regulations and rule: 

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 
651 et seq. ................................................................................. 
1 

29 U.S.C. 651(b) ............................................................... 
1, 5, 16 

29 U.S.C. 653(a) (§ 4(a)) ............................... 
1, 3, 10, 16, 17, 19 

29 U.S.C. 653(b)(1) (§ 4(b)(1)) ........................................ 
passim 

29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1) ............................................................. 
1, 7, 8 

29 U.S.C. 654(a)(2) ................................................................. 
1 

29 U.S.C. 655(a) ...................................................................... 
19 

29 U.S.C. 655(b) ..................................................................... 
19 

29 U.S.C. 657(c)(1) ................................................................. 
13 

Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Tit. I, 
33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq. ............................................................. 
5 

Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. ..................... 
17 

43 U.S.C. 1311(a) .................................................................... 
17 

43 U.S.C. 1312 ........................................................................ 
18 

43 U.S.C. 1314 ........................................................................ 
18 

14 U.S.C. 2 ............................................................................ 
8, 9, 10 

14 U.S.C. 2 note ......................................................................... 
9 

28 U.S.C. 1333(1) ....................................................................... 
10 

46 U.S.C. 2103 ............................................................................ 
11 

46 U.S.C. 2104 ............................................................................ 
11 

46 U.S.C. 6301-6307 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ......................... 
6 

46 U.S.C. 10903 .......................................................................... 8 

III 

Regulations and rule—Continued: 
Page 

29 C.F.R.: 

Section 1910 ......................................................................... 

1-2 

Section 1910.1(a) ................................................................. 
19 

Section 1910.11 .................................................................... 
19 

33 C.F.R: 

Pt. 2: 
Subpt. 2.05 ............................................................................... 

19 
Section 2.05-25(a) ................................................................ 
19 

Pt. 81 ........................................................................................ 
13 

Pt. 155 ...................................................................................... 
14 

Section 155.1010 .................................................................. 
14 

Section 155.1015 .................................................................. 
14 

Section 155.1110 .................................................................. 
14 

Section 155.1210 .................................................................. 
14 

Section 155.2210 .................................................................. 
14 

App. C: 
§ 2.216 ................................................................................... 
14 

§ 4 14 
Pt. 156 ...................................................................................... 

13 

Pt. 159 ...................................................................................... 
14 

Section 159.1 ........................................................................ 
14 

Section 159.95 ...................................................................... 
6, 14 

Section 159.129 .................................................................... 
14 

Section 159.131 .................................................................... 
14 

Pt. 160 ...................................................................................... 
14 

Section 160.101 .................................................................... 
14 

Section 160.111 .................................................................... 
8, 14 

Pt. 164 ...................................................................................... 
13 

46 C.F.R. Ch. I: 

Pt. 4 ......................................................................................... 

6, 13 

Subch. C ................................................................................... 
12 

Pt. 24: 

Section 24.05-1 ..................................................................... 

12 

Section 24.10-27 ................................................................... 
12 

Pt. 42: 

Section 42.03-5 ..................................................................... 18 

IV 

Regulations and rule—Continued: 
Page 

Section 42.09 ........................................................................ 
13 

Section 42.15 ........................................................................ 
13 

Pt. 52 ........................................................................................ 
13 

Pt. 56: 

Section 56.50-85 ................................................................... 

13 

Pt. 58 ........................................................................................ 
13 

Pt. 61 ........................................................................................ 
13 

Section 61.15-10 ................................................................... 
13 

Pt. 67 ........................................................................................ 
13 

Section 67.121 ...................................................................... 
13 

Section 67.123 ...................................................................... 
13 

Pt. 113: 

Section 113.25 ...................................................................... 

13 

Pt. 160: 

Section 160.151-57(p) ......................................................... 

13 

Pt. 199: 

Section 199.620 .................................................................... 

13 

Sup. Ct. R. 15.2 .......................................................................... 
19 

Miscellaneous: 

54 Fed. Reg. (1989): 

p. 9294 ...................................................................................... 

19 

pp. 9311-9312 .......................................................................... 
19 

H.R. Rep. No. 557, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) .................. 
9 

OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20 (Nov. 8, 1996) ..................... 
7 

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ...................... 
3 

S. Rep. No. 656, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ....................... 9 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 00-927 

ELAINE L. CHAO, SECRETARY OF LABOR, 
PETITIONER 

v. 

MALLARD BAY DRILLING, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER 

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
(OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., was enacted “to assure 
so far as possible every working man and woman in the 
Nation safe and healthful working conditions.” 29 
U.S.C. 651(b). To that end, it applies broadly to “em- 
ployment performed in a workplace in a State,” as well 
as in specified territories and “Outer Continental Shelf 
lands,” 29 U.S.C. 653(a). It further imposes on each 
employer a “general duty” to provide to “each of his 
employees employment and a place of employment 
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing 
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to 
his employees,” 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1), as well as the 
obligation to comply with occupational safety and 
health standards promulgated by the Secretary of 
Labor, 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(2). See generally 29 C.F.R. 

(1) 

2 

1910 (setting forth comprehensive occupational safety 
and health standards). 

Section 4(b)(1) of the OSH Act provides that another 
federal agency can displace application of the OSH Act 
only for “working conditions * * * with respect to 
which [that agency] * * * exercise[s] statutory 
authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regula- 
tions affecting occupational safety or health.” 29 U.S.C. 
653(b)(1). As we explain in our opening brief (at 16-18, 
19-20), that language and its drafting history make 
clear that, in order to displace OSH Act coverage, an 
agency must not only possess authority to regulate 
occupational safety and health in a particular industry, 
but also actually “exercise” that authority. Further- 
more, because the OSH Act is displaced only for 
“working conditions * * * with respect to which” the 
other agency has exercised its authority, an agency’s 
regulation of some workplace conditions in a particular 
industry does not create an industry-wide exemption 
that displaces OSH Act regulation of other conditions. 
See id. at 18-19. Rather, as the drafting history con- 
firms, see id. at 20-21, displacement of the OSH Act 
turns on whether the other agency has exercised its 
authority with respect to the particular working 
conditions at issue. 

Finally, “working conditions,” as used in Section 
4(b)(1), means the physical and environmental hazards 
encountered by an employee in the course of the job, 
rather than the “environmental area” in which the 
employee customarily works. Gov’t Br. 24-29. Under 
either definition, however, the Coast Guard has not 
regulated the working conditions at issue in this case, 
and therefore the OSH Act continues to apply. Id. at 
29-32. 

3 

Respondent does not discuss the text or drafting 
history of Section 4(b)(1). Nor does respondent dispute 
our submission that, under a hazard-based definition of 
“working conditions,” there is no preemption of OSH 
Act authority in this case because the Coast Guard has 
no regulation addressing the hazard at issue. See Resp. 
Br. 31. Instead, respondent proposes alternative inter- 
pretations of Section 4(b)(1), primarily of the term 
“working conditions.” Id. at 29-35. Respondent also 
argues that the Coast Guard has sufficient authority 
over the working conditions of seamen to preclude OSH 
Act authority. Id. at 13-29. Finally, as an alternative 
ground for affirmance, respondent argues that a work 
site in the territorial waters of a State is not a 
“workplace in a State” covered by Section 4(a) of the 
OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 653(a). Resp. Br. 35-41. Respon- 
dent’s arguments misconstrue the OSH Act and the 
Coast Guard’s authority and are unsound as a matter of 
policy. 

1. Respondent argues that the phrase “working 
conditions” in Section 4(b)(1) means “the general area 
or work site in which employees perform their daily 
tasks.” Resp. Br. 29. Thus, in respondent’s view, 
“working conditions” means an entire plant or, in this 
case, the entire vessel on which the employees work. 
Id. at 30-31. 

As we explain in our opening brief (at 25, 28), how- 
ever, an area-based definition of “working conditions” 
cannot be reconciled with the ordinary meaning of 
“conditions,” which are circumstances that exist within 
an area. Nor is an area-based definition consistent with 
the surrounding text of Section 4(b)(1) and its drafting 
history, which indicate that the OSH Act is displaced 
only for the “particular working conditions” (S. Rep. 
No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1970) (emphasis 

4 

added)) “with respect to which” (29 U.S.C. 653(b)(1) 
(emphasis added)) another agency has exercised its 
authority. See Gov’t Br. 18-21, 28-29. Finally, an area- 
based definition would frustrate the OSH Act’s funda- 
mental purpose, which is to provide comprehensive 
protection from occupational safety and health hazards, 
because that definition would result in gaps in cover- 
age. Id. at 29; see pp. 5-6 infra. 

Even the two courts of appeals that have endorsed an 
area-based definition of working conditions use a 
definition that is significantly narrower than the 
“entire” work site definition that respondent advocates. 
See Resp. Br. 30. Those courts of appeals limit the 
“area” that they regard as the relevant “working condi- 
tions” to that portion of the work site that presents the 
relevant hazard. See Gov’t Br. 30-31. Under that 
approach, the OSH Act has not been displaced here, 
because the Coast Guard has neither promulgated 
regulatory requirements governing the atmosphere of 
uninspected barges operating on inland waters nor 
articulated a policy that such areas should not be 
subject to such requirements. See id. at 31-32. 

Respondent’s assertion (Br. 31-32) that the Secre- 
tary’s approach will result in inconsistent enforcement 
and an unclear division of regulatory responsibility is 
mistaken for several reasons. First, it is based on an 
incorrect characterization of the Secretary’s interpre- 
tation of “working conditions.” Respondent asserts 
that, under the Secretary’s interpretation, OSH Act 
regulation on a vessel can be preempted only if the 
Coast Guard “has a substantially similar or ‘redundant’ 
regulation addressing the exact same hazard and with 
the exact same intent.” Id. at 31. To the contrary, 
under the Secretary’s approach, “if the other agency 
has exercised its statutory authority, OSH Act 

5 

coverage is displaced regardless of whether the other 
agency’s requirements are the same as or different 
from, or are more or less stringent than, the require- 
ments that would apply under the OSH Act.” Gov’t Br. 
16 n.5. Indeed, the Secretary recognizes that the Coast 
Guard may preempt OSH Act coverage of particular 
working conditions without imposing any regulatory 
requirements, if the Coast Guard articulates a policy 
that no such requirements are warranted. Id. at 18, 36. 
The Secretary’s approach thus prevents duplicative 
regulation of the same occupational safety and health 
hazard and provides clear guidelines regarding the 
boundaries between OSHA and Coast Guard juris- 
diction. 

Second, respondent acknowledges (Br. 29) that other 
courts of appeals have approved the Secretary’s ap- 
proach, yet respondent points to no evidence that 
adverse consequences have resulted in those circuits. 
Moreover, as previously explained, the Secretary’s 
longstanding approach to preemption of OSH Act 
coverage is similar to the approach this Court uses in 
addressing the parallel issue of Coast Guard pre- 
emption of state laws under Title I of the Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq. 
See Gov’t Br. 23-24 (discussing United States v. Locke, 
529 U.S. 89, 108-110 (2000)). That approach (which has 
been in place at least since this Court’s decision in Ray 

v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978)) has not 
resulted in confusion and inconsistent regulation. 
Third, the fundamental purpose of the OSH Act is to 
assure, so far as possible, safe and healthful working 
conditions for “every working man and woman in the 
Nation.” 29 U.S.C. 651(b); see Gov’t Br. 32-35. Respon- 
dent’s proposed definition of “working conditions” 
would defeat that purpose. If “working conditions” 

6 

means an entire plant or an entire vessel, as respondent 
argues, then another federal agency’s regulation of only 
one hazardous condition in a plant or on a vessel would 
prevent OSHA from regulating all other conditions, 
even if no other agency had authority to regulate them. 
For example, in respondent’s view, the Coast Guard’s 
regulation requiring the Mr. Beldon to have toilets that 
do not cause bodily injuries or allow toxic substances to 
escape into the interior of the vessel, 33 C.F.R. 159.95, 
would prevent OSHA from regulating unguarded 
machines and blood-borne pathogens, see Herman v. 
Tidewater Pac., Inc., 160 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1998), 
noise, see Donovan v. Red Star Marine Servs., Inc., 739 
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 
(1985), or the drilling hazards at issue in this case. 
Indeed, under respondent’s theory, the Coast Guard’s 
casualty reporting requirements, which do not set any 
workplace health or safety standards at all, see 46 
U.S.C. 6301-6307 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 46 C.F.R. Pt. 4, 
preempt all OSH Act coverage of all vessels. See Resp. 
Br. 18-19. Respondent’s interpretation of “working 
conditions” would result in the kind of industry-wide 
exemptions and gaps in worker protection that courts 
have repeatedly rejected as inconsistent with the 
purposes of the OSH Act. See Red Star Marine, 739 
F.2d at 780; Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. OSHRC, 548 
F.2d 1052, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Southern Pac. Transp. 
Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).1 

1 Respondent argues in the alternative (Br. 32-33) that any 
regulation of a “class of workers” displaces all OSHA regulation of 
the working conditions of those workers. As explained in the 
Secretary’s opening brief (at 18-19, 20-21), that view of Section 
4(b)(1) is inconsistent with the statutory text, and the drafting 
history demonstrates that the text was changed deliberately to 

7 

In any event, the Secretary ensures against incon- 
sistent enforcement of the OSH Act by issuing direc- 
tives to compliance officers that delineate the lines of 
responsibility between OSHA and the Coast Guard and 
provide for coordination between the two agencies. See 
OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20, at 4-13 (Nov. 8, 1996) 
(Secretary’s Exh. C-2). Such coordination occurred in 
this case, in which OSHA based its citations on infor- 
mation collected by the Coast Guard. Pet. App. 2a. 
Vessel owners are also well aware of the Secretary’s 
interpretation of her OSH Act authority, because that 
interpretation has been set out in long-standing 
regulations, three decades of citations for OSH Act 
violations, as well as a statutorily-mandated report to 
Congress. See Gov’t Br. 38-40; cf. United States v. 
Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001) (discussing varying 
degrees of deference to agency interpretations in 
administering a statute).2 

avoid the result that respondent seeks. Respondent erroneously 
relies on Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Bren- 
nan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1975), to support its argument. 
Although the D.C. Circuit held in Organized Migrants that the 
EPA’s regulation of farmworker exposure to pesticides preempts 
OSHA’s regulation of that subject, see id. at 1163, 1169, it did not 
hold that another agency’s regulation of some working conditions 
would preempt OSHA regulation of other conditions of those 
workers. The D.C. Circuit has specifically rejected that interpre- 
tation. See Association of Am. R.R. v. Department of Transp., 38 
F.3d 582, 586-587 (1994); see also Gov’t Br. 40 n.20 (noting that 
EPA coordinated its pesticide regulation with OSHA’s field- 
sanitation and hazard-communication standards). 

2 Respondent contends that the Secretary is “hypocritical” in 
citing employers under the OSH Act’s general duty clause, 29 
U.S.C. 654(a)(1), while (supposedly) arguing that the Coast Guard 
and other agencies must promulgate specific regulations in order 
to preempt the OSH Act. Resp. Br. 34. As we have explained, 

8 

2. Respondent also argues that the Secretary mis- 
construes the extent of the Coast Guard’s authority to 
regulate uninspected vessels. Resp. Br. 17. In parti- 
cular, respondent argues that 14 U.S.C. 2 gives the 
Coast Guard plenary and exclusive authority over the 
working conditions of seamen on vessels on navigable 
waters. See Resp. Br. 9-10, 13-14, 15, 18, 27-29; see also 
Amicus Br. of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. 
(AGC) 5-12. Respondent further argues that the Coast 
Guard has promulgated extensive regulations that are 
sufficient to preempt the OSH Act. Resp. Br. 14-29; see 
also Amicus Br. of Transportation Inst. (TI) 4-8. Re- 
spondent’s arguments do not withstand scrutiny. 

pp. 4-5, supra, the Secretary does not contend that other agencies 
may displace the OSH Act only by promulgating a specific 
regulation governing a specific hazard. Here, however, the Coast 
Guard has no regulation comparable to the OSH Act’s general duty 
clause, 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1), requiring uninspected vessels to be free 
from all recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm to employees. Coast Guard regulations do authorize 
Coast Guard officers to “order a vessel to operate or anchor in the 
manner directed” if “such [an] order is justified in the interest of 
safety by reason of * * * temporary hazardous circumstances, or 
the condition of the vessel.” 33 C.F.R. 160.111. But that provision 
authorizes the Coast Guard to react to emergency situations that 
threaten vessels, waterways, or waterfront facilities; it does not 
prescribe fixed standards or impose a general duty on maritime 
employers to protect the occupational safety and health of 
employees on uninspected vessels. Nor does the statutorily- 
imposed and judicially-enforced duty to provide a seaworthy 
vessel, see 46 U.S.C. 10903; Resp. Br. 33, constitute an “exercise” 
of “authority” by a “Federal agenc[y]” under Section 4(b)(1). See 
Tidewater Pac., 160 F.3d at 1246 (explaining why seaworthiness 
doctrine does not preempt OSH Act coverage). 

9 

a. Under 14 U.S.C. 2, the Coast Guard shall, among 
other things, 

administer laws and promulgate and enforce regu- 
lations for the promotion of safety of life and 
property on and under the high seas and waters 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
covering all matters not specifically delegated by 
law to some other executive department. 

Section 2 serves as a codification and description of 
the Coast Guard’s authority under other provisions of 
law. See 14 U.S.C. 2 note (Historical and Revision 
Notes) (explaining that Section 2 “contains a codifica- 
tion of functions” that “sets forth in general language 
the primary responsibilities of the Coast Guard” and 
“outline[s] in general terms in one section the broad 
scope of the functions of the Coast Guard”); S. Rep. No. 
656, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949) (noting that the 
“primary duties of the service are stated in general 
terms in Section 2” and “these duties are set forth in 
detail” in other provisions of law); H.R. Rep. No. 557, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, A2 (1949) (same). Thus, Section 
2 has not been understood to be a plenary grant of 
independent authority, or to vest the Coast Guard with 
responsibility for issuing pervasive occupational health 
and safety regulations covering seamen in the absence 
of more specific statutory authority. 

In any event, nothing in Section 2 precludes the 
exercise of authority by other agencies, such as OSHA, 
over seamen on navigable waters. To the contrary, 
Section 2 expressly recognizes that some “matters” are 
“delegated by law to * * * other executive depart- 
ment[s].” 14 U.S.C. 2. Here, the OSH Act delegates to 
the Secretary of Labor the authority to regulate 
occupational safety and health in “employment per- 

10 

formed in a workplace in a State,” including on naviga- 
ble waters within a State. 29 U.S.C. 653(a); see also pp. 
16-19, infra. Nor does Foremost Insurance Co. v. 
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982), on which respondent 
relies (Br. 18), suggest that Section 2 vests the Coast 
Guard with exclusive authority over safety on naviga- 
ble waters. In that case, this Court held that a federal 
court had admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1333(1) 
to decide a wrongful death action resulting from the 
collision of two pleasure boats on a Louisiana river. 457 
U.S. at 674. The Court said nothing about 14 U.S.C. 2 
or the Coast Guard’s jurisdiction.3 

Furthermore, under Section 4(b)(1) of the OSH Act, 
the mere possession of authority—under 14 U.S.C. 2 or 
any other statute—is not enough to exclude OSH Act 
coverage. To displace OSH Act coverage, an agency 

3 The Second Circuit in Red Star Marine, 739 F.2d at 778-779, 
explained why the lower court decisions cited by respondent (Br. 
23-24, 27-29) are not persuasive. See also Gov’t Br. 8-9, nn. 2 & 4; 
Gov’t Pet. Reply 3 n.1. As for the Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission decision on which respondent relies, Secretary 
of Labor v. Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp., 10 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 
1859 (1982), subsequent Commission decisions have rejected a 
reading of Dillingham that would endorse an industry-wide 
exemption from OSH Act coverage for seamen and have held that 
working conditions on uninspected vessels may be subject to the 
OSH Act. See Secretary of Labor v. Tidewater Pac. Inc., 17 O.S.H. 
Cas. (BNA) 1920, 1923-1924 (1997), aff ’d, 160 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 
1998); Secretary of Labor v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries Inc., 15 O.S.H. 
Cas. (BNA) 1699, 1704-1705 (1992). Moreover, contrary to respon- 
dent’s contention (Br. 25), we do not seek judicial deference to 
Commission precedent interpreting Section 4(b)(1). This Court 
has made clear that the Secretary’s interpretation, as reflected in 
her enforcement citation, not the Commission’s decision, is entitled 
to deference. See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991); 
Gov’t Br. 38. 

11 

with authority to regulate occupational safety and 
health must “exercise” that authority. 29 U.S.C. 
653(b)(1); Gov’t Br. 14-21.4 

b. Respondent does not dispute that the Coast 
Guard does not regulate the working condition at issue 
in this case—the risk of explosion caused by natural gas 
in the atmosphere of an uninspected barge drilling on 
inland waters. See Resp. Br. 31; see also Gov’t Br. 29- 

32. Nonetheless, relying largely on a list of Coast 
Guard regulations appended to TI’s amicus brief (Resp. 
Br. 15 (citing TI Br. App. 1a-2a)),5 respondent argues 
that the Coast Guard’s regulation of uninspected ves- 
sels is sufficient to displace the OSH Act. Id. at 15-23.6 

4 Amicus TI errs in contending (Br. 8-10) that 46 U.S.C. 2103 
and 2104 give the Coast Guard exclusive jurisdiction over vessels. 
Although Section 2104 has been construed to prevent the Secre- 
tary of Transportation from delegating his statutory authority to 
an agency other than the Coast Guard, see Halverson v. Slater, 129 
F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1997), it does not prevent other agencies from 
exercising the authority Congress has given them under statutes 
such as the OSH Act. And Section 2103 expressly recognizes that 
“vessels and personnel” may be “subject, under other law, to the 
supervision of another official of the United States Government.” 

5 The appendix to this brief identifies the subject matter and 
applicability of each of the regulations included in the Appendix to 
TI’s brief. 

6 The American Waterways Operators (AWO) argues (Br. 2-3) 
that the Court should decide only whether the Coast Guard has 
displaced OSH Act regulation of the Mr. Beldon and not whether 
the Coast Guard has displaced OSH Act regulation of other 
uninspected vessels. The AWO then argues (Br. 4-23) that the 
Coast Guard has displaced OSH Act regulation of tugs and barges 
operated by its members. We only ask the Court to hold that the 
Fifth Circuit erred in creating an industry-wide exemption for 
seamen on uninspected vessels and that the Coast Guard has not 
displaced OSH Act regulation of the Mr. Beldon, either generally 
or with respect to the hazard at issue here. Whether the OSH Act 

12 

Respondent’s argument is fundamentally flawed be- 
cause, under Section 4(b)(1), OSH Act coverage is dis- 
placed only when another agency has actually exercised 
its statutory authority “with respect to” the “working 
conditions” at issue. See Gov’t Br. 16-21; p. 2, supra. 
Moreover, respondent overstates the extent to which 
the Coast Guard regulates occupational safety and 
health on uninspected vessels generally and on the Mr. 
Beldon (and other uninspected barges operating on 
inland waters) in particular. 

Respondent places special reliance (Br. 16-17) on the 
regulations in Subchapter C of Chapter I of Title 46 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. As we explain in our 
opening brief (at 4-5, 9 & n.3), that Subchapter (entitled 
“Uninspected Vessels”) contains the bulk of the Coast 
Guard regulations that are generally applicable to 
uninspected vessels, including regulations directed at 
occupational safety and health. Those regulations, how- 
ever, address only a limited range of occupational 
safety and health hazards, and do not apply to all types 
of uninspected vessels. Of particular significance to this 
case, they do not apply to uninspected barges that do 
not carry passengers, such as the Mr. Beldon. See 46 
C.F.R. 24.05-1 (Table 24.05-1(a) (Col.6)), 24.10-27. Nor 
do they address hazards related to oil drilling opera- 
tions on inland waters, such as the risk of explosion 
from natural gas. See App., infra, 4a-9a. 

Respondent also relies (Br. 18-23) on Coast Guard 
regulations that govern the reporting and investigation 
of marine accidents on both inspected and uninspected 

is displaced with respect to working conditions in other situations, 
including those involving AWO vessels, requires consideration of 
the particular working conditions, type of vessel, and Coast Guard 
regulations at issue. 

13 

vessels. See 46 C.F.R. Pt. 4 (discussed at Gov’t Br. 5 

n.1). Respondent argues that those regulations give 
the Coast Guard authority over the working conditions 
of seamen on uninspected vessels that is quite similar to 
OSHA’s regulation of ordinary workplaces. Regula- 
tions that govern reporting and investigation of casual- 
ties that have already occurred, however, do not regu- 
late “working conditions,” even though marine casual- 
ties may, in some instances, result from unsafe working 
conditions.7 
Many of the other Coast Guard regulations on which 
respondent relies apply only to certain types of unin- 
spected vessels or to uninspected vessels engaged in 
certain activities. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. Pt. 156; 46 C.F.R. 

42.09, 42.15. Others deal with navigation or other 
matters that bear only indirectly or in limited respects 
on workplace health and safety. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. Pt. 
81; 33 C.F.R. Pt. 164; 46 C.F.R. 67.121, 67.123.8 The 
only regulatory requirements identified by respondent 
and its amici (apart from the marine casualty reporting 

7 Respondent also argues (Br. 19-20) that OSHA reporting 
requirements duplicate Coast Guard reporting requirements. 
Respondent, however, was not cited for violating OSHA reporting 
requirements. Accordingly, the question whether Coast Guard 
reporting requirements may in some instances preempt OSHA 
reporting requirements is not presented in this case. See also 
Tidewater Pac., 160 F.3d at 1246-1247 (whether OSHA may en- 
force recordkeeping requirements is addressed by 29 U.S.C. 
657(c)(1), not by the provision at issue in this case, 29 U.S.C. 
653(b)(1)). 

8 Still others do not apply to uninspected vessels at all. See 46 
C.F.R. Pts. 52, 58, 61; 46 C.F.R. 56.50-85; 46 C.F.R. 61.15-10; 46 
C.F.R. 113.25; 46 C.F.R. 199.620. Section 160.151-57(p) of Title 46 
imposes requirements not on vessels but on liferaft servicing 
facilities. And, although the Mr. Beldon was documented under 
46 C.F.R. Pt. 67, there was no requirement that it be documented. 

14 

requirements) that applied to the Mr. Beldon while it 
was drilling in Little Bayou Pigeon are the Marine 
Sanitation Device regulations, 33 C.F.R. Pt. 159, and 
certain provisions of the Pollution Prevention, 33 
C.F.R. Pt. 155, and Ports and Waterways Safety Act 
(PWSA) regulations, 33 C.F.R. Pt. 160. None of those 
provisions regulates the hazard of explosion caused by 
natural gas.9 Accordingly, none represents an exercise 
of authority by the Coast Guard over the working 
conditions at issue in this case. 

c. Respondent argues that exclusive reliance on 
Coast Guard regulations would be better policy because 
the Coast Guard has expertise regarding the assertedly 
“unique” working conditions of seamen aboard vessels, 
and confusion and wasted resources will result if both 
OSHA and the Coast Guard regulate seamen. Resp. Br. 

9 The Marine Sanitation Device regulations primarily protect 
the marine environment from the discharge of untreated sewage, 
see 33 C.F.R. 159.1, although they contain a few provisions 
directed at the health and safety of those on board vessels, see 33 
C.F.R. 159.95, 159.129, 159.131. The Pollution Prevention Regu- 
lations are directed at preventing and responding to the discharge 
of oil and liquid hazardous materials from vessels, see, e.g., 33 
C.F.R. 155.1010, 155.1110, 155.1210, 155.2210; 33 C.F.R. Pt. 155, 
App. C, § 4, and require certain vessels to have response plans that 
address, among other things, OSHA requirements for worker 
health and safety hazards posed by spills, see 33 C.F.R. Pt. 155, 
App. C, § 2.2.16. The response plan requirements, however, apply 
only to vessels that carry oil as cargo, see 33 C.F.R. 155.1015, 
155.1110, 155.1210, 155.2210, and only to oil spills from vessels, not 
to the release of natural gas from a well blowout. The PWSA 
regulations seek “to insure the safety of vessels and waterfront 
facilities, and the protection of the navigable waters and the 
resources therein.” 33 C.F.R. 160.101. Although they may indi- 
rectly affect occupational safety and health, those provisions do not 
regulate or prescribe standards respecting “working conditions.” 
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 160.111 (discussed in note 2, supra). 

15 

14-15, 23-27. Contrary to respondent’s assertion that 
the working conditions of seamen aboard uninspected 
vessels are “unique” (id. at 14), their employment often 
involves hazards similar to those faced by land-based 
employees. See In re Inspection of Norfolk Dredging 
Co., 783 F.2d 1526, 1527, 1530 (11th Cir.) (crane safety), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Red Star Marine, 739 
F.2d at 775 (excessive noise); Secretary of Labor v. 
Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 
1699, 1703 (1992) (“factory conditions” involving clean- 
ing, processing, freezing, and packaging fish); Pet. App. 
11a (respondent’s drilling operations). OSHA has 
experience and expertise concerning such conditions, 
and, to the extent that further expertise is necessary, 
OSHA coordinates with the Coast Guard. See Gov’t Br. 
38 n.18. 

10 

Furthermore, respondent’s arguments concerning 
duplication and confusion are unfounded. Under the 
Secretary’s longstanding interpretation of Section 
4(b)(1), only one agency regulates a particular occupa- 
tional safety and health hazard. OSHA’s regulation is 
only displaced if another agency has promulgated a 
regulation governing the hazard or articulated a policy 
that regulatory requirements should not be imposed for 
that hazard or a set of hazards that includes it. See 
Gov’t Br. 35-37; pp. 2, 4-5, supra. In addition, OSHA 

10 In arguing that seamen’s “unique” working conditions require 
exclusive Coast Guard jurisdiction, respondent mistakenly relies 
(Br. 14) on Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 38 (1942). In 
that case, the Court held that the NLRB abused its discretion by 
requiring the owner of a ship to reinstate seamen fired for a strike 
that was illegal under federal maritime law. Id. at 38-40. The 
Court did not hold that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction over the 
seamen. Rather, the Court affirmed the Board’s authority to 
require the shipowner to bargain with the employees. Id. at 48-49. 

16 

has issued enforcement directives that explain in detail 
the different spheres of OSHA and Coast Guard author- 
ity. See p. 7, supra. See also Locke, 529 U.S. at 108-110 
(applying similar rule governing preemption of state 
laws by Coast Guard regulations without indicating any 
concern over confusion or wasted resources). Re- 
spondent’s proposed approach not only is unnecessary 
to avoid duplication and confusion but also would defeat 
the OSH Act’s fundamental purpose of protecting each 
working man and woman, 29 U.S.C. 651(b), because it 
would leave gaps in coverage. See Gov’t Br. 32-35. 

3. As an alternative ground in support of the 
judgment below, respondent argues (Br. 35-41) that the 
Mr. Beldon is not subject to the OSH Act because it 
was operating “within the territorial waters of the 
United States” at the time of the explosion, and such 
waters are not covered under 29 U.S.C. 653(a). Be- 
cause that argument was not addressed by the court of 
appeals, Pet. App. 7a, this Court need not consider it. 
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 
367, 379 n.5 (1996). 

Respondent’s argument is also lacking in merit. The 
OSH Act applies “with respect to employment per- 
formed in a workplace in a State.” 29 U.S.C. 653(a). 
Respondent stipulated that the Mr. Beldon was operat- 
ing in a bayou about 30 miles northwest of Morgan City 
in the Parish of St. Martin in the territorial waters of 
the State of Louisiana. Exh. J-1 ¶¶ 10, 11; see also 
Exhs. C-4, C-5, C-6 (photographs of work site); Pet. 
App. 2a, 11a; Resp. Br. 2, 6. Because those waters are 
“internal waters of the State,” United States v. Maine, 
469 U.S. 504, 513 (1985), respondent’s bayou work site 
was “in [the] State.” 29 U.S.C. 653(a); see Tidewater 

17 

Pac., 160 F.3d at 1243 (holding that a vessel on state 
territorial waters is a “workplace in a State”). 

11 

Respondent attempts to avoid the plain meaning of 
“a workplace in a State,” 29 U.S.C. 653(a), by arguing 
(Br. 36-39) that the phrase refers only to land under 
navigable waters within a State’s boundaries but not 
the navigable waters themselves. Congress’s reference 
to workplaces “in a State,” however, was plainly 
intended to identify the reach of the Act in geographic 
or territorial terms, and to do so comprehensively, by 
including all areas within the boundaries of the States. 
There can be no doubt that the navigable waters where 
respondent’s barge was located, like the submerged 
lands underlying those waters (to which the barge was 
affixed, see Def ’s Exh. 2), are within the State of Lou- 
isiana in a geographical or territorial sense. Excluding 
workplaces on the waters would create a gap in 
coverage that the comprehensive territorial reach of 
the Act, set forth in Section 653(a)(1), was intended to 
foreclose. 

Respondent’s assertion (Br. 36-38) that the 
Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 43 U.S.C. 1301 et seq., 
and this Court’s decision in United States v. Louisiana, 
363 U.S. 1 (1960), support its argument is incorrect. 
The SLA gives States title to and ownership of lands 
under “navigable waters within the[ir] boundaries,” 43 
U.S.C. 1311(a) (emphasis added), and also allows States 
to extend their seaward boundaries three miles from 

11 Respondent inaccurately asserts (Br. 35) that Donovan v. 
Texaco, Inc., 720 F.2d 825, 829 (5th Cir. 1983), held that a vessel 
operating in territorial waters of the United States is not a 
“workplace” under Section 4(a). The court held only that “[a] 
vessel on the high seas is not such a ‘workplace.’ ” 
Ibid. (emphasis 

added). 

18 

their coast lines, 43 U.S.C. 1312. The SLA thus recog- 
nizes that State territory includes “[w]aters landward 
of the coastline” and “waters up to three miles seaward 
of the coastline,” Maine, 469 U.S. at 513, not simply the 
submerged lands under those waters. Nor does the 
Court’s discussion of the SLA in the Louisiana case, 
363 U.S. at 8-10, suggest that waters landward of a 
State’s coastline, such as a bayou in a parish in Louisi- 
ana, are outside of that State. 

See also United States v. 
California, 332 U.S. 19, 36-37 (1947) (recognizing 
States’ authority over inland waters). 

12 

Respondent notes (Br. 37-38) that the SLA preserves 
the federal government’s right to regulate and control 
both submerged lands and state territorial waters for 
the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, 
national defense, and international affairs. See 43 
U.S.C. 1314. That reservation of regulatory authority, 
however, does not transform navigable waters within a 
State’s boundaries into “a federal territory within the 
meaning of the OSH Act and not ‘a work place in a 
state.’ ” Resp. Br. 38. Instead, it recognizes the dual 
regulatory authority of the United States and individ- 
ual States over navigable waters in the State. Cf. 
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 

12 Respondent argues (Br. 39-40) that recognizing OSH Act 
jurisdiction over vessels on state waters is unworkable because 
they would “steam in and out of OSHA coverage” when they trav- 
eled between those waters and the high seas. It is not uncommon, 
however, for regulatory requirements concerning vessels (even 
requirements imposed by the Coast Guard) to vary depending on 
where the vessels travel. See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. 42.03-5 (load line 
requirements for U.S. flag vessels engaged in foreign or inter- 
national voyages, domestic voyages by sea, or Great Lakes 
voyages). 

19 

207 (1996) (concurrent state and federal remedies for 
wrongful deaths within a State’s territorial waters). 

Similarly, 33 C.F.R. 2.05-25(a), cited by respondent 
(Br. 38), does not purport to define OSH Act coverage 
or state boundaries. Instead, it defines the Coast 
Guard’s regulatory jurisdiction to include navigable 
waters, whether they are lakes, rivers, or water outside 
the country’s coastline. See 33 C.F.R. Subpt. 2.05. 
That assertion of jurisdiction does not transform a lake, 
river, or bayou inside a State into a federal territory 
outside the State. Cf. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 
U.S. 96, 99-101 (1984) (recognizing Louisiana’s boun- 
dary in the Mississippi River). Employment in those 
locations is “employment performed in a workplace in a 
State” under 29 U.S.C. 653(a), whether or not the 
locations are also subject to the Coast Guard’s jurisdic- 
tion. 

13 

13 Respondent asserts (Br. 40) that OSHA regulations were not 
written with vessels and crewmen in mind, that operators in the 
marine industry were never given an opportunity to participate in 
the rulemaking process, and that there was no cost-benefit analysis 
in which vessel owners/operators were considered. Because 
respondent did not raise that argument below or in its brief in 
opposition, it is waived. See Sup. Ct. R. 15.2; Ohio Forestry Ass’n 

v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 738-739 (1998). We note, however, 
that Congress required OSHA initially to promulgate regulations 
without notice and comment. See 29 U.S.C. 655(a); 29 C.F.R. 
1910.1(a), 1910.11. When OSHA has subsequently issued regula- 
tions with notice and comment, see 29 U.S.C. 655(b), operators in 
the marine industry have had the same opportunities to comment 
as other members of the general public. The OSH Act does not 
require a cost-benefit analysis. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., 
Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506-522 (1981). Nor are OSHA’s 
regulatory analyses limited to specific industries as respondent 
asserts. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 9294, 9311-9312 (1989) (analyses for 
standards that were part of the basis on which respondent was 
cited in this case). 

20 

* * * * * 

For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in our 
opening brief, the judgment of the court of appeals 
should be reversed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

HOWARD M. RADZELY 

Acting Solicitor of Labor 
Department of Labor 

ROSALIND A. KNAPP 

Acting General Counsel 
RADM ROBERT F. DUNCAN 

Chief Counsel 
United States Coast Guard 
Department of 

Transportation 
THEODORE B. OLSON 
Solicitor General 

JULY 2001 

APPENDIX 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

33 C.F.R. 
Pt. 81 

72 COLREGS: 
Implementing 
Rules 

Implements the Inter- 
national Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at 
Sea, including alternate 
requirements for light, 
shape, and sound 
signals. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards. 

Applies when vessel is 
in navigation on the 
high seas. 

Did not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon at the time 
of the explosion 
because it was on 
inland waters and not 
in navigation. 

Applicability vaires by 
vessel type and 
activity. Most 
provisions, including oil 
spill response plan 
requirements, apply 
only to vessels that 
carry oil as cargo. 

Only §§ 155.400 (plat- 
form machinery space 
drainage), 155.450 
(placard noting that 
discharge of oil or oily 
waste is prohibited), 
and 155.770 (prohibi- 
tion on intentional 
drainage of oil or liquid 
hazardous material into 
bilge) applied to the 
Mr. Beldon at the time 
of the explosion. 

33 C.F.R. 
Pt. 155 

Pollution 
Prevention 
Regulations 
Contains regulations to 
prevent and respond to 
water pollution from oil 
or liquid hazardous 
substances. 

Generally does not 
regulate occupational 
safety and health 
hazards, although oil 
spill response plan 
provisions require 
response plans to 
address OSHA 
regulations on 
hazardous substance 
releases. 

(1a) 

2a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

33 C.F.R. 
Pt. 156 

Oil and 
Hazardous 
Material 
Transfer 
Operations 
Sets requirements for 
transfers of oil or liquid 
hazardous materials to, 
from, or within a vessel 
with a capacity of 250 
barrels or more. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards. 

Applies when vessels 
with capacity of at least 
250 barrels are 
transferring oil or 
liquid hazardous 
materials. 

Did not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon at the time 
of the explosion 
because it was not 
engaged in a transfer. 

Sets requirements for 
design, construction, 
and certification of 
marine sanitation 
devices. 

Not primarily directed 
at occupational safety 
and health hazards. 
Contains a few 
provisions that regulate 
hazards (§§ 159.95, 
159.129, and 159.131) 
unrelated to drilling 
operations on inland 
waters. 

Applies to all vessels 
equipped with marine 
sanitation devices. 

Applies to the Mr. 
Beldon. 

33 C.F.R. 
Pt. 159 

Marine 
Sanitation 
Devices 

3a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

33 C.F.R. 
Pt. 160 

Ports & 
Waterways 
Safety 

Implements Ports & 
Waterways Safety Act, 
33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq., 
and related statutes, to 
insure the safety of 
vessels and waterfront 
facilities and the 
protection of navigable 
waters. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards, but may 
indirectly affect occupa- 
tional safety and health. 

Applicability varies by 
vessel type and 
activity. 

Only §§ 160.111 (special 
orders applying to 
vessel operations) and 
160.215 (notice of 
hazardous conditions) 
applied to the Mr. 
Beldon at the time of 
the explosion. 

33 C.F.R. 
Pt. 164 

Navigation 
Safety Rules 
Sets requirements for 
navigation procedure, 
publications, and 
equipment. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards. 

Applies to certain self- 
propelled vessels when 
they are destined for or 
departing from a 
United States port. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, which is a 
barge. 

4a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 
Pt. 16 

Drug & 
Alcohol 
Testing 

Prescribes standards, 
procedures, and means 
to test for drug and 
alcohol use by “crew 
members” under 46 
C.F.R. 16.105. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to vessels 
carrying “crew 
members,” i.e., 
individuals holding a 
license, certificate of 
registry or merchant 
mariner’s document. 
46 C.F.R. 16.105. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, whose sea- 
men were not “crew- 
members” under 46 
C.F.R. 16.105. 

Sets out definitions and 
identifies classes of 
vessels subject to 46 
C.F.R. pts. 25-28, the 
regulations generally 
applicable to 
uninspected vessels. 

Does not itself regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards. 

Makes clear that none 
of the provisions in 46 
C.F.R. Pts. 25-28 
applies to the Mr. 
Beldon, an uninspected 
barge that does not 
carry passengers. 

46 C.F.R. 
Pt. 24 

Uninspected 
Vessels— 
General 
Provisions 

5a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 25.25 

Life 
Preservers & 
Other 
Lifesaving 
Equipment 
Establishes 
requirements for life 
preservers and other 
lifesaving equipment. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to all vessels 
covered by 46 C.F.R. 
Pts. 24-28, except 
vessels used or leased, 
rented or chartered for 
noncommercial use, 
vessels propelled by 
sail not carrying 
passengers for hire, 
and barges not 
carrying passengers for 
hire. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, a barge 
that does not carry 
passengers for hire. 

Sets requirements for 
emergency position 
indicating radio beacons. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to commercial 
fishing industry vessels 
and certain other 
manned uninspected 
commercial vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, a barge 
that does not carry 
passengers for hire. 

46 C.F.R. 25.26 
Emergency 
Position 
Indicating 
Radio Beacons 

6a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 25.30 

Fixed Fire 
Extinguishing 
Gear 

Requires certain types 
of fire extinguishing 
equipment depending on 
type of uninspected 
vessel. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to motorboats, 
motor vessels, and 
certain barges carrying 
passengers. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, a barge 
that does not carry 
passengers. 

Requires gasoline 
engines installed in 
motorboats or motor 
vessels, except outboard 
motors, to have backfire 
flame control. 

Requires motorboats or 
motor vessels to 
ventilate their engines 
and fuel tank 
compartments. 

Regulates cooking, 
heating, and lighting 
systems on vessels 
carrying passengers for 
hire. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applicability varies 
depending on type of 
uninspected vessel and 
activity. 

Do not apply to the Mr. 
Beldon, a barge that 
does not carry 
passengers for hire. 

46 C.F.R. 25.35 

Backfire Flame 
Control 

46 C.F.R. 25.40 

Ventilation 

46 C.F.R. 25.45 

Cooking, 
Heating, and 
Lighting 
Systems 

7a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 25.50 

Garbage 
Retention 

Requires uninspected 
vessels to meet garbage 
discharge, waste 
management, and 
placard requirements in 
33 C.F.R. Pt. 151. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
grom drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Did not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon at the time 
of the explosion 
because it was not 
engaged in an 
international voyage, 
see 33 C.F.R. Pt. 151. 

Applicability varies 
depending on vessel 
type and activity. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, a 
documented barge that 
does not carry 
passengers and was not 
engaged at the time of 
the explosion in an 
international voyage. 

46 C.F.R. 26.03 

Special 
Operating 
Requirements 
Imposes special 
operating requirements 
on small passenger 
vessels. 

Requires the individual 
in charge of an 
undocumented vessel 
involved in a marine 
casualty to provide 
necessary assistance. 

Requires certain vessels 
engaged on an 
international voyage to 
have an efficient 
daylight signaling lamp. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

8a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 26.08 

Notice & 
Reporting of 
Casualty & 
Voyage 
Records 

States that 
requirements for notice 
and reporting of marine 
casualties and retention 
of voyage records are 
contained in 46 C.F.R. 
Pt. 4. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards. 

References 
requirements in 46 
C.F.R. Pt. 4, which 
apply to the Mr. 
Beldon. 

46 C.F.R. 26.15 

Boarding 
Requires uninspected 
vessels that are 
underway to stop 
immediately if hailed by 
a Coast Guard vessel 
and to maneuver in a 
manner that permits 
boarding. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards. 

Did not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, which was 
not underway at the 
time of the explosion. 

46 C.F.R. 26.30 

Work Vest 
Sets requirements for 
buoyant work vests if 
they are carried on a 
vessel. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Only applies if work 
vests are used. 

9a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 
Pt. 27 

Towing 
Vessels 
Regulates towing 
vessels. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to towing 
vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, a barge. 

46 C.F.R. 
Pt. 28 

Commercial 
Fishing 
Industry 
Vessels 
Regulates commercial 
fishing industry vessels. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to commercial 
fishing vessels, fish 
processing vessels, and 
fish tender vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, which is 
not any of those types 
of vessels. 

Sets load line and 
related requirements to 
ensure vessel stability. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies, with some 
exceptions, to United 
States flag vessels that 
engage in foreign or 
international voyages, 
in domestic voyages by 
sea, or on Great Lakes 
voyages. 

Did not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon at the time 
of the explosion 
because it was not 
engaged in any of those 
kinds of voyages. 

46 C.F.R. 42.09 
Load Line 
Assignments 
and Surveys 

46 C.F.R. 42.15 

Conditions of 
Assignment of 
Freeboards 

10a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 

42.15-75 

Protection of 
the crew 

Requires deckhouses for 
accommodation of the 
crew to be of 
satisfactory strength 
and requires guard rails, 
life lines, and gangways 
to meet certain require- 
ments to ensure the 
safety of the crew. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies, with some 
exceptions, to United 
States flag vessels that 
engage in foreign or 
international voyages, 
in domestic voyages by 
sea, or on Great Lakes 
voyages. 

Did not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon at the time 
of the explosion 
because it was not 
engaged in any of those 
kinds of voyages. 

Sets requirements for 
power boilers. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to inspected 
and certificated 
vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, an 
uninspected vessel. 

46 C.F.R. 
Pt. 52 

Power Boilers 

46 C.F.R. 

56.50-85 

Tank-vent 
piping 
Sets requirements for 
venting of containers, 
including fuel tanks. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to inspected 
and certificated 
vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, an 
uninspected vessel. 

11a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 
Pt. 58 

Main 
Propulsion 
Machinery 

Sets requirements for 
material, design, 
construction, 
workmanship, and 
arrangement of 
propulsion machinery. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to inspected 
and certificated 
vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, an 
uninspected vessel. 

Requires periodic tests 
and inspections of 
certain machinery and 
equipment. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to inspected 
and certificated 
vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, an 
uninspected vessel. 

46 C.F.R. 
Pt. 61 

Periodic Tests 
and 
Inspections 

Requires leak tests for 
heating and cooking 
piping. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to inspected 
and certificated 
vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, an 
uninspected vessel. 

46 C.F.R. 

61.15-10 

Liquified 
petroleum gas 
piping for 
heating and 
cooking 

12a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 

67.121 

Official number 
marking 
requirement 

46 C.F.R. 

67.123 

Name and 
hailing port 
marking 
requirements 
Sets requirements for 
display of number, 
name, and hailing port 
of vessel in order for 
certificate of 
documentation to be 
valid for vessel 
operation. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards. 

Any vessel of at least 
five net tons owned by 
a citizen of the United 
States is eligible for 
documentation. 

The Mr. Beldon is 
eligible for 
documentation and was 
documented. 

Sets requirements for 
general alarm systems. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to certain 
inspected vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, an 
uninspected vessel. 

46 C.F.R. 
113.25 

General 
Emergency 
Alarm Systems 

Applies to liferaft 
servicing facilities, not 
vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, which is 
not a liferaft servicing 
facility. The Mr. 
Beldon is not required 
to have liferafts by 
Coast Guard 
regulations. 

46 C.F.R. 
160.151-57(p) 

Liferaft 
Servicing 
Prescribes information 
that liferaft servicing 
facility must include on 
certificate that it 
provides to liferaft 
owner when it services 
an inflatable liferaft. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards. 

13a 

Regulation Subject Matter Applicability 

46 C.F.R. 
199.620 

Alternatives 
for all vessels 
in a specified 
service 
Addresses requirements 
for lifesaving systems 
on certain inspected 
vessels. 

Does not regulate 
occupational safety and 
health hazards arising 
from drilling operations 
on inland waters. 

Applies to certain 
inspected vessels. 

Does not apply to the 
Mr. Beldon, an 
uninspected vessel.