No. 00-853 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

CORRECTION OFFICER PORTER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

v. 

RONALD NUSSLE 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS 

THEODORE B. OLSON 

Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 

STUART E. SCHIFFER 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

PAUL D. CLEMENT 

Deputy Solicitor General 

IRVING L. GORNSTEIN 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

BARBARA L. HERWIG 
PETER R. MAIER 

Attorneys 

Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
(202) 514-2217 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether the exhaustion provision of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. V 1999), 
requires an inmate to exhaust available administrative re- 
medies before filing an action alleging a use of excessive 
force by a correction officer. 

(I) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Interest of the United States ...................................................... 
1 

Statement ........................................................................................ 2 

Summary of argument .................................................................. 

4 

Argument: 

An action challenging a particular instance of 
alleged excessive force is an action with respect to 
“prison conditions” within the meaning of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement ....................................... 

7 

A. The text of the exhaustion provision includes 
actions that challenge particular instances of 
alleged misconduct ........................................................ 
8 

B. The exhaustion of claims challenging particular 
instances of alleged misconduct directly ad- 
vances the purposes of the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement ................................................................... 12 

C. An exception to the exhaustion requirement 
for claims challenging particular instances of 
alleged misconduct would generate wasteful liti- 
gation ............................................................................... 16 

D. Congress changed the exhaustion provision to 
broaden its scope, and creating an exception 
for actions challenging particular instances of 
alleged misconduct would contravene that 
purpose ............................................................................ 18 

E. The legislative history does not support an ex- 
ception for particular instances claims ..................... 
20 

F. The definition of prison conditions in 18 U.S.C. 
3626(g) (Supp. V 1999) supports a broad con- 
struction of that term in the exhaustion provi- 
sion ................................................................................... 21 

G. Neither McMillian nor the general rule that 
claims under Section 1983 need not be ex- 
hausted supports the court of appeals’ 
interpretation ................................................................ 
25 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 28 

(III) 

IV 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: Page 

A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 

(1945) ........................................................................................ 27 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) .................................... 

15 

Booth v. Churner, Co.: 

206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000), aff ’d on other grounds, 

121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001) ........................................................ 

8, 23 

121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001) .................................................. 

12, 14, 19 

City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 

725 (1995) ................................................................................. 

27 

Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989) .................... 

27 

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) ................... 

24, 27 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) ................................. 

10 

Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999) ........... 

8, 13 

Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2001) ..................... 

8 

H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 

229 (1989) ................................................................................. 

24 

Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 

2000) ......................................................................................... 8 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) ................... 

4, 11, 25 

Lawrence v. Goord, 238 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2001) ............... 

7, 14 

Marvin v. Goord, No. 99-0325, 2001 WL 686838 

(2d Cir. June 19, 2001) ................................................... 

7, 14, 16 

McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991) ............ 

5, 9, 10, 11 

12, 17, 22, 24 
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) ...................... 

12 

McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) .................. 

15 

Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) ................................. 

27 

Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972) .............................. 

15 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) ................... 

5, 9, 22 

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) ...................... 15 

V 

Cases—Continued: Page 

Royster v. United States, No. 00-0185, 2001 WL 

388051 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2001), petition for cert. 

pending, No. 01-100 (filed July 16, 2001) ........ 

1-2, 7-8, 14, 16 

Smith v. Zachary, No. 99-4084, 2001 WL 723010 

(7th Cir. June 28, 2001) .......................................... 

8, 13, 14, 15 

United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 

121 S. Ct. 1433 (2001) ............................................................ 

24 

Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 

529 U.S. 765 (2000) ................................................................ 

24 

Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) ........................... 

15 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) ............................... 

10 

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) .......................... 

5, 10, 18 

Constitution, statutes and regulations: 

U.S. Const. Amend. VIII .......................... 

2, 4, 6, 10, 18, 25, 26 

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. 

3626 et seq.: 

18 U.S.C. 3626 (Supp. V 1999) .............................. 

22, 23, 24 

18 U.S.C. 3626(g) (Supp. V 1999) ................................... 

6, 21 

18 U.S.C. 3626(g)(2) (Supp. 1999) ...................... 

4, 21, 22, 23 

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 

1997a et seq.: 
42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. V 1999) ........ 
1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 18, 19 

42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(2) (Supp. V 1999) ............................. 
26 

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 
1997 et seq.: 
42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (1994) ............................................... 
19, 20 

42 U.S.C. 1997e(a)(1) (1994) .......................................... 
18, 19 

42 U.S.C. 1997e(a)(2) (1994) ............................................ 
18 

18 U.S.C. 2705(a)(1)(B) ............................................................. 
24 

42 U.S.C. 1983 ...................................... 
2, 4, 6, 9, 18, 19, 22, 25, 27 

42 U.S.C. 2000aa-11(a)(4) ......................................................... 

24 

42 U.S.C. 3769a(b) ..................................................................... 
11 

42 U.S.C. 3769b(a)(1) ................................................................ 
11 

50 U.S.C. 403-3(b)(5) (Supp. V 1999) ..................................... 
24 

28 C.F.R. 542.10 et seq. ............................................................. 
1 

28 C.F.R. 542.14 ........................................................................ 13 

VI 

Miscellaneous: Page 

141 Cong. Rec. (1995): 

p. 14,570 ................................................................................. 

12, 21 

p. 14,573 ................................................................................... 
12 

p. 26,548 ................................................................................... 
21 

p. 26,553 ............................................................................. 
13, 21 

p. 27,042 ..................................................................................... 
21 

p. 27,044 ..................................................................................... 
21 

p. 35,624 ..................................................................................... 
12 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: 
(1961 ed.) ................................................................................. 
11 

(1993 ed.) ................................................................................. 12 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 00-853 

CORRECTION OFFICER PORTER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

v. 

RONALD NUSSLE 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS 

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 

This case presents the question whether the exhaustion 
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. V 1999), requires an in- 
mate to exhaust available administrative remedies before 
filing an action alleging a use of excessive force by a correc- 
tion officer. The United States has a substantial interest in 
the resolution of that question. Pursuant to its authority to 
manage federal prisons, the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) has adopted an administrative remedy program 
through which inmates may seek review of issues relating to 
their confinement. See 28 C.F.R. 542.10 et seq. Moreover, 
inmates frequently name BOP officials as defendants in 
actions arising from conditions of confinement in federal 
correctional institutions. See e.g. Royster v. United States, 

(1) 

2 

No. 00-0185, 2001 WL 388051 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2001), petition 
for cert. pending, No. 01-100 (filed July 16, 2001). The court’s 
decision in this case will affect both the efficacy of BOP’s 
administrative remedy program and the conduct of litigation 
against BOP officials. 

STATEMENT 

1. At the time of the events in question, respondent was 
confined at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Che- 
shire, Connecticut (CCI). Pet. App. A3. In June 1999, re- 
spondent filed suit in federal district court, alleging that 
correction officers at CCI subjected him to a sustained pat- 
tern of harassment and intimidation because of his perceived 
friendship with the Governor of the State of Connecticut. 
Ibid. Respondent specifically alleged that, on or about June 
15, 1996, two named correction officers (petitioners), to- 
gether with other unknown correction officers, placed him 
against a wall outside his cell, and then struck him with their 
hands, kneed him in the back, and pulled his hair. Ibid. 
Respondent further alleged that petitioners threatened to 
kill him if he reported the beating. Ibid. Respondent 
claimed that petitioners’ actions constituted cruel and un- 
usual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a 
violation of substantive due process, and an assault under 
state law. Ibid. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, respondent 
sought compensatory and punitive damages for the injuries 
that he allegedly sustained. Pet. App. A3. 
CCI has a grievance system for resolving prisoner 
complaints. J.A. 5-18. Under that procedure, an inmate may 
file a grievance relating to “[i]ndividual employee and inmate 
actions including any denial of access of inmates to the 
Inmate Grievance Procedure,” and any matter “relating to 
access to privileges, programs and services, conditions of 
care or supervision and living unit conditions within the 
authority of the Department of Correction.” J.A. 8. Respon- 

3 

dent did not file a grievance concerning the matters set forth 
in his complaint. Pet. App. A29. 

Petitioners moved to dismiss respondent’s complaint for 
failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as re- 
quired by the exhaustion provision of the PLRA. Pet. App. 
A4. That provision directs that “[n]o action shall be brought 
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this 
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such admini- 
strative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 
1997e(a) (Supp. V 1999). 

The district court granted petitioner’s motion and dis- 
missed respondent’s complaint without prejudice. Pet. App. 
A22-A30. It rejected respondent’s contention that the ex- 
haustion requirement does not apply to excessive force 
claims. The court explained that “[t]he use of excessive force 
by correctional officers falls into the category of ‘prison con- 
ditions,’ ” id. at A28, and that “[c]reating an exception for ex- 
cessive force claims would circumvent the Congressional 
purpose of weeding out frivolous claims before they are filed 
in federal court,” id. at A29. 

2. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s 
judgment, Pet. App. A1-A21, holding that the PLRA’s ex- 
haustion provision “does not apply to allegations of parti- 
cular instances of excessive force or assault by prison em- 
ployees,” id. at A2. Relying on a dictionary definition of the 
term “conditions,” the court of appeals concluded that the 
phrase “prison conditions” in the exhaustion provision refers 
to “circumstances affecting everyone in the area affected by 
them, rather than single or momentary matters, such as 
beatings or assaults.” Id. at A9 (citation and internal quota- 
tion marks omitted). 

The court of appeals concluded that the definition of 
“prison conditions” in the section of the PLRA addressed to 
prospective relief that courts may award also supported its 

4 

interpretation of the exhaustion requirement. Pet. App. A9- 
A12. The court noted that the definition includes two cate- 
gories: “conditions of confinement” and “the effects of 
actions by government officials on the lives of persons 
confined in prison.” Id. at A10 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3626(g)(2) 
(Supp. V 1999)). The court concluded that the first category 
“is no more apt to include particular instances of assault or 
excessive force than the reference to ‘prison conditions’ in 
§ 1997e(a) itself.” Ibid. As to the second category, the court 
concluded that “such awkward language would not, 
ordinarily, be used to describe such incidents.” Id. at A11. 
The court further concluded that, in light of the background 
and purposes of the prospective relief provisions, the second 
category’s use of the phrase “government officials” refers to 
“administrative and policymaking officials,” id. at A13, not to 
“lower level government employees, such as corrections 
officers,” id. at A15. 

The court of appeals also relied on this Court’s holding in 
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), that a malicious 
use of force constitutes cruel and unusual punishment with- 
out proof of serious harm, while proof of such harm is neces- 
sary to prove other Eighth Amendment claims. Pet. App. 
A17. The court viewed that distinction as “equally appli- 
cable here,” because it believed that Section 1997e(a) filters 
through the exhaustion provision only “claims that may be 
frivolous as to subject matter.” Ibid. Finally, the court 
concluded that, as an exception to the general rule of non- 
exhaustion in Section 1983 cases, the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement should be construed “narrowly.” Ibid. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to actions 
that challenge particular instances of alleged misconduct as 
well as actions that challenge practices that affect the prison 
population generally. An inmate challenging a particular in- 

5 

stance of alleged excessive force therefore must exhaust 
available administrative remedies before filing suit. 

The text of the exhaustion provision makes clear that it 
applies to all actions that challenge prison conditions; there 
is no exception for challenges to prison conditions that affect 
only a single inmate or that are of brief duration. Nor can 
such a limitation be derived from the plain meaning of the 
phrase “prison conditions,” as the court of appeals believed. 
When an individual inmate is placed in isolation, denied a 
specific medical procedure, or subjected to a use of force, 
that is a “prison condition” for him, regardless of its duration 
or whether that condition is inflicted on others. 

This Court’s decisions confirm that the phrase “prison 
conditions” includes particular instances of alleged mis- 
conduct. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498 (1973), 
and Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the Court used the 
phrases “conditions of confinement” and “prison conditions” 
to refer to particular instances of alleged misconduct. In 
McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 142 (1991), the Court 
interpreted the phrase “conditions of confinement” in the 
magistrate referral statute to encompass a single episode of 
excessive force. Moreover, all the rationales for the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement apply with full force to claims alleg- 
ing excessive force or challenging other individual incidents. 

The court of appeals interpreted the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement in a manner contrary to the overall thrust of 
the PLRA. Having adopted an exhaustion requirement in 
order to help reduce the crushing burden that prison law- 
suits impose on courts, Congress could not have intended 
for there to be extensive proceedings simply to determine 
whether a claim must be exhausted. In addition, the pre- 
PLRA exhaustion provision contained numerous limits and 
exceptions, but it extended to all actions challenging state 
prison conditions, including isolated incidents. The PLRA 
eliminated the constraints on exhaustion and dramatically 

6 

expanded the number of claims governed by a strict exhaus- 
tion requirement. It is highly implausible that the Congress 
that adopted a significantly broader exhaustion requirement 
simultaneously dramatically cut back on its scope. In fact, 
numerous statements made during the course of Congress’s 
consideration of the PLRA show that the exhaustion re- 
quirement applies to all prison conditions—isolated incidents 
and recurring practices alike. 

The separate definition of prison conditions for purposes 
of the PLRA’s procedures for certain injunctions confirms 
the broad reach of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. 
Both halves of the definition of “prison conditions” in 18 
U.S.C. 3626(g) include particular instances of alleged mis- 
conduct. When read in light of the Court’s decisions in 
Prieser, Bronson, and Wilson, the phrase “conditions of con- 
finement” includes particular instances of alleged mis- 
conduct. The phrase “the effects of actions by government 
officials on the lives of persons confined in prison” is even 
better suited to capture particularized misconduct, such as 
uses of excessive force. 

The Court’s holding in McMillian that a malicious use of 
force is cruel and unusual without proof of serious harm, 
while other Eighth Amendment claims require such proof, 
has no relevance here. The standards for proving a parti- 
cular claim have no bearing on whether it is appropriate to 
require an inmate to raise that claim in a prison grievance 
process before filing suit. Nor should the PLRA’s ex- 
haustion requirement be construed narrowly in order to give 
maximum effect to Section 1983’s general rule of non- 
exhaustion. The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement addresses 
Section 1983 actions specifically and is part of a comprehen- 
sive set of measures designed to address the extraordinary 
problems posed by prisoner lawsuits. It represents a deli- 
berate and dramatic departure from prior law. It is there- 

7 

fore inappropriate to construe the PLRA’s exhaustion re- 
quirement narrowly. 

ARGUMENT 

AN ACTION CHALLENGING A PARTICULAR IN- 
STANCE OF ALLEGED EXCESSIVE FORCE IS AN 
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO “PRISON CONDITIONS” 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE PLRA’S EXHAUS- 
TION REQUIREMENT 

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement directs that “[n]o 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by 
a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility until such administrative remedies as are available 
are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. V 1999). The 
court of appeals in this case held that actions challenging 
“particular instances” of alleged excessive force by prison 
guards are not actions “with respect to prison conditions” 
within the meaning of Section 1997e(a), and that inmates can 
therefore bring such claims without exhausting available 
administrative remedies. Pet. App. A7-A8. 

In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit has made clear 
that its exception to the exhaustion requirement is not 
limited to excessive force claims. The Second Circuit has 
explained that the exhaustion requirement applies when an 
inmate challenges “aspects of prison life affecting the entire 
prison population,” Lawrence v. Goord, 238 F.3d 182, 185 
(2001), or conduct that is “clearly mandated by a prison 
policy or undertaken pursuant to a systematic practice,” 
Marvin v. Goord, No. 99-0325, 2001 WL 686838, at *1 (June 
19, 2001) (per curiam), but that it does not apply to any case 
in which an inmate challenges “particularized instances” of 
alleged misconduct. Lawrence, 238 F.3d at 186; Marvin, 
2001 WL 686838, at * 1; see also Royster v. United States, 

8 

No. 00-0185, 2001 WL 388051, at *1-*2 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 
2001), petition for cert. pending, No. 01-100 (filed July 16, 
2001); Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2001). 

That reading of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is 
incorrect. As four courts of appeals have held, the exhaus- 
tion requirement applies equally to actions that challenge 
particular instances of alleged misconduct and those 
that challenge practices that affect the prison population 
generally. Smith v. Zachary, No. 99-4084, 2001 WL 723010 
(7th Cir. June 28, 2001); Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 
1259 (11th Cir. 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641 (6th 
Cir. 1999); Booth v. Churner, C.O., 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 
2000), aff ’d on other grounds, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001). 

A. The Text Of The Exhaustion Provision Includes Ac- 
tions That Challenge Particular Instances Of Alleged 

Misconduct 

The text of the exhaustion provision directs that “[n]o” 
action may be brought “with respect to prison conditions” 
absent the exhaustion of available administrative remedies. 
42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. V 1999). By its terms, the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement applies to all actions that challenge 
prison conditions; there is no exception for challenges to 
prison conditions that affect only a single inmate or that last 
for only a brief period of time. 

Nor can such a limitation be derived from the plain mean- 
ing of the phrase “prison conditions,” as the court of appeals 
believed. Pet. App. A9. That phrase undoubtedly encom- 
passes prison practices that affect prison life for all inmates. 
But it also encompasses specific actions directed to parti- 
cular inmates. When an individual inmate is placed in isola- 
tion, or denied requested medical care or access to a parti- 
cular document, or endures a use of force, that is a “prison 
condition” for him, regardless of its duration or whether 
everyone else in the prison experiences the same conditions. 

9 

This Court’s decisions in Preiser, Bronson, and Wilson all 
support that conclusion. In Preiser, the Court held that 
inmates may challenge the “conditions of their confinement” 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but that an inmate may challenge “the 
fact or duration of his physical confinement” only by filing a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court gave as 
examples of challenges to conditions of confinement inmate 
actions complaining of: (1) the denial of the right to purchase 
religious publications, (2) the confiscation of legal materials, 
and (3) placement in solitary confinement as a disciplinary 
measure. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-499. Those examples 
“were all challenges to specific instances of unconstitutional 
conduct.” Bronson, 500 U.S. at 142. Although the PLRA 
uses the phrase “prison conditions,” rather than “conditions 
of confinement,” that minor difference in phraseology is 
not significant. Indeed, the Court in Preiser used the two 
phrases interchangeably. Compare 411 U.S. at 498 (“The 
respondents place a great deal of reliance on our recent de- 
cisions upholding the right of state prisoners to bring federal 
civil rights actions to challenge the conditions of their con- 
finement.”) with id. at 499 (“This is not to say that habeas 
corpus may not also be available to challenge such prison 
conditions.”). Preiser therefore establishes that prison con- 
ditions include not only broad policies that affect the entire 
prison population, but also specific actions directed at parti- 
cular inmates. 

Bronson reinforces that conclusion. In Bronson, the 
Court held that a statute that authorized the referral to 
magistrates of “prisoner petitions challenging conditions of 
confinement” (500 U.S. at 137) applied to a prisoner petition 
alleging a single episode of excessive force. Id. at 139-144. 
Relying in significant part on Preiser, and Congress’s pre- 
sumed familiarity with that decision, the Court rejected the 
inmate’s contention that the phrase “ ‘conditions of confine- 
ment’ includes continuous conditions and excludes isolated 

10 

incidents.” Id. at 139. The Court explained that Preiser had 
described two broad categories of prisoner actions—“those 
challenging the fact or duration of confinement itself,” and 
“those challenging the conditions of confinement,” and 
Preiser’s “description * * * of the latter category unam- 
biguously embraced the kind of single episode cases that 
petitioner’s construction would exclude.” Id. at 140-141. 

Wilson is equally persuasive on that point. There, the 
Court held that inmates challenging conditions of confine- 
ment must show a culpable state of mind in order to estab- 
lish an Eighth Amendment violation. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court relied on the holdings in Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312 (1986), that inmates alleging a deprivation of adequate 
medical care and the use excessive force during a riot must 
demonstrate a culpable state of mind. The Wilson Court 
rejected the concurring opinion’s effort to distinguish those 
cases on the ground that they did not involve “conditions of 
confinement,” but rather “specific acts or omissions directed 
at individual prisoners.” 501 U.S. at 299 n.1. The Court 
stated that “if an individual prisoner is deprived of needed 
medical treatment, that is a condition of his confinement, 
whether or not the deprivation is inflicted upon every- 
one else.” Ibid. The Court further explained that “[u]n- 
doubtedly deprivations inflicted upon all prisoners are, as a 
policy matter, of greater concern than deprivations inflicted 
upon particular prisoners, but we see no basis whatever for 
saying that the one is a ‘condition of confinement,’ and the 
other is not.” Ibid. Like the Court in Preiser, the Court in 
Wilson used the phrase “conditions of confinement” inter- 
changeably with the phrase “prison conditions.” Compare 
the passage quoted above with id. at 299-300 (“Petitioner 
concedes that this is so with respect to some claims of cruel 
and unusual prison conditions.”) (emphasis omitted) and id. 
at 300 (“The long duration of a cruel prison condition may 

11 

make it easier to establish knowledge and hence some form 
of intent.”) (emphasis omitted). 

To be sure, the phrase “prison conditions” does not in- 
variably or inescapably encompass particular instances of 
misconduct. The context in which that phrase is used may 
suggest that it has a narrower meaning. For example, in 
Bronson, the Court cited 42 U.S.C. 3769a(b), 3769b(a)(1) as 
an example of a statute that may use the phrase “conditions 
of confinement” to refer to “ongoing conditions.” 500 U.S. at 
142 & n.3. That statute requires state governments to 
develop a “plan for . . . improving conditions of confine- 
ment” as a precondition to receiving federal funds to 
“reliev[e] overcrowding [and] substandard conditions.” The 
use of the phrase in the context of a precondition for an 
ongoing funding program may suggest a focus on broader 
conditions affecting the inmate population as a whole. See 
also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992) (discussed 
at pp. 25-26, infra). But Preiser, Bronson, and Wilson make 
clear that, absent contextual limitations of that kind, the 
phrase “prison conditions” includes particularized conduct. 
Moreover, to the extent context informs the meaning of the 
term “prison conditions,” the overall context of the PLRA 
supports a broad rather than a narrow construction of that 
term in the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See pp. 12-20, 
infra. 

Rather than interpreting the PLRA’s exhaustion pro- 
vision in light of Preiser, Bronson, and Wilson, the court of 
appeals derived the “plain meaning” of “prison conditions” 
from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(Webster’s) 473 (1961), which defines “conditions” as “atten- 
dant circumstances,” or an “existing state of affairs.” Pet. 
App. A9. Even that definition of “conditions” unmodified, 
however, does not support the court of appeals’ interpreta- 
tion. A particular instance of misconduct, such as a use of 
excessive force, is an “attendant circumstance” of an in- 

12 

mate’s confinement—it is connected to, and a consequence 
of, confinement. See Webster’s 140 (1993) (definition of 
“attendant”: (3) “accompanying, connected with, or immedi- 
ately following as consequential”). Ultimately, however, the 
question at issue here does not depend on the meaning of the 
term “conditions” unmodified. Instead, it depends on the 
meaning of the phrase “prison conditions” as used in the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. When viewed against the 
backdrop of Preiser, Bronson, and Wilson, as well as the 
broader purposes of exhaustion and the PLRA, that phrase 
includes particular instances of misconduct. 

B. The Exhaustion Of Claims Challenging Particular In- 
stances Of Alleged Misconduct Directly Advances The 

Purposes Of The PLRA’s Exhaustion Requirement 

Interpreting the phrase “prison conditions” to include 
particular instances of misconduct directly advances the 
purposes of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Cf. 
Bronson, 500 U.S. at 142-143. Those purposes are to (1) give 
prison authorities the opportunity to resolve problems 
within the prison without judicial intervention, (2) help 
reduce the volume of prison litigation in federal courts, and 
(3) develop the underlying facts in a way that facilitates 
litigation in the event a case ends up in court. Booth v. C.O. 
Churner, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1823 (2001); see McCarthy v. 
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144-146 (1992).* 

* See also 141 Cong. Rec. 35,624 (1995) (Rep. LoBiondo) (exhaustion 
requirement will “provide the opportunity for early resolution of the 
problem,” “reduce the intrusion of the courts into the administration of the 
prisons,” and “provide some degree of fact-finding so that when or if the 
matter reaches Federal court there will be a record upon which to proceed 
in a more efficient manner”); id. at 14,573 (Sen. Kyl) (“An exhaustion re- 
quirement is appropriate for prisoners given the burden that their cases 
place on the Federal court system, the availability of administrative re- 
medies, and the lack of merit of many of the claims.”); id. at 14,570 (Sen. 

13 

Requiring an inmate to exhaust a claim challenging a 
particular instance of alleged misconduct furthers each of 
those purposes. Unlike broad challenges to institutional 
policies, most isolated incident claims, including virtually all 
excessive force claims, involve deviation from the 
institution’s stated policy. Accordingly, it makes particular 
sense to require exhaustion, which will give prison officials 
notification of the violation and an opportunity to correct it. 
For example, a prison institution has a strong interest in 
resolving an excessive force claim. If the claim is legitimate, 
a prison institution has an overriding interest in learning 
about it at an early stage, so that it can take immediate steps 
to discipline the abusive guard. Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644. 
While prison institutions typically advance their interest in 
receiving timely notification by requiring inmates to file ad- 
ministrative grievances within a short period after the in- 
cident, e.g. J.A. 11 (grievance must be filed within 30 days of 
the occurrence of discovery of the cause of the grievance); 28 
C.F.R. 542.14 (grievance must be filed with 20 days following 
the date on which the basis for the grievance occurred), 
applicable statutes of limitation can give inmates years to file 
suit. 

Excessive force claims are also well-suited to admini- 
strative resolution. A prison institution may remedy a legiti- 
mate claim of excessive force by disciplining the officer in- 
volved, retraining the officer, transferring the inmate to a 
different area of the prison, or issuing a decision that the 
inmate’s complaint is meritorious and the guard’s conduct 
should not be repeated. See Smith, 2001 WL 723010, at *3. 

Dole) (noting “an alarming explosion in the number of lawsuits filed by 
State and Federal prisoners”—“from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in 
1994”); id. at 26,553 (Sen. Hatch) (noting that the “vast majority” of the 
39,000 non-habeas suits filed by inmates in federal court “are completely 
without merit,” and that “[t]he crushing burden” of the suits “makes it 
difficult for courts to consider meritorious claims”). 

14 

Such measures may well satisfy the complaining inmate and 
eliminate his desire to pursue federal court litigation. Booth, 
121 S. Ct. at 1823. Alternatively, factual development of the 
issue and a written decision may persuade the inmate that 
there is no merit to his claim and dissuade him from filing 
suit. Ibid. In either event, the administrative process re- 
duces the volume of litigation in federal court. 

When litigation cannot be avoided, exhaustion of an exces- 
sive force claim can better prepare the parties for litigation 
on the issue and expedite resolution of the matter in court. 
Booth, 121 S. Ct. at 1823. Excessive force claims can be 
“factually intense,” and the administrative process may, “at 
a minimum,” develop the “basics of who-did-what-to-whom.” 
Smith, 2001 WL 723010, at *2. 

Other particular instance claims, such as claims involving 
a particular instance of retaliation, or claims involving a 
particular instance of inadequate medical care, implicate the 
policies of exhaustion to the same degree. In those cases as 
well, institutions have an interest in learning about a devia- 
tion from institution policy quickly; internal proceedings can 
remedy the problem or clarify the facts in a way that dis- 
suades the inmate from filing suit; and factual development 
can assist the parties in presenting the issues that must be 
resolved by a court. 

The Second Circuit nonetheless concluded in Lawrence, 
the second in its series of exhaustion cases, that the purposes 
of exhaustion are not implicated by particular instance 
claims. The court reasoned that the purpose of exhaustion is 
to give prison institutions a chance to change their policies, a 
purpose “not served when a practice is aimed at one specific 
inmate rather than the prison population as a whole.” 238 
F.3d at 186. In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit has re- 
peated that limited rationale for the exhaustion requirement. 
Royster, 2001 WL 388051, at *1; Marvin, 2001 WL 686838, at 

*1. 

15 

The Second Circuit has provided no basis for its view that 
the purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is 
limited to giving prison institutions a chance to change their 
policies. The PLRA responded to a perceived flood of prison 
litigation, not just suits aimed at changing overall policies. 
More broadly, exhaustion requirements are typically de- 
signed to serve a variety of purposes, including reducing 
the volume of federal court litigation and facilitating the 
development of the facts should a dispute reach court. 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); Parisi v. 
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 
395 U.S. 185, 193-194 (1969). 

Moreover, the Second Circuit is mistaken in its view that 
isolated incidents can never lead to the reassessment of insti- 
tutional policies. Institutions may view a particular guard’s 
use of excessive force as a symptom of “systemic problems, 
including poor hiring procedures, insufficient training and 
supervision, or an inadequate procedure for responding to 
prison riots or insubordinate behavior by prisoners.” Smith, 
2001 WL 723010, at *2. A report of a particular incident may 
well prompt a reassessment of those broader policies. 

Exhaustion of challenges, whether incident-specific or 
implicating broader policies, also gives the courts the benefit 
of institutional expertise. Courts are “ill suited to act as the 
front-line agencies for the consideration and resolution of the 
infinite variety of prisoner complaints.” Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 n.9 (1974). The proper response 
to prison grievances falls squarely within the expertise of 
prison officials, and, in general, courts owe deference to the 
solutions chosen by those officials. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 547 n.29 (1979). 

16 

C. An Exception To The Exhaustion Requirement For 

Claims Challenging Particular Instances Of Alleged 

Misconduct Would Generate Wasteful Litigation 

The difficulty of distinguishing between actions chal- 
lenging particular instances of alleged misconduct and 
actions challenging systematic prison practices provides yet 
another reason for rejecting the court of appeals’ 
interpretation. The very effort to determine which cases fall 
into which category will generate substantial additional 
work for the courts. Requiring all claims arising from 
incarceration to be exhausted avoids that difficulty and 
further advances the PLRA’s goal of reducing the amount of 
judicial resources devoted to prisoner claims. 

The exhaustion cases decided by the Second Circuit in the 
wake of its decision in this case provide an early indication of 
the additional litigation that the Second Circuit’s rule would 
generate. While the Second Circuit had no difficulty classi- 
fying a retaliation claim as a particular instance claim, it has 
remanded for district courts to consider in the first instance 
whether the following claims must be exhausted: a claim 
that an inmate was denied access to his legal documents, 
Royster, 2001 WL 388051, at *2; a claim that an inmate’s mail 
was seized, Marvin, 2001 WL 686838, at *1-*2; a claim that a 
directive promulgated by prison employees abridged an 
inmate’s right to freedom of religion, ibid; and a claim that an 
inmate was denied adequate medical care when prison 
employees failed to allow him to obtain root canal surgery 
from a dentist, ibid. The Second Circuit has also left open 
for future litigation “the question of whether exhaustion is 
required if the challenged conduct is undertaken pursuant to 
a prison policy which vests discretion in correctional em- 
ployees to act or not act, e.g., a policy providing that an em- 
ployee should perform some act if it is ‘reasonably’ 
warranted by the circumstances.” Id. at *3 n.2. 

17 

The complaint in this case illustrates that even an exces- 
sive force claim may resist easy characterization. Respon- 
dent’s complaint centers on one specific incident of alleged 
excessive force. Pet. App. A3. But his complaint also alleges 
that correction officers subjected him to a sustained pattern 
of harassment and intimidation because of his perceived 
friendship with the Governor of the State of Connecticut. 
Ibid. Thus, respondent’s complaint, like many inmate 
complaints, fairly can be characterized as challenging both a 
systematic practice and a particular instance of alleged 
misconduct. 

The Second Circuit’s interpretation thus invites sub- 
stantial collateral litigation on whether a claim must be ex- 
hausted. Having adopted an exhaustion requirement in 
order to help reduce the crushing burden that prison law- 
suits impose on courts, Congress could not have intended for 
there to be extensive pleadings, hearings, and possibly trials 
simply to determine whether a claim must be exhausted. 

This Court has previously recognized that the attempt to 
separate particular instance claims from other prison con- 
dition claims provokes wasteful litigation. In Bronson, the 
Court noted that its holding that all prison petitions may be 
referred to magistrates “furthers the policy of the Act be- 
cause its simplicity avoids the litigation that otherwise 
would inevitably arise in trying to identify the precise con- 
tours of [an] exception for single episode cases.” 500 U.S. at 
143. The Court added that such an exception “would gener- 
ate additional work for the district courts because the 
distinction between cases challenging ongoing conditions and 
those challenging specific acts of alleged misconduct will 
often be difficult to identify.” Ibid. Many prison petitions, 
the Court explained, “could fairly be characterized as chal- 
lenging both ongoing practices and a specific act of alleged 
misconduct.” Id. at 143-144. 

18 

Similarly, in Wilson, the difficulty of drawing a distinction 
between “short-term” or “one-time” prison conditions and 
“continuing” or “systematic” conditions played a significant 
role in the Court’s rejection of that distinction as a basis for 
determining whether proof of a culpable state of mind is re- 
quired to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. 501 
U.S. at 300. The Court explained that “[a]part from the 
difficulty of determining the day or hour that divides the two 
categories (Is it the same for all conditions?), the violations 
alleged in specific cases often consist of composite conditions 
that do not lend themselves to such pigeonholing.” Id. at 
301. The Court also “wonder[ed] whether depriving all the 
individual prisoners who are murderers would suffice; or all 
the individual prisoners in Cellblock B.” Id. at 299 n.1. The 
Court concluded that the proposed distinction “defies ra- 
tional implementation,” id at 301, and is not only “unsup- 
portable in principle but unworkable in practice,” id. at 299 

n.1. The practical considerations discussed in Bronson and 
Wilson are equally applicable here. 

D. Congress Changed The Exhaustion Provision To 

Broaden Its Scope, And Creating An Exception For 

Actions Challenging Particular Instances Of Alleged 

Misconduct Would Contravene That Purpose 

Before the PLRA amended Section 1997e(a), a district 
court had discretion to require a state inmate to exhaust a 
claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 if the court 
determined that exhaustion would be “appropriate and in 
the interests of justice,” and if the State afforded remedies 
for the claim that were “plain, speedy, and effective.” 42 
U.S.C. 1997e(a)(1) (1994). Before ordering exhaustion, a 
court was also required to determine that the state proce- 
dures satisfied minimum standards of fairness and effec- 
tiveness. 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a)(2) (1994). In addition, rather 
than ordering a dismissal of the case pending exhaustion, a 

19 

court’s only option was to continue a case pending exhaus- 
tion for a period of not more than 180 days. 42 U.S.C. 
1997e(a)(1) (1994). Nonetheless, that exhaustion require- 
ment applied to all actions filed by inmates under Section 
1983 and therefore unambiguously included actions chal- 
lenging particular instances of alleged misconduct. 42 U.S.C. 
1997e(a) (1994). 

In the PLRA, Congress made substantial changes in 
Section 1997e(a) to expand the scope and ease the application 
of the exhaustion requirement. In place of the previous ver- 
sion, Congress substituted a broad and firm mandate that 
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison condi- 
tions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal 
law” by an inmate “until such administrative remedies as are 
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. V 1999). 
That provision (1) eliminates the requirement that state re- 
medies must be “plain, speedy, and effective,” (2) eliminates 
the requirement that administrative remedies must satisfy 
minimum standards of fairness and effectiveness, (3) 
eliminates a court’s discretion to waive exhaustion when it 
would not be “appropriate” or “in the interests of justice,” (4) 
requires dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust, rather 
than a continuance for not more than 180 days, and (5) ex- 
tends exhaustion to claims brought under any federal law. 
See Booth, 121 S. Ct. at 1824-1825 & n.5. 

It is “highly implausible” that the Congress that adopted 
“an obviously broader exhaustion requirement” intended to 
permit the many inmates who challenge particular instances 
of alleged misconduct to “skip the administrative process” 
and go directly to federal court. 121 S. Ct. at 1825. That is 
particularly true in light of the original version of Section 
1997e(a)’s unambiguous application to actions challenging 
particular instances of alleged misconduct. If the court of 
appeals’ interpretation were correct, it would mean that at 
the same time that Congress widely expanded the scope of 

20 

the exhaustion requirement, it simultaneously dramatically 
cut back on it. 

As the court of appeals noted (Pet. App. A6), the PLRA 
inserted the phrase “with respect to prison conditions” into 
Section 1997e(a), and some meaning must be given to that 
addition. But that phrase can be given meaning without 
undermining the underlying purpose of the exhaustion 
requirement’s revisions. The phrase “with respect to prison 
conditions” serves at least one limited but important func- 
tion: it eliminates the new mandatory exhaustion require- 
ment for claims that concern pre-incarceration incidents, 
such as an action alleging excessive force by an arresting 
officer, or an action alleging that a pre-incarceration em- 
ployer engaged in discrimination in violation of Title VII. In 
a provision requiring mandatory exhaustion of prison 
grievance procedures, it would have made little sense to 
have required exhaustion of such claims. There is no com- 
parable reason for Congress to have excluded actions chal- 
lenging particular instances of alleged misconduct that occur 
while an inmate is confined. To the contrary, a principal 
purpose of prison grievance procedures is to address claims 
of that kind. 

E. The Legislative History Does Not Support An Ex- 
ception For Particular Instances Claims 

The legislative statements made during the course of 
Congress’s consideration of the PLRA also support a broad 
reading of the exhaustion requirement. In discussing the 
prisoner lawsuits that prompted the PLRA, the proponents 
referred to the numerous suits involving isolated incidents, 
including: the failure to provide sufficient locker space; a 
defective haircut by a prison barber; the failure of prison 
officials to invite an inmate to a pizza party; the service of 
chunky peanut butter rather than creamy; the denial of the 
use a Game Boy; the issuance of Converse shoes rather than 

21 

Reebok or L.A. Gear; a clean-up of a flooded cell that re- 
sulted in pinochle cards getting wet; and a search of a cell in 
which clean and dirty clothes were mixed together. 141 
Cong. Rec. at 14,570 (Sen. Dole); id. at 26,548 (Sen. Dole); id. 
at 26,553 (Sen. Hatch); ibid. (Sen. Kyl); id. at 27,042 (Sen. 
Hatch). 

The proponents did not refer directly to excessive force 
claims. In discussing the need for the PLRA, however, its 
sponsors could hardly be expected to discuss all the claims 
that would be subject to exhaustion. In pressing their case 
for a change in the law, the sponsors understandably se- 
lected the most egregious examples of lawsuits filed by 
inmates. In addition, while no sponsor referred to excessive 
force claims directly, one of the sponsors referred to the 
propensity of inmates to file cruel and unusual punishment 
claims, 141 Cong. Rec. at 14,570 (Sen. Dole), a category that 
includes excessive force claims. Furthermore, an opponent 
of the legislation pointed out that excessive force claims, like 
the claims discussed by the proponents, would be affected by 
the legislation, id. at 27,044 (Sen. Biden), and no proponent 
contradicted that assertion. Nothing in the legislative 
history remotely suggests that the sponsors intended to 
exclude excessive force or other isolated incident claims 
from the exhaustion requirement’s coverage. 

F. The Definition Of Prison Conditions In 18 U.S.C. 

3626(g) (Supp. V 1999) Supports A Broad Construc- 
tion of That Term In The Exhaustion Provision 

The court of appeals concluded that the definition of 
“prison conditions” in 18 U.S.C. 3626(g)(2) (Supp. V 1999) 
supported its interpretation of the exhaustion requirement. 
Pet. App. A12-A16. That definition is included in a separate 
section of the PLRA addressed to limitations on prospective 
relief and provides that, “[a]s used in this section, * * * the 
term ‘civil action with respect to prison conditions’ means 

22 

any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect 
to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by 
government officials on the lives of persons confined in 
prison, but does not include habeas corpus proceedings 
challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.” 18 
U.S.C. 3626(g)(2) (Supp. V 1999). The court of appeals’ re- 
liance on that definition is misplaced. To the extent it is 
relevant, that definition encompasses particular instances of 
alleged misconduct and so supports a broad reading of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Even if it excluded them, 
however, it would not affect the construction of the PLRA’s 
separate exhaustion requirement. 

1. The definition in Section 3626(g)(2) tracks the 
distinction drawn by the Court in Preiser between actions 
that inmates may bring pursuant to Section 1983 and actions 
that they may bring only by filing a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Preiser used the phrase “conditions of their 
confinement” to describe the former category, 411 U.S. at 
498, and “challenge [to] the very fact or duration of the con- 
finement” to describe the latter, id. at 499. Because the 
Section 3626 definition “so clearly parallels” the decision in 
Preiser, it should be interpreted in accordance with that 
decision. Bronson, 500 U.S. at 142. 

As previously discussed, Preiser used the phrase “con- 
ditions of confinement” to include particular instances of 
alleged misconduct. The term “conditions of confinement” in 
the Section 3626 definition therefore includes that class of 
claims as well. The decisions in Bronson, and Wilson, which 
adopted similar definitions of “conditions of confinement,” 
reinforce that conclusion. See pp. 10-11, supra. The court of 
appeals concluded that the phrase “conditions of confine- 
ment” is not an “apt” way to describe particular instances of 
alleged misconduct. Pet. App. A10. But that assessment 
ignores the decisions in Preiser, Bronson, and Wilson. In 
light of those decisions, the phrase “conditions of confine- 

23 

ment,” when contrasted with “habeas corpus proceedings 
challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison,” is 
a particularly “apt” way to encompass particular instances of 
alleged misconduct. 

2. The phrase “the effects of actions by government 
officials on the lives of persons confined in prison” (18 U.S.C. 
3626(g)(2) (Supp. V 1999)) is even better suited than the 
phrase “conditions of confinement” to capture challenges to 
particular instances of alleged misconduct. Its evident pur- 
pose is to make doubly sure that a particular instance of al- 
leged misconduct would not be excluded from the definition. 
The court of appeals viewed that phrase as too “awkward” 
to capture particular instances of excessive force. Pet. App. 
A11. As the Third Circuit has explained, however, 
particular instances of excessive force affect the lives of in- 
mates in the same way as other adverse prison conditions— 
“[t]hey make their lives worse.” Booth, 206 F.3d at 295. 
There are undoubtedly more precise ways to describe parti- 
cular instances of excessive force. But Congress had to 
choose a general phrase that would capture a wide variety of 
practices not just uses of excessive force. The phrase it 
selected effectively serves that purpose. 

3. The court of appeals also drew on the background and 
purposes of Section 3626 to interpret its definition narrowly. 
In particular, the court concluded that, because the primary 
purpose of Section 3626 is to prevent courts from micro- 
managing prisons through broad-based decrees directed to 
high-ranking prison officials, the term “government officials” 
in Section 3626(g)(2) must refer only to “administrative and 
policymaking officials,” Pet. App. A13, and not to “lower 
level government employees, such as corrections officers,” 
id. at A15; see generally id. at A12-A15. 

That construction of Section 3626 is mistaken. Congress 
crafted an expansive definition embracing the actions of all 
government officials, not just policymaking officials. Com- 

24 

pare 50 U.S.C. 403-3(b)(5) (Supp. V 1999) (limiting provision 
to “policymaking officials”); 18 U.S.C. 2705(a)(1)(B) (limiting 
provision to “supervisory official”); 42 U.S.C. 2000aa-11(a)(4) 
(same). Correction officers, no matter what their rank, are 
still “government officials.” See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 
U.S. 574, 577, 581, 585 (1998). But to the extent that the 
specific purposes of Section 3626 are relevant, they counsel 
against transplanting a definition from that section that is 
expressly limited to defining the term “as used in this 
section.” In other words, even if the Section 3626 definition 
were construed to exclude particular instances of alleged 
misconduct for purposes of that Section, it would not furnish 
a basis for construing the PLRA’s separate exhaustion 
provision in the same way. Bronson, 500 U.S. at 142 (“the 
fact that Congress may have used the term ‘conditions of 
confinement’ in a different sense in legislation having a 
different purpose cannot control our interpretation of the 
language in this Act”); United States v. Cleveland Indians 
Baseball Co., 121 S. Ct. 1433, 1440-1443 (2001) (refusing to 
give the phrase “wages paid” the same interpretation in the 
“discrete taxation and benefits eligibility contexts” when the 
concerns that animated treatment of backpay in the benefits 
context had “no relevance to the tax side”); see Vermont 
Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 783 & 

n.12 (2000) (refusing to apply a section-specific definition of 
“person” to a different section, where the definition departed 
from the usual meaning of that term); compare H.J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239-240 (1989) 
(adopting a definition applicable to a different section when 
there was “no reason to suppose that Congress had in mind 

* * * any more constrained a notion”). 

25 

G. Neither McMillian Nor The General Rule That Claims 

Under Section 1983 Need Not Be Exhausted Supports 

The Court Of Appeals’ Interpretation 

The court of appeals cited two additional considerations in 
support of its interpretation—the holding in McMillian that 
excessive force claims have a different standard of proof 
from other cruel and unusual punishment claims, and the 
general rule that Section 1983 claims do not have to be ex- 
hausted. Pet. App. A16-A17. Neither provides a basis for 
excluding particular instance claims from the scope of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. 

1. In McMillian, the Court held that in order to establish 
that a malicious and sadistic use of excessive force violates 
the Eighth Amendment, it is not necessary to show that 
serious harm has resulted. 503 U.S. at 7-11. The Court dis- 
tinguished excessive force claims from other Eighth Amend- 
ment claims, which require such a showing. Id. at 8-9. 
Referring to the other Eighth Amendment claims as “con- 
ditions-of-confinement” claims and “medical needs” claims, 
id. at 9, the Court gave the following explanation for the 
distinction: 

In the excessive force context, society’s expectations 
are different. When prison officials maliciously and sa- 
distically use force to cause harm, contemporary stan- 
dards of decency always are violated. This is true 
whether or not significant injury is evident. 

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). 

McMillian shows that it is linguistically possible to use 
the phrase “conditions of confinement” in a way that ex- 
cludes instances of excessive force and deprivations of medi- 
cal needs, a point previously noted. See pp. 10-11, supra. 
The question here, however, is not whether it is linguistically 
possible to use the phrase “prison conditions” in that way. 
Instead, the question is whether that is what Congress in- 

26 

tended in the specific context of the PLRA’s exhaustion 
provision. As we have discussed, the factors bearing on that 
question overwhelmingly establish that the phrase “prison 
conditions” in the exhaustion provision encompasses parti- 
cular instances of misconduct, including particular instances 
of excessive force. Nothing in McMillian suggests other- 
wise. Indeed, McMillian’s holding that a malicious use of 
excessive force is cruel and unusual without proof of serious 
harm, while other Eighth Amendment claims require such 
proof, has no relevance here. The standards for proving a 
particular claim in court have no bearing on whether it is 
appropriate to require an inmate to raise that claim in a 
prison grievance process before filing suit. 

The court of appeals nonetheless concluded that Mc- 
Millian is significant in the present context because the 
purpose of exhaustion is to filter out claims that are 
“frivolous as to subject matter,” and McMillian establishes 
that excessive force claims do not meet that description. 
Pet. App. A17. The text of the exhaustion provision, how- 
ever, applies to any action that challenges prison conditions, 
not just those that challenge conditions that are “frivolous as 
to subject matter.” Compare 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(2) (Supp. V 
1999) (authorizing dismissal of any claim that “is, on its face, 
frivolous”). 

Nor is there any other basis for the court of appeals’ gloss 
on the statute. Requiring exhaustion of claims that are fri- 
volous as to subject matter undeniably advances the pur- 
poses of the exhaustion requirement. But, as we have dis- 
cussed (pp. 12-15, supra), exhaustion requirements apply 
and serve beneficial purposes for legitimate, as well as 
frivolous, claims. Moreover, claims that are not frivolous as 
to subject matter can still be frivolous. McMillian requires 
proof of malice, but not serious harm. There is no reason to 
think that allegations of malice by prisoners can never be 
frivolous. Because there is no basis for limiting the ex- 

27 

haustion requirement to claims that are frivolous as to 
subject matter, McMillian is inapposite here. 

2. The court of appeals similarly erred in concluding (Pet. 
App. A17) that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement should 
be construed narrowly in order to give “full effect” to the 
general rule of non-exhaustion in actions brought under 42 
U.S.C. 1983. In several cases, this Court has construed an 
exception to a statute narrowly when a broader construction 
would defeat the primary policy of the statute. City of 
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731-732 (1995); 
Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989); A.H. 
Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). The 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, however, is part of a com- 
prehensive set of measures designed to address the 
extraordinary problems posed by prisoner lawsuits; it ap- 
plies expressly to actions under Section 1983 and to actions 
under any federal law; and it represents a deliberate and 
dramatic departure from prior law. Moreover, it was a delib- 
erate effort to expand the exhaustion requirement to cover 
more claims. It is therefore inappropriate to begin with a 
presumption that Congress intended for the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement to be construed narrowly. Miller v. 
French, 530 U.S. 327, 340-341 (2000) (refusing to apply a pre- 
sumption against interpreting statutes to reduce equitable 
discretion when it was clear that Congress was trying to re- 
duce equitable discretion). 

In any event, the primary purpose of Section 1983 is “to 
provide a remedy for the violation of federal rights,” Craw- 
ford-El, 523 U.S. at 595, and interpreting the exhaustion 
requirement to apply to actions challenging particular in- 
stances of alleged misconduct does not defeat that purpose. 
Inmates can continue to obtain a remedy for a violation of 
their federal rights; they simply need to raise their claims in 
the administrative process first. 

28 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

THEODORE B. OLSON 

Solicitor General 

STUART E. SCHIFFER 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

PAUL D. CLEMENT 

Deputy Solicitor General 

IRVING L. GORNSTEIN 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

BARBARA L. HERWIG 
PETER R. MAIER 

Attorneys 

AUGUST 2001