No. 00-836 

IN THE 

Supreme Court of the United States 
Supreme Court of the United States 

_______________________________ 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 

Counsel Press LLC 

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859 

GEORGE W. BUSH, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

PALM BEACH COUNTY CANVASSING BOARD, et al., 

Respondents. 

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PALM BEACH 
COUNTY CANVASSING BOARD 

DENISE D. DYTRYCH 

Palm Beach County Attorney 
301 North Olive Avenue 
Suite 601 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(561) 355-2225 
BRUCE S. ROGOW 

Counsel of Record 
BEVERLY A. POHL 
BRUCE S. ROGOW, P.A. 

Suite 1930 
Broward Financial Centre 
500 East Broward Boulevard 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 
(954) 767-8909 

Counsel for Respondents Theresa LePore, 
Charles Burton, and Carol Roberts, 
the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board 

163713 

i 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 

1. Whether post-election judicial limitations on the 
discretion granted by the legislature to state executive 
officials to certify election results, and/or post-election 
judicially created standards for the determination of 
controversies concerning the appointment of presidential 
electors, violate the Due Process Clause or 3 U.S.C. § 5, 
which requires that a State resolve controversies relating to 
the appointment of electors under “laws enacted prior to” 
election day. 

2. Whether the state court’s decision, which cannot be 
reconciled with state statutes enacted before the election was 
held, is inconsistent with Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of 
the Constitution, which provides that electors shall be 
appointed by each State “in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct.” 

3. What would be the consequences of this Court’s 
finding that the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida 
does not comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5? 

ii 

Cited Authorities 

Page 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Questions Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
i 

Table of Contents 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ii 

Table of Cited Authorities 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

iii 

Opinion Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 

Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 

Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 

Summary of Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5 

Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6 

I. The Decision Of The Supreme Court Of 

Florida, Reconciling The Statutory 
Ambiguities In The Florida Election Code, 
Did Not Violate 3 U.S.C. § 5 Or The Due 
Process Clause 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6 

II. The Supreme Court Of Florida Opinion Did 

Not Violate Article II, § 1, cl. 2 Of The 
Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
12 

III. If This Court Found That The Decision Of 

The Supreme Court Of Florida Does Not 
Comply With 3 U.S.C. § 5, The Consequences 
Would Be Nil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
13 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 

iii 

Cited Authorities 

Page 

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) . . . . . . . . . 
8 

Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 
440 U.S. 173 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
8 

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10 

Seaford Court Estates, Ltd. v. Asher [1949] 2 K.B. 
481, 499 (C.A.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
11 

West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 
83 (1991) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

11 

United States Constitution: 

Article II, Section 1, clause 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 

Statutes: 

3 U.S.C. § 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 

28 U.S.C. § 1257 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 

Fla. Stat. Ch. 25 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

12 

Fla. Stat. Ch. 26 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

12 

Fla. Stat. Ch. 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

iv 

Cited Authorities 

Page 

Fla. Stat. § 102.111(1) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7 

Fla. Stat. § 102.112(2) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7 

Fla. Stat. § 102.166 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
7 

Fla. Stat. § 102.166(4)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2 

Fla. Stat. § 102.166(4)(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2 

Fla. Stat. § 102.166(5) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 4 

Fla. Stat. § 102.168 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8 

Fla. Stat. § 106.23(2) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 

Other Authorities: 

Article V, Fla. Const. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
12 

Felix Frankfurter, A Symposium on Statutory 

Construction, Foreward, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 365 
(1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
11 

Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 373 
(1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 9, 10 

William D. Popkin, Statutes in Court, The History 
and Theory of Statutory Interpretation 246 (1999) 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

1 

OPINION BELOW 

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida 
(Pet. App. 1a-38a) is unreported as yet, but available on 
Westlaw at 2000 WL 1725434. The orders of the Circuit 
Court for the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, 
Florida (Pet. App. 43a-51a) are not reported. 

JURISDICTION 

The final judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida was 
entered on November 21, 2000. This Court has jurisdiction 
to review a final judgment of the highest state court, under 
28 U.S.C. § 1257. However, because the recounts that were 
permitted by the decision below have been completed, and 
the petitioner was certified on November 26, 2000 as the 
winner of the Florida election, the relief sought by the 
petitioner — to have been certified as the winner on 
November 14, 2000 — is superfluous, and the Article III, 
§ 2 case or controversy requirement necessary for this Court’s 
jurisdiction is questionable. 

STATEMENT 

The primary parties, Governor Bush and Vice President 
Gore, have submitted, and will submit, extensive statements 
of the events since November 7, 2000. The Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Board submits this abbreviated statement 
of the actions it took to discharge, in a non-partisan way, its 
statutory duties — actions that led to the decision below. 

Following the November 7, 2000 general election the 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board granted a request by 
the Florida Democratic Party for a manual recount of the 

2 

votes cast for President and Vice President, as set forth in 
section 102.166(4)(a), Florida Statutes.1 Pursuant to section 
102.166(4)(d), the Canvassing Board conducted a manual 
recount of just over 1% of the total votes cast.2 Based on the 
results of that limited manual recount, the Canvassing Board 
exercised its statutory option to conduct a manual recount 
of the entire County.3 

1. Subsection (4)(a) provides: 

Any candidate whose name appeared on the ballot, any 
political committee that supports or opposes an issue 
which appeared on the ballot, or any political party 
whose candidates’ names appeared on the ballot may 
file a written request with the county canvassing board 
for a manual recount. The written request shall contain 
a statement of the reason the manual recount is being 
requested. 

2. Subsection (4)(d) provides: 

The manual recount must include at least three precincts 
and at least 1 percent of the total votes cast for such 
candidate or issue. In the event there are less than three 
precincts involved in the election, all precincts shall be 
counted. The person who requested the recount shall 
choose three precincts to be recounted, and, if other 
precincts are recounted, the county canvassing board 
shall select the additional precincts. 

3. Subsection (5) provides three options following the initial 
limited manual recount: 

If the manual recount indicates an error in the vote 
tabulation which could affect the outcome of the 
election, the county canvassing board shall: 
(Cont’d) 

3 

After beginning the manual recount, the Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Board sought and obtained opinions from 
both the Secretary of State of Florida and the Attorney 
General of Florida as to as to whether the Canvassing Board 
could, in the circumstances presented and consistent with 
section 102.166(5), Fla. Stat., conduct a manual recount of 
the votes cast for the offices of President and Vice President 
of the United States in the November 7, 2000 general 
election, in accordance with the Board’s unanimous vote to 
do so.4 

The Secretary of State, through L. Clayton Roberts, 
Director, Division of Elections, provided an advisory opinion 
on November 13, 2000 (J.A. 56-58), which “construed the 

(a) Correct the error and recount the remaining 
precincts with the vote tabulation system; 

(b) Request the Department of State to verify the 
tabulation software; or 

(c) Manually recount all ballots. 

4. Specifically, the Board asked: 

Would a discrepancy between the number of votes 
determined by a tabulation system and by a manual 
recount of four precincts be considered an “error in 
voting tabulation which could affect the outcome of” 
an election within the meaning of Section 102.166(5), 
Florida Statutes thereby enabling the canvassing board 
to request a manual recount of the entire county, or are 
“errors” confined to errors in tabulation system / 
software? 

J.A. 47. 
(Cont’d) 

4 

language ‘error in vote tabulation’ [in § 102.166(5)] to 
exclude the situation where a discrepancy between the 
original machine return and sample manual recount is due 
to the manner in which a ballot has been marked or punched.” 
Pet. App. 10a. That advisory opinion, indicating that the 
recount in Palm Beach County was unauthorized, was 
binding on the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board 
“until amended or revoked.” § 106.23(2), Fla. Stat. 

The next day, the Attorney General issued an opinion 
disagreeing with the Secretary of State’s statutory analysis 
and concluding that a manual recount was not limited to 
situations presenting errors in the vote tabulation system or 
software. See November 14, 2000 Attorney General Opinion 
2000-65. (J.A. 40-46). Faced with the binding advisory 
opinion and a conflicting Attorney General Opinion, on 
November 14, 2000 the Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board voted to suspend its manual recount pending a judicial 
determination of its rights and responsibilities under the law. 
The Canvassing Board filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
in the Supreme Court of Florida, asking that Court to provide 
the definitive statutory interpretation. (Pet. App. 2a, n.1). 
Based on an Interim Order of the Supreme Court of Florida 
stating that there was no impediment to the vote count 
continuing (Pet. App. 41a), and the opinion below issued 
November 21, 2000 (Pet. App. 1a-38a) resolving the issue 
contrary to the view of the Florida Secretary of State, the 
Canvassing Board resumed its manual recount and completed 
it on the evening of November 26, 2000. 

Earlier, in order to avoid the certification of statewide 
election results without the Palm Beach County tabulation, 
the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board intervened on 
November 13, 2000 in a lawsuit brought by Volusia County 

5 

against the Secretary of State to enjoin her from ignoring 
results submitted after November 14, 2000. Pet. App. 4a. 
The decision below details the chronology of that action, 
which ultimately joined with the original action brought by 
the Canvassing Board and resulted in the decision below. 
Pet. App. 4a-8a. That decision, which permitted the recounted 
vote to be considered, and set the certification date of 
November 26, 2000 to accommodate the need for the manual 
recount, is the decision that the petitioner seeks to set aside. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision reconciling 
conflicting provisions of the Florida Election Code did not 
establish a new rule of law; did not depart from well 
established Florida law; did not violate the Due Process 
Clause or 3 U.S.C. § 5; and did not conflict with Article II, 
Section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution. 

The decision of the Supreme Court of Florida was a 
classic example of a court making sense out of a conflicting 
statutory election code that threatened to discount the right 
to vote, one of the most fundamental of rights. 

The decision below utilized standard principles of 
statutory construction to alleviate the tension between a 1951 
statute, which mandated the state certification of election 
results on the seventh day following an election, and a 1989 
statute, which permitted later filed local returns to be 
included for certification. Since Florida law authorized 
manual recounts, and those recounts could take longer than 
seven days, the Supreme Court of Florida harmonized the 
conflict by setting a certification date — November 26, 2000 
— that allowed each actor to complete his or her task: the 

6 

Canvassing Board could count; the voter could be protected; 
the Secretary of State could certify; a dissatisfied candidate 
or voter could contest the election after certification. All of 
this was pursuant to statutes enacted prior to November 7, 
2000. 

Therefore, the decision below was in accord with 
3 U.S.C. § 5, which requires states to resolve controversies 
relating to the appointment of electors “under laws enacted 
prior to” election day, and the decision below was consistent 
with the Florida statutory law, thus guaranteeing that 
Florida’s electors shall be appointed “in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct.” Article II, Section 1, clause 
2 of the Constitution. 

The Supreme Court of Florida decision should be 
affirmed. 

ARGUMENT 

I. 

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
FLORIDA, RECONCILING THE STATUTORY 
AMBIGUITIES IN THE FLORIDA ELECTION CODE, 

DID NOT VIOLATE 3 U.S.C. § 5 OR THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE 

Karl Llewellyn, speaking of courts and statutes, wrote: 

But a court must strive to make sense as a 
whole out of our law as a whole. It must, to use 
[Jerome] Frank’s figure, take the music of any 
statute as written by the legislature; it must take 

7 

the text of the play as written by the legislature. 
But there are many ways to play that music, to 
play that play, and a court’s duty is to play it well, 
and to play it in harmony with the other music of 
the legal system. 

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 373 (1960) 
(emphasis in original). The Supreme Court of Florida’s 
decision achieved that harmonious result. 

The Supreme Court of Florida reconciled “the time frame 
for conducting a manual recount under section 102.166(4) 

. . . with the time frame for submitting county returns under 
sections 102.111 and 102.112.” Pet. App. 17a. 

Under section 102.111(1), enacted in 1951, if the election 
returns of a county “are not received by the Department of 
State by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an election, all 
missing counties shall be ignored and the results shown by 
the returns on file shall be certified.” Pet. App. 22a. But under 
section 102.112(1), enacted in 1989, if county returns are 
not received by the Department of State by 5 p.m. on the 
7 

th day following the general election, “such returns may be 
ignored and the results on file at that time may be certified 
by the department.” Under 102.112(2), also enacted in 1989, 
the “department shall fine each [county canvassing] board 
member $200 for each day such returns are late.” 

The “shall — may” conflict becomes critical when the 
manual recount provisions of section 102.166 are triggered. 
As the Supreme Court of Florida explained, because a manual 
recount can be requested as late as “the sixth day following 
the election” (Pet. App. 21a), the seven day limitation could 
render the recount provision meaningless: “logic dictates that 

8 

the period of time required to complete a full manual recount 
may be substantial, particularly in a populous county, and may 
require several days.” Pet. App. 21a. 

The Supreme Court of Florida’s reconciliation of the 
conflicting statutes utilized accepted canons of statutory 
construction: a specific statute controls a general statute; a more 
recently enacted statute controls an older statute; construction 
of a statute should not “render meaningless or absurd any other 
statutory provision;” and “related statutory provisions must be 
read as a cohesive whole.” Pet. App. 24-25a. And these rules 
were applied on the canvas of the right to vote, the most 
fundamental of rights. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 
(1992) (“It is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the most 
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.’ ” 
Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 
173, 184. . . . (1979)”). 

It is undisputed that the Florida statutes giving rise to this 
case, and the statute providing for election contests, section 
102.168, Fla. Stat., were enacted prior to November 7, 2000. 
That alone should end the claim of alleged conflict with Title 
3 U.S.C. § 5, because the safe harbor provided by the statute is 
premised upon the existence of “laws enacted prior to the day 
fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final 
determination of any controversy or contest concerning the 
appointment of all or any of the electors of such state, by judicial 
or other methods or procedures. . . .” Nevertheless, the petitioner 

contends that the Supreme Court of Florida’s reconciliation of 
the statutes and setting of a November 26, 2000 certification 
deadline made new law, and thus violated Title 3 U.S.C. § 5: 

This arbitrary judicial departure from the well- 
established law of Florida — as it plainly stood prior 

9 

to November 7, 2000 — is in flagrant violation 
of Congress’ federally imposed requirement that 
controversy over the appointment of electors be 
resolved solely under legal standards “enacted 
prior to” the date of the election. 3 U.S.C. § 5. 

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 15-16. 

Where, as here, no preexisting rule of law required 
(or even authoritatively authorized) the Secretary 
of State to waive the time limit on the facts 
presented, 3 U.S.C. § 5 precludes the retroactive 
enforcement of a new rule of law compelling that 
previously unknown result. 

Id. at 17. 

The petitioner errs in calling the Supreme Court of 
Florida’s opinion “a new rule of law.” That opinion did what 
a court should do: “to quarry out of a legislative text the 
best sense which the text permits. . . .” LLEWLLYN, supra, at 

381. The Supreme Court of Florida carefully construed the 
Florida Election Code “as a whole.” Pet. App. 37a. Faced 
with a 1951 statute’s mandate to ignore an eighth (or later) 
day return (a mandate that could not be followed anyway 
because overseas voters have a 10-day window, see Pet. App. 
27a, n.47), the court sought to apply the Code in a sensible 
way. 

[I]ncreasingly, as any statute gains in age [,] its 
language is called upon to deal with circumstances 
utterly uncontemplated at the time of its passage. 
Here the quest is not properly for the sense 
originally intended by the statute, for the sense 

10 

originally to be put into it, but rather for the sense 
which can be quarried out of it in the light of the 
new situation. Broad purposes can indeed reach far 
beyond details known or knowable at the time of 
drafting. 

LLEWLLYN, supra at 374 (emphasis in original). 

That judicial process is not “legislative;” it is quintessential 
common law judging — “the power to say what the law is.” 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 

The Supreme Court of Florida did adhere to preexisting 
law. Making sense out of that law does not, as the petitioner 
says, constitute “post hoc standards announced for the first time 
some two weeks after the election.” Pet., p. 16, n. 4. What the 
Supreme Court of Florida did was not legislative, it was ordinary 
judging. 

More specifically, the judge is uniquely competent 
to place statutes in their temporal setting, taking 
account of what happens both before and after a 
statute is passed. Moreover, the exercise of this 
competence inevitably results from applying texts 
to facts, an exercise that forces the judge to think 
about how a text’s meaning interacts with the past 
and the future (about the statute’s intent). Once this 
thought process begins, judgment requires thinking 
about substantive values and comparative 
institutional competence; however, these are the 
results of ordinary judging. . . . 

WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, THE HISTORY AND 

THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 246 (1999). 

11 

The petitioner’s premise — that “the Supreme Court of 
Florida has authorized a clear departure from the established 
legal requirements set forth by the Florida legislature that 
were in place on November 7” — is based upon a 
misconception of the judicial function. One role of the courts 
is “to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus 
juris.” West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 
83, 101 (1991). Justice Frankfurter put it another way, 
quoting Lord Justice Denning in Seaford Court Estates, Ltd. 

v. Asher [1949] 2 K.B. 481, 499 (C.A.): “ ‘A judge must not 
alter the material of which it [an act] is woven, but he can 
and should iron out the creases.’ ” Felix Frankfurter, 
A Symposium on Statutory Construction, Foreward, 3 Vand. 
L. Rev. 365, 367 (1950). 

The Supreme Court of Florida tailored its decision to 
preserve every aspect of the Florida Election Code. The 
opportunity to ensure the accuracy of the vote was preserved. 
The duty of the Secretary of State to certify election results 
was preserved. The opportunity to lodge a statutory post- 
certification election contest was preserved. 

The Supreme Court of Florida decision was not arbitrary 
and it was not a departure from the well established law of 

process or the 3 U.S.C. § 5 requirement that controversy 
over the appointment of electors be resolved solely under 

5. amicus curiae 
Representatives, p. 12, contends that by allowing a later certification 

not be finally adjudicated” by December 12, 2000 and that “may 

adjudication of such contests.” The speculativeness of that 

12 

II. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA OPINION DID 
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE II, § 1, CL. 2 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 

Article II, § 1, cl. 2 provides that Electors shall be 
appointed “in such manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct.” The petitioner contends that the Supreme Court of 
Florida “has seen fit to revise the ‘manner’ in which Florida’s 
electors are chosen by directing the Secretary of State to 
consider results from those counties that are conducting 
manual recounts. . . .” Under the petitioner’s theory, no 

Florida court could reconcile conflicting state election 
statutes that implicate the choice of electors: “Had the Florida 
legislature seen fit to vest the decision in the hands of the 
judiciary, presumably it could have done so, but the simple 
fact is that it did not do so.” Pet., p. 20 (emphasis in original). 

The simple fact is, of course, that the Florida Constitution 
and the Florida statutes provide Florida courts with 
jurisdiction to resolve all controversies. Article V, Fla. 
Const.; Ch. 25, Ch. 26, Ch. 35, Fla. Stat. Election law 
disputes are just one genre of controversy suited to judicial 
review. There is nothing extraordinary about the Supreme 
Court of Florida’s assumption of jurisdiction in this case. 
Indeed, if the petitioner were correct, election law disputes 
touching upon presidential electors could only be addressed 
before an election. That cannot be, because election disputes 
only occur after an election. 

The petitioner’s flawed view of the judicial function 
spoils his argument under Article II, § 1, cl. 2, just as it did 
under Title 3 U.S.C. § 5. 

Florida laws enacted prior to November 7, 2000 
governed this election and disputes arising from that election. 
The Supreme Court of Florida’s resolution of the subsequent- 
to-election dispute was not a legislative act, nor was it 
contrary to the “manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. While this election dispute may be 
extraordinary, the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision was 
ordinary judging, and violated no federal constitutional or 
statutory principles. 

III. 

IF THIS COURT FOUND THAT THE DECISION OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA DOES NOT 
COMPLY WITH 3 U.S.C. § 5, THE CONSEQUENCES 

WOULD BE NIL 

If the Supreme Court of Florida decision were reversed, 
there would be no immediate consequences. The Secretary 
of State’s certification of election results occurred on 
November 26, 2000. The petitioner sought to be certified as 
the election winner on November 14, 2000. His goal was 
delayed, not denied. Setting aside the Supreme Court of 
Florida decision would not change the certified election 
outcome. Indeed, the question posed in the jurisdiction 
portion of this brief seems pertinent; since certification has 
occurred, the remedy sought by petitioner is of little 
consequence now. 

DENISE D. DYTRYCH 
Palm Beach County Attorney 
301 North Olive Avenue 
Suite 601 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(561) 355-2225 

14 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Florida should be affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

BRUCE S. ROGOW 
Counsel of Record 
BEVERLY A. POHL 
BRUCE S. ROGOW, P.A. 
Suite 1930 
Broward Financial Centre 
500 East Broward Boulevard 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 
(954) 767-8909 

Counsel for Respondents Theresa LePore, 
Charles Burton, and Carol Roberts, 
the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board