i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................ iii 

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ................ 1 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................. 2 

ARGUMENT .................................... 3 

I. BASIC CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM ARE 
AT THE CORE OF THIS CASE 

................ 3 
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS HAVE 

GIVEN THE STATES CONSIDERABLE POWER 
TO CONTROL ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES .................... 4 

A. The State Legislatures Are Vested With 
the Power to Enact Statutory Schemes 
Regulating the Conduct of Elections .......... 4 

B. The State Judiciaries Are Vested With the 

Power to Interpret the State Election Codes ..... 
6 

III. THERE IS NO REASON IN THIS CASE FOR THE 

COURT TO ABANDON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERALISM BY INTERFERING WITH THE 
DECISION OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME 
COURT ..................................... 8 

A. The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision Did Not 

Constitute A “Post-Election” Change in the Law 9 

ii 

B. The Florida Supreme Court Did Not Encroach 

Upon the Power of the Legislature ........... 10 

IV. OVERTURNING THE DECISION OF THE 
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT WOULD 
HAVE SERIOUS ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES 
FOR BOTH THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
JUDICIARIES .............................. 11 

CONCLUSION ................................. 12 

TABLE OF CONTENTS — continued 

Page 

iii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES: Page(s) 

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.780 (1983) ........... 6 

Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudlee, 27 U.S. 492 
(1829) ...................................... 6 

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) ............... 
6 

Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. 152 (1825) .............. 7 

Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. 

Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917) .................. 
7 

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct.1291 (2000) ............. 
10 

Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 
(1989) ..................................... 10 

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 
(1982) ..................................... 10 

McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) 
.......... 5, 11 

Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 
(1986) ...................................... 6 

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) ..... 
9 

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
........... 4 

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ......... 7 

iv 

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 
(1976) ..................................... 10 

Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) .......... 
10 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - continued 

Page(s) 

Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994) .... 
9 

Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972) .............. 
6 

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) ................. 
6 

United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998) 
. 10 

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 
(1995) ...................................... 4 

Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) ............... 
8 

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 

U.S. Const., art 1, § 4 .............................. 
5 

U.S. Const., art. II, §1 ......................... 2, 4, 5 

3 U.S.C. § 5 ................................... 2, 5 

42 U.S.C. § 1971 ................................. 8 

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 

This case comes before the Court under the most 
extraordinary circumstances. The tumultuous presidential 
election has created an emotionally charged atmosphere and 
raised a multitude of issues in the state and federal courts, many 
of which are questions of first impression. At the core of this 
controversy are basic questions of federalism which could affect 
the delicate relationship between the federal and state 
governments, and the judicial branches of those governments. 
These principles, which are basic to our federal system of 
government, must not be overlooked in the midst of heated 
political rhetoric. 

The amici States have a strong interest in preserving the 
rights of the individual states to control the election of 
presidential electors. The amici States want to ensure that the 
state judiciaries remain free to interpret state laws governing 
elections, without interference by the federal courts, as they 
have done for nearly 200 years. And the amici States have a 
compelling interest in guarding against the erosion of these 
fundamental principles of federalism in any way that could 
impair the rights of the states to govern their affairs in other 
matters that have been entrusted to them by the United States 
Constitution. 

This Court has a unique opportunity to clarify for the 
American public the basic workings of the state and federal 
judiciaries and their proper roles in our federal and state 
schemes of government. The amici States believe that this 
Court can take a significant step toward healing the nation from 
the divisiveness that has resulted from the presidential election 
and in giving credibility to the final result of this election – 
whatever that might be. The amici States respectfully request 
this Court to undertake that process with due regard for 
fundamental principles of federalism. 

2 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

The fundamental question before the Court is whether the 
state or federal courts are the final arbiters of state law. This 
case is based on a claim that the Florida Supreme Court 
retroactively changed the law and impinged on the Florida 
Secretary of State’s discretion when it interpreted Florida’s 
election code, and thereby violated the due process clause of 
the United States Constitution and 3 U.S.C. § 5. Closely related 
is the claim that the Florida Supreme Court changed the 
election laws passed by the Florida legislature, in derogation of 
the legislature’s constitutional right to control the manner in 
which presidential electors are appointed pursuant to Article II, 
section 1 of the United States Constitution. 

Because the actions of the Florida Supreme Court in 
interpreting state law are being reviewed by the United States 
Supreme Court, fundamental questions of federalism become 
paramount. State courts traditionally have been charged with 
the responsibility of interpreting state law. For nearly 200 years, 
this Court has deferred to state courts on questions regarding the 
meaning of state laws. Any departure from that tradition would 
significantly alter fundamental notions of federalism. 

There is no justification in this case for such an erosion of 
federalism. The Florida Supreme Court did not retroactively 
change the law. It simply interpreted a state law, according to 
traditional rules of statutory construction, with the result being 
that the Florida Supreme Court explained its interpretation of 
what the statutory law had been since the date it was adopted. 
The Florida Supreme Court was guided by the cardinal principle 
that its task, in interpreting ambiguous and inconsistent statutes, 
was to give effect to the intent of the Florida legislature. 

If this Court were to superimpose its judgment on that of 
the Florida Supreme Court in matters of state law, such action 
would constitute a remarkable intrusion by the federal 
government into the province of the state judiciary. It would 

3 

constitute a significant erosion of fundamental principles of 
federalism, and could have effects far beyond this case. 

If this Court were to strike down the Florida Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of a Florida statute as a retroactive change 
of the law, it would find itself on a slippery slope of claims 
alleging “retroactive” application of laws and ex post facto laws 
whenever a court interpreted a statute for the first time. Indeed, 
the federal courts themselves would be beset with claims that 
they had retroactively changed the laws whenever they engaged 
in statutory construction. 

Under basic principles of comity and federalism, this Court 
should respect the Florida Supreme Court as the final arbiter of 
state law and dismiss this petition. 

ARGUMENT 

I. Basic Concepts of Federalism Are At the Core of This 
Case 

Amidst the furor over the presidential election, it is 
important to reflect on one of the basic principles underlying our 
democracy: 

Federalism was our nation’s own discovery. The 
Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the 
genius of their idea that our citizens would have two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each 
protected from incursion by the other. The resulting 
Constitution created a legal system, unprecedented in 
form and design, establishing two orders of 
government, each with its own direct relationship, its 
own privity, its own set of mutual rights and 
obligations to the people who sustain it and are 
governed by it. It is appropriate to recall these origins, 
which instruct us as to the nature of the two different 
governments created and confirmed by the 
Constitution. 

4 

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 

The dual sovereignty of the states and the federal 
government is manifested in the Constitution both implicitly and 
explicitly. The states’ residual sovereignty was implied by 
Article I, section 8, which conferred upon Congress only certain 
discrete, enumerated powers. The sovereignty of the states was 
later explicitly recognized by the Tenth Amendment, which 
acknowledged that those “powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor 

prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Printz 

v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997). 

No power of the states is more clearly recognized in the 
Constitution than the power to control elections – particularly 
with regard to the appointment of electors for President of the 
United States. See U.S. Const. art. II, §1. It is that 
constitutional power in particular, and the sovereign powers of 
the states in general, which are now being challenged before 
this Court. 

II. The Constitution and Congress Have Given The States 
Considerable Power to Control Elections for President 
of the United States. 

A. The State Legislatures Are Vested With the Power 
to Enact Statutory Schemes Regulating the 
Conduct of Elections 

The authority to control the appointment of electors for 
President of the United States is vested in the states by virtue of 
both the United States Constitution and federal statute. Article 
II, section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution gives the states 
exclusive control over the process by which presidential electors 
are chosen: “Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to 
the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the 

5 

State may be entitled in the Congress.” 
U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, 

cl.2 (emphasis added). 

Congress has confirmed the power of the states in this area 
by authorizing the states to establish procedures for conclusively 
resolving disputes over the appointment of electors: 

If any State shall have provided, by laws 
enacted prior to the day fixed for the 
appointment of the electors, for its final 
determination of any controversy or contest 
concerning the appointment of all or any of 
the electors of such State, by judicial or other 
methods or procedures, and such 
determination shall have been made at least 
six days before the time fixed for the meeting 
of the electors, such determination . . . shall 
be conclusive, and shall govern in the 
counting of the electoral votes as provided in 
the Constitution . . . . 

3 U.S.C. § 5. 

This Court has recognized the plenary authority of the state 
legislatures to control the manner of selecting presidential 
electors. In McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), the Court 
held that the Constitution “recognizes that the people act 
through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to 
the legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the 
object [of selecting presidential electors].” Id. at 27. (Emphasis 
added). 

The states have been given similar authority to control the 
manner in which United States Senators and members of the 
House of Representatives are elected to office. U.S. Const. 
art.1, § 4. 

Although those powers are not as plenary as the 
powers regarding presidential electors, they are still quite 
extensive: “This court has recognized the breadth of those 

6 

powers . . . .” Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24 (1972). 

See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); Munro v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-96 (1986); Anderson 

v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). 

This Court has acknowledged that, as a practical matter, 
there must be substantial regulation of elections if they are to be 
fair and honest and orderly. As a result, “the States have 
evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election 
codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both 
federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of 
holding primary and general elections, the registration and 
qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification of 
candidates.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) 
(emphasis added). 

B. The State Judiciaries Are Vested With the Power 
to Interpret the State Election Codes 

The constitutional provisions and federal law vesting power 
in the states to control the manner of elections and, in particular, 
the manner of selecting the electors for President of the United 
States, have necessitated the adoption of comprehensive, often 
complex election codes by the states. The statutory scheme 
enacted by Florida, at issue in this case, is but one example of 
such a scheme. A foreseeable, indeed, unavoidable consequence 
of detailed legislative schemes of this type is that statutory 
ambiguities and inconsistencies arise. When this occurs, it is 
incumbent upon the judicial branch to interpret those statutes, to 
clarify their ambiguities, and to resolve their inconsistencies 
where possible. “The judicial department of every government 
is the rightful expositor of its laws . . . .” Bank of Hamilton v. 

Lessee of Dudlee, 27 U.S. 492, 524 (1829). 

In our federal system based upon dual sovereignty, when 
questions of state law arise, the state judiciary is the proper and 
final arbiter of the meaning of the state statute. This was 
explained as follows by Chief Justice Marshall: 

7 

This Court has uniformly professed its 
disposition, in cases depending on the laws of 
a particular State, to adopt the construction 
which the Courts of the State have given to 
those laws. This course is founded on the 
principle, supposed to be universally 
recognised, that the judicial department of 
every government, where such department 
exists, is the appropriate organ for construing 
the legislative acts of that government . . . . 

We receive the construction given by the 
Courts of the nation as the true sense of the 
law, and feel ourselves no more at liberty to 
depart from that construction, than to depart 
from the words of the statute . . . . [T]he 

construction given by the Courts of the 
several States to the legislative acts of those 
States, is received as true, unless they come 
in conflict with the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States. 

Elmendorf v.Taylor, 23 U.S. 152, 159-60 (1825). 

Indeed, as a general proposition, it is beyond dispute that, 
“[w]here a state court has interpreted a provision of state law, 
[the Court] cannot ignore that interpretation, even if it is not one 
that we would have reached if we were construing the statute in 
the first instance.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 412 
(1992). Even where this Court is empowered to protect an 
underlying federal right that is threatened by the interpretation 
of state law, it will not do so unless the interpretation is “so 
certainly unfounded that it properly may be regarded as 
essentially arbitrary.” If the interpretation has “fair support” in 
state law, the Court is “not at liberty to inquire whether it is right 
or wrong, but must accept it, as [it does] other state decisions of 
non-Federal questions.” Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers 
Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917). 

8 

When the states were given the power to regulate the 
manner in which elections are conducted, that power necessarily 
involved both the state legislatures and the state judiciaries. The 
legislatures were given the authority and the responsibility to 
enact appropriate statutory schemes to govern the conduct of 
elections. The state judiciaries were charged with the 
responsibility to interpret those statutes, just as they interpret all 
other statutes enacted by their state legislatures. And in our 
federalist system of dual sovereignty, the federal courts defer to 
the state courts on the interpretation of state law. Nearly two 
centuries of precedent and time-honored principles of federalism 
mandate that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Florida law be considered final. 

III. There Is No Reason In This Case For The Court to 
Abandon Basic Principles of Federalism By Interfering 
With The Decision of The Florida Supreme Court 

The petitioner has attempted to federalize a state law issue 
by characterizing the Florida Supreme Court’s decision as one 
which substantively changed Florida’s election laws after the 
date of the election and infringed upon the right of the 
legislature to control the manner of selecting presidential 
electors.1 An examination of the Florida Supreme Court’s 

1 It should be noted that this case does not involve claims that the 
Florida election code, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, 
violates the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971, or the First or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because of 
any course of conduct sanctioned by the Florida Supreme Court. If 
such prohibited conduct occurred as a result of state legislative or 
judicial action, this Court would become involved. See, e.g., Williams 

v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). No such prohibited conduct is alleged 
in this case. The constitutional claims before this Court arise 
primarily out of the fact that the Florida Supreme Court interpreted 
the Florida election code after election day, thereby allegedly 
retroactively changing the law in violation of due process and other 

9 

decision indicates, however, that it was nothing more than the 
normal exercise by the judiciary of its authority to interpret state 
legislation, to clarify ambiguities in that legislation, and to 
resolve inconsistencies in that legislation, all for the purpose of 
effectuating the intent of the Florida legislature. Accordingly, 
this Court should not permit itself to be drawn into reviewing 
the substance of the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation. 

A. The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision Did Not 

Constitute A “Post-Election” Change in the Law 

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision consisted entirely of 
interpreting and reconciling Florida statutes which were 
inconsistent and ambiguous. By interpreting the statutes after 
the date of the election, however, the Florida Supreme Court did 
not engage in “post-election” lawmaking. Indeed, this Court has 
recognized that “judicial construction of a statute is an 
authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well 
as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.” 
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313 (1994) 
(emphasis added). “[W]hen this Court construes a statute, it is 
explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant 
continuously since the date when it became law.” Id. at 313 

n.12. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 215 
(1995). Consistent with these principles, the decision of the 
Florida Supreme Court constitutes an explanation by that court 
of its understanding of what the Florida statutes have meant 
since the date they became law, which was prior to the election. 
That does not constitute “post-election” lawmaking. 

The analysis utilized by the Florida Supreme Court in 
interpreting the Florida election statutes was neither unusual nor 
surprising. The Florida Supreme Court attempted to determine 

constitutional provisions. If the Florida court had interpreted the 
Florida election code before the election, it is unlikely that this case 
would be before the Court. 

10 

the legislature’s intent, “the polestar that guides a [Florida] 
court’s inquiry into the provisions of the Florida Election Code.” 
(App.23a). The Court followed traditional rules of statutory 
construction throughout its opinion. (App. 23-26a). It applied 
the rule that specific statutes control general ones, which this 
Court also uses routinely. See, e.g. Green v. Bock Laundry 
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524-26 (1989); Radzanower v. Touche 
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 151 (1976). It relied on the canon 
that newer statutes control older ones, a perfectly logical 
presumption that this Court also applies. See, e.g., United States 

v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998). The Court 
applied the rule that statutes should be interpreted in a manner 
that avoids rendering other statutory provisions meaningless or 
absurd, an approach that also is utilized by this Court. See, e.g., 
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994); Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982). Finally, 
the Florida Supreme Court applied the canon that statutes should 
be read in their entirety, which is also applied in this Court. See, 

e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
120 S. Ct. 1291, 1300 (2000). 

Against this background, the 
Florida Supreme Court plainly did not “enact” new law; it 
simply interpreted laws which were in existence prior to election 
day. 

B. The Florida Supreme Court Did Not Encroach 

Upon The Power of The Legislature 

Petitioners’s argument that the Florida Supreme Court 
encroached upon the power of the Florida legislature to control 
the manner in which presidential electors are appointed, in 
violation of Article II, section 1 of the Constitution, ignores the 
reality of how state governments function. The Florida 
legislature had a duty under the Constitution and federal law to 
enact legislation governing the manner in which presidential 
electors would be elected. It was the proper function of the 
judiciary to interpret those election laws when interpretation 
became necessary as a result of ambiguities, inconsistencies, or 

11 

other uncertainties in the meaning of those laws. Rather than 
encroaching on the authority of the legislature, the Florida 
Supreme Court was attempting to give effect to the legislature’s 
statutory scheme. That is exactly what a state supreme court is 
supposed to do. Therefore, it is incumbent upon this Court, as 
a federal court, to respect the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of its state election laws. McPherson v. Blacker, 
146 U.S. 1, 23 (1892) (“We are not authorized to revise the 
conclusions of the state court on these matters of local law.”) 

IV. Overturning the Decision of the Florida Supreme Court 
Would Have Serious Adverse Consequences for Both 
the Federal and State Judiciaries 

The states are clearly charged with the duty to establish the 
manner of selecting presidential electors. The Florida legislature 
has performed its function by adopting the state election laws in 
question. The Florida Supreme Court, likewise, has performed 
exactly as a Supreme Court should. It would be highly 
offensive to basic principles of federalism for this court to 
superimpose its judgment on the Florida Supreme Court or to 
disagree or change the interpretation of state law rendered by 
that court. Indeed, such action by this Court would be a 
remarkable intrusion into the province of the state judiciary. 

If this Court accepts the claim that the Florida Supreme 
Court invaded the province of the legislature by merely 
interpreting the Florida election code, it will fundamentally alter 
the separation of powers that presently exists between the 
legislative and judicial branches of government. Such a decision 
by this Court would diminish the authority of the state judiciary 
to be the final arbiter of the meaning of state law, leaving every 
state court decision open to appeal to the federal courts on due 
process grounds. 

And, if this Court superimposes its judgment 
on that of the Florida Supreme Court, it might find itself or the 
lower federal courts embroiled in the process of managing the 
final resolution of the Florida election disputes. 

12 

If this Court were to hold that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Florida law constituted a retroactive “change” 
in the law, rather than an explanation of what the law had 
always been, this Court would be opening the door to a flood of 
due process claims. Whenever a court adopted a new 
interpretation of a statute, or answered a question of statutory 
interpretation for the first time, individuals adversely affected by 
the decision could claim a violation of due process rights. 
Whenever the courts were required to interpret statutes with 
civil or criminal penalties, such as consumer fraud statutes, to 
apply to new factual situations, adversely affected parties could 
claim a violation of due process rights. Any new interpretation 
of a criminal statute could lead to claims of ex post facto laws in 
violation of Article I, section 10 of the Constitution. Indeed, 
this Court itself engages in statutory construction of federal 
statutes. Litigants could very well claim that new interpretations 
of federal statutes by this Court, or other federal courts, give rise 
to claims that their due process rights were violated. 

Although the presidential election is unquestionably 
important to the people of this nation, upholding the basic 
principles of federalism is equally important and perhaps could 
have longer lasting effects on ths nation than the decision as to 
who will be our next president. This Court should follow well- 
recognized principles of comity and federalism and respect the 
decision of the Florida Supreme Court as a binding 
interpretation of Florida law, regardless of whether it agrees 
with the substance of the Florida court’s analysis. To do 
otherwise would plunge this Court into the province of the state 
judiciary, in substantial derogation of the basic principles of 
federalism which have guided this country since its inception. 

CONCLUSION 

This Court should be guided by fundamental principles of 
federalism in resolving the issues presented by this highly 
charged case. The matters presented to the Court are truly 

13 

matters of state law, and it is appropriate that they be resolved 
by the Florida Supreme Court, without interference from the 
federal government. The Court is respectfully urged to dismiss 
the petition. 

THOMAS J. MILLER 

Attorney General of Iowa 

*DENNIS W. JOHNSON 
Solicitor General of Iowa 
TAM B. ORMISTON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Hoover State Office Building 
Des Moines, Iowa 50319 
(515) 281-5164 

* Counsel of Record 

14 

BILL LOCKYER 
JOSEPH P. MAZUREK 

Attorney General 
Attorney General 

State of California 
State of Montana 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL 

FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA 

Attorney General 
Attorney General 

State of Connecticut 
State of Nevada 

EARL I. ANZAI 
PATRICIA A. MADRID 

Attorney General 
Attorney General 

State of Hawaii 

State of New Mexico 

KAREN M. 

DREW EDMONDSON 

FREEMAN-WILSON Attorney General 
Attorney General 

State of Oklahoma 
State of Indiana 

ANDREW KETTERER 

HARDY MYERS 

Attorney General 
Attorney General 

State of Maine 

State of Oregon 

J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR. 
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE 

Attorney General 
Attorney General 

State of Maryland 
State of Rhode Island 

THOMAS F. REILLY 
Attorney General 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 

NOVEMBER 28, 2000