No. 00-391 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER 

v. 

ROBERT A. THOMAS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD 
Acting Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 

JOHN C. KEENEY 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

MICHAEL R. DREEBEN 

Deputy Solicitor General 

GREGORY G. GARRE 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

LISA SIMOTAS 

Attorney 

Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
(202) 514-2217 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether a police officer may search the passenger 
compartment of an automobile as a contemporaneous 
incident of the lawful custodial arrest of the vehicle’s 
recent occupant, when the arrestee exited the vehicle 
voluntarily rather than upon the direction of the officer. 

(I) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Interest of the United States ...................................................... 
1 

Statement ........................................................................................ 2 

Summary of argument .................................................................. 
5 

Argument: 

A search of the passenger compartment of an 

automobile is justified as a contemporaneous incident 

of the lawful custodial arrest of the vehicle’s recent 

occupant, without regard to the reason that the 

individual exited the vehicle ................................................ 

7 

A. Under New York v. Belton, police officers may 

search the passenger compartment of a car 

incident to the lawful custodial arrest of any 

“recent occupant” of the vehicle .................................. 

7 

B. The Belton rule applies without regard to 

whether the arrestee exited the car of his own 

volition or upon the direction of law enforcement 

personnel .......................................................................... 14 

C. The search of a respondent’s car was valid 

under Belton, because it was a contemporaneous 

incident of respondent’s lawful custodial arrest ....... 
23 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 28 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) .............................. 

21 

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) ........................ 

7 

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) ....................... 

19 

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) .. 

3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17 

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) ........................... 

12, 19 

Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) ................................ 

9 

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) ..................... 18 

(III) 

IV 

Cases—Continued: Page 

Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 

(1967) ........................................................................................ 26 

Glasco v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 137 (Va. 

1999) ......................................................................................... 17, 22 

Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) ............................ 

19 

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) .......................... 

19 

Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75 (1997) .............. 

5 

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) .................. 

4, 6, 8, 15, 16 

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) ........................... 

8 

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) .......................... 

13 

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ......... 

6, 14, 15, 16, 17 

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) .............................. 

4 

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) ....................... 

passim 

New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) ........................ 

4 

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) ..................... 

19 

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) .................. 

8 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) ................. 

13 

Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 513 U.S. 820 (1994) .................................................. 

26 

Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) .................. 

14, 27 

Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) ............... 

11, 12, 18 

Sealed Case, In re, 153 F.3d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1998) .............. 

24 

Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969) ........................ 

22 

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) ............. 

12 

State v. Wanzak, 598 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1999) ................. 

22 

United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996) ................................................................................. 

27 

United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 

(1994) ........................................................................................ 21 

United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990) ........................... 

16, 21 

United States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 

1982) ......................................................................................... 25 

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) .................. 

9, 27 

United States v. Doward, 44 F.3d 789 (1st Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1074 (1995) ....................................... 24 

V 

Cases—Continued: Page 

United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) ................ 

12, 14 

United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 

(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989) ........... 

21 

United States v. Franco, 981 F.2d 470 

(10th Cir. 1992) ....................................................................... 

21 

United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190 (10th 

Cir. 2000) ................................................................................. 

24 

United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 944 (1996) .................... 

24 

United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146 

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 856 (1996) ...................... 

24 

United States v. Moorehead, 57 F.3d 875 

(9th Cir. 1995) ......................................................................... 

24 

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) ............... 

7, 8, 9, 

11, 14, 16, 17 

United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 955 (1993) ......................................... 

26 

United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 1997) ... 

24 

United States v. Strahan, 984 F.3d 155 

(6th Cir. 1993) ......................................................................... 

21 

United States v. Valiant, 873 F.2d 205 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 837 (1989) ......................................... 

24 

United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 

1989) ......................................................................................... 24 

Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) ..................... 

17 

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ..................... 

7 

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) ..................... 

19 

Constitution: 

U.S. Const. Amend. IV ................................... 

7, 10, 12, 18, 19, 28 

Miscellaneous: 

Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice 

(7th ed. 1993) .......................................................................... 4 

VI 

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page 

3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed. 

1996 & Supp. 2001) ...................................... 

12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24 

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation: 

Killed in the Line of Duty: A Study of Felonious 

Killings of Law Enforcement Officers 

(Sept. 1992) ................................................................... 

8 

Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement 

Officers Killed and Assaulted (1998) ...................... 8, 9, 26 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 00-391 

STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER 

v. 

ROBERT A. THOMAS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 

This case presents the question whether a police 
officer may search the passenger compartment of an 
automobile as a contemporaneous incident of the lawful 
custodial arrest of the vehicle’s recent occupant, when 
the arrestee exited the vehicle voluntarily rather than 
upon the direction of the officer. 

The Court’s resolu- 
tion of that question will affect the practices of federal 
law enforcement agents in the commonly recurring 
situation in which the recent occupant of a vehicle is 
arrested. In addition, the disposition of this case will 
affect the admissibility in federal prosecutions of 
evidence obtained by federal, state, or local police 
officers as the result of the search of an automobile 
incident to the arrest of an individual who has recently 
occupied the vehicle. 

(1) 

2 

STATEMENT 

On the evening of February 28, 1997, Police Officer 
J.D. Maney of the Polk County, Florida Sheriff’s Office 
and his partner drove to a residence in Lakeland, 
Florida, on information that marijuana was being sold 
there. The officers obtained consent to search the 
home and found marijuana. Other detectives arrived 
and Officer Maney returned to his patrol car outside the 
residence. As Officer Maney was sitting in his car, he 
saw respondent drive up to the house, park in the 
driveway, and exit his car. Officer Maney got out of his 
patrol car and met respondent at the rear passenger 
side of respondent’s car. Officer Maney asked respon- 
dent for his name and for permission to see his driver’s 
license. A routine check of the license revealed an 
outstanding warrant for a probation violation. Officer 
Maney arrested respondent, handcuffed him, and 
brought him into the house. Officer Maney then re- 
turned to respondent’s car, searched the passenger 
compartment, and found methamphetamine in the 
driver’s side door and glove compartment. Five 
minutes elapsed between the time respondent exited 
his car and was arrested and Officer Maney searched 
the car. Pet. App. A3, A16; J.A. 4, 7, 10-11, 115-118. 

Respondent was charged with possession of metham- 
phetamine and related narcotics offenses. Before trial, 
he moved to suppress the evidence seized during the 
search of his car on the ground that the search was 
illegal. The trial court granted that motion. Pet. App. 
A17; J.A. 128-129. The Second District Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding that the search was valid under New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Pet. App. A15-A19. 
In Belton, this Court held “that when a policeman has 
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 

3 

automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of 
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile.” 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted). The 
court of appeal reasoned that “the occupant of a vehicle 
cannot avoid the consequence of the Belton rule merely 
by stepping outside the automobile as officers ap- 
proach.” Pet. App. A17. Thus, according to the court, 
as long as the arrest is not “a preplanned pretext to 
conduct a warrantless search of the driver, * * * the 
bright-line test in Belton applies.” Id. at A19. 

The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the decision 
of the court of appeal. Pet. App. A2-A12. The court 
recognized that Belton applies when the arrestee “has 
been removed from or has exited the automobile.” Id. 
at A10. But the court drew a “distinction” between 
“arrests initiated by the conduct of an officer” and 
instances “when an individual voluntarily exits his car 
without provocation from law enforcement personnel 
and without knowledge of their presence.” Id. at A4. 
In the court’s view, “Belton’s bright-line rule is limited 
to situations where the law enforcement officer initiates 
contact with the defendant, either by actually confront- 
ing the defendant or by signaling confrontation with the 
defendant.” Id. at A10. “[W]here the first contact the 
defendant has with the officer occurs after exiting the 
vehicle,” the court believed, Belton is inapplicable. Id. 
at A8. Applying that test here, the court held that 
“Belton does not apply,” because “[respondent] did not 
exit the vehicle upon the direction of the law enforce- 
ment officer.” Id. at A10. The court remanded for 
consideration of whether the search was justified under 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and, in parti- 
cular, findings as to “whether Officer Maney’s safety 
was endangered or whether the preservation of the 
evidence was in jeopardy.” Pet. App. A10. 

4 

Then-Justice Wells dissented from the court’s appli- 
cation of Belton. Pet. App. A11-A12. As he explained, 
“Belton does not add as a condition ‘where the law 
enforcement officer initiates contact with the defen- 
dant.’ ” Id. at A11. “The reason for [Belton’s] bright- 
line rule is officer safety, which is equally as much a 
concern whether the officer initiates the contact, 
actually confronts the person, or the person voluntarily 
exits the vehicle as long as the connection with the 
vehicle is proximate to the arrest.” Id. at A11-A12. 
Justice Wells nevertheless concurred in the judgment 
based on his view that, under this Court’s decision 
in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), respondent’s 
arrest was not sufficiently “related to the vehicle” to 
justify the search of the car. Pet. App. A11. 

This Court granted certiorari. 121 S. Ct. 755 (2001).1 

1 In opposing certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction, because the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
“is not a final decision as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).” Br. in 
Opp. 4. This Court, however, has exercised jurisdiction under 
Section 1257 over the interlocutory rulings of state courts of last 
resort, when the State might be prevented from raising the federal 
question presented to this Court at a later date, even if the State 
were to prevail on remand. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649, 651 n.1 (1984); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 
(1978). If the State were to prevail on remand in this case, the 
State would be unable to obtain review in this Court of the Florida 
Supreme Court’s ruling limiting the application of Belton, and that 
federal question would be lost. See also Robert L. Stern et al., 
Supreme Court Practice § 3.8 at 110 (7th ed. 1993) (“ [A]n imme- 
diate appeal may be available under § 1257 if an important federal 
issue may entirely escape Supreme Court review as a result of the 
remand order.”) (citing cases). In addition, the remand is limited 
to a federal question, i.e., whether the search is valid under a 
Chimel analysis. Pet. App. A10. As a result, the remand would 
not permit the state courts to decide the suppression motion on a 

5 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), this 
Court adopted a bright-line rule to guide the officer in 
the field in confronting the commonly recurring 
situation in which the recent occupant of an automobile 
is arrested. The Court held that police officers may 
search the passenger compartment of an automobile as 
a contemporaneous incident of the lawful custodial 
arrest of the vehicle’s occupant. The Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision in this case limits the application of 
Belton to circumstances in which the arrestee exits a 
vehicle at the direction of law enforcement personnel. 
That limitation finds no support in precedent or prin- 
ciple, and should be rejected. 

The Belton rule is grounded on the historic rationales 
underlying the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine—the 
need to protect officer safety and to preserve evidence 
of a crime. As this Court has long recognized, the need 
to disarm suspects and protect evidence makes it 
reasonable for police officers to search the person of the 
arrestee and the area within his immediate control. 
E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In 
Belton, this Court adopted the “generalization” that the 
passenger compartment of an automobile is “generally, 
even if not inevitably, within the area into which an 
arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary ite[m],” when “the arrestee is [the car’s] 
recent occupant.” 453 U.S. at 460 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). That generalization enabled the Court 
to “establish the workable rule [that] this category of 
cases requires.” Ibid. 

state law ground that would moot the Belton issue raised here. 
Compare Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 82 (1997). 

6 

The rationales underlying Belton are implicated 
“whenever officers effect a custodial arrest” of the 
recent occupant of a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032, 1049 n.14 (1983). As this Court has recog- 
nized, the custodial arrest is a volatile and dangerous 
event, increasing the risk to the officer that a suspect 
will grab for a weapon and the likelihood that he will 
attempt to conceal or destroy evidence of his guilt. 
E.g., Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). In the 
Belton context, those concerns justify the search of a 
vehicle recently occupied by an arrestee, without re- 
gard to whether the arrestee was ordered out of the car 
by police or voluntarily exited the car oblivious to 
police. The fact of the arrest, and not the reason that 
the arrestee exited the car, justifies the Belton search. 

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision not only has no 
footing in the rationales of Belton, but it needlessly 
blurs the bright line drawn by Belton. In Belton, this 
Court recognized that it was essential to provide the 
officer in the field with a “single familiar standard” to 
determine when a vehicle search is authorized incident 
to an arrest. 453 U.S. at 458 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Florida decision undermines that salu- 
tary objective by requiring officers to undertake an ad 
hoc, case-by-case inquiry into the reason that an 
arrestee exited his vehicle in order to decide whether a 
search of the passenger compartment is authorized. 
That inquiry invites the same sort of uncertainty from 
the standpoint of the officer in the field and disarray in 
results that this Court sought to foreclose in Belton. 

The search of respondent’s vehicle was valid under 
a proper application of Belton. Respondent was a “re- 
cent occupant” of the car; he was subjected to a “lawful 
custodial arrest” while standing next to the car; and the 
search of respondent’s car was conducted as “a con- 

7 

temporaneous incident of that arrest.” Belton, 453 U.S. 
at 460. Accordingly, the challenged search was a 
reasonable and thus lawful intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment. 

ARGUMENT 

A SEARCH OF THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT 
OF AN AUTOMOBILE IS JUSTIFIED AS A CON- 
TEMPORANEOUS INCIDENT OF THE LAWFUL 
CUSTODIAL ARREST OF THE VEHICLE’S RECENT 
OCCUPANT, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE REASON 
THAT THE INDIVIDUAL EXITED THE VEHICLE 

A. Under New York v. Belton, Police Officers May Search 

The Passenger Compartment Of A Car Incident To 

The Lawful Custodial Arrest Of Any “Recent Occu- 
pant” Of The Vehicle 

1. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated,” and further provides 
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. This Court has long 
recognized that when there has been a lawful arrest, a 
search of the person of the arrestee and area within his 
control “is not only an exception to the warrant require- 
ment of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘rea- 
sonable’ search under that Amendment.” United States 

v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); see Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).2 There are two 

2 Another “circumstance[] in which the Constitution does not 
require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile on 
the street or highway because they have probable cause to believe 
it contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979) (citing cases). See also, e.g., 

8 

longstanding rationales for the search-incident-to- 
arrest doctrine: the need “to remove any weapons that 
[the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest 
or effect his escape,” and the need to prevent the “con- 
cealment or destruction” of evidence. Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); see Knowles v. 
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-117 (1998) (citing cases). 

As this Court has recognized, the custodial arrest is a 
volatile and dangerous event. See Knowles, 525 U.S. at 
117; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-235 & n.5. Between 1989 
and 1998, for example, 239 of the 682 law enforcement 
officers who were feloniously killed in the line of duty 
were slain in arrest situations, making the arrest by far 
the most dangerous situation that officers commonly 
confronted during that period. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Re- 
ports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 
30 (1998) (Uniform Crime Reports). In 1998 alone, 16 of 
the 61 law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty 
were engaged in arrest situations when they were 
mortally wounded, and in that same year officers were 
assaulted while attempting arrests on 10,997 occasions. 
Id. at 29, 86. See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Killed in the Line of Duty: A 
Study of Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement 
Officers 3 (Sept. 1992).3 Similarly, the moment an 

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-467 (1999) (per curiam); 
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam). 
The “automobile exception” is not applicable in this case, however, 
because in justifying the challenged search the State has relied 
upon the fact of respondent’s arrest, and not upon any probable 
cause that Officer Maney may have had to believe that respon- 
dent’s car contained contraband or evidence of a crime. 

3 Drug-related arrests pose a particularly high risk to police 
officers. In 1998, for example, seven of the 16 officers who were 

9 

individual is placed under formal arrest, he has an 
increased motive “to take conspicuous, immediate steps 
to destroy incriminating evidence.” Cupp v. Murphy, 
412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973). 

Accordingly, this Court has recognized that, “[w]hen 
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove 
any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order 
to resist arrest or effect his escape,” and “to search for 
and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order 
to prevent its concealment or destruction.” Chimel, 395 
U.S. at 762-763. Further, the officer’s need to protect 
himself and to preserve evidence justifies a search of 
the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control,” 
which the Court has defined as “the area from within 
which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon 
or destructible evidence.” Id. at 763. Because “poten- 
tial dangers lurk[] in all custodial arrests,” United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977), the validity 
of a search incident to arrest “does not depend on what 
a court may later decide was the probability in a 
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence 
would in fact be found.” Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
Rather, “[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which 
establishes the authority to search.” Ibid. 

2. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), this 
Court applied those principles to define the permissible 
scope of a search incident to the arrest of the occupant 
of an automobile. The Belton case arose when a New 
York state trooper stopped a car for speeding and 

slain in arrest situations were investigating drug-related matters. 
Uniform Crime Reports at 29; see id. at 30 (between 1989 and 
1998, 40 of the 239 officers feloniously killed in arrest situations 
were investigating drug-related matters). 

10 

thereafter developed probable cause to arrest the occu- 
pants of the vehicle for possession of marijuana. The 
officer ordered the occupants out of the car and placed 
them under arrest. See id. at 455-456. After “patt[ing] 
down” the arrestees and separating them, the officer 
searched the passenger compartment of the car and 
discovered cocaine in the zippered pocket of a jacket 
that was lying on the back seat. See id. at 456. The 
state courts suppressed the evidence found during the 
vehicle search on the ground that, when the search took 
place, “there [was] no longer any danger that the 
arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the 
article.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). This 
Court reversed. 

The Court began its Fourth Amendment analysis 
with the principle that “a lawful custodial arrest creates 
a situation which justifies the contemporaneous search 
without a warrant of the person arrested and of 
the immediately surrounding area.” Belton, 454 U.S. at 
457. The Court then explained that courts had strug- 
gled in applying the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine 
to the recurring question presented in Belton, namely, 
“whether, in the course of a search incident to the law- 
ful custodial arrest of the occupants of an automobile, 
police may search inside the automobile after the arres- 
tees are no longer in it.” Id. at 459 (emphasis added). A 
review of the case law illustrated that the lower courts 
had “found no workable definition of ‘the area within 
the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area 
arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the 
arrestee is its recent occupant.” Id. at 460. As a result, 
police officers were left without “a settled principle” to 
establish the “scope of [their] authority” in this 
“problematic context.” Id. at 459-460 & n.3. 

11 

The Court admonished that “[a] single familiar 
standard is essential to guide police officers, who have 
only limited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the social and individual interests involved in 
the specific circumstances they confront.” 453 U.S. at 
458 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o establish 
the workable rule [that] this category of cases re- 
quires,” the Court adopted “the generalization that 
articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the 
passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact 
generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into 
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a 
weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’ ” Id. at 460 (quoting 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). And, based on that generali- 
zation, the Court held that whenever “a policeman has 
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of 
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile.” Ibid. (footnotes omitted). 

In so holding, the Court emphasized that this rule, 
“ ‘while based upon the need to disarm and to discover 
evidence, does not depend on what a court may later 
decide was the probability in a particular arrest situa- 
tion that weapons or evidence would in fact be found.’ ” 
453 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). 
Just as is true with respect to the search of the person 
of the arrestee, if the arrest is lawful, then the “ ‘search 
[of the vehicle] incident to the arrest requires no 
additional justification.’ ” Ibid.4 

4 As Justice Powell explained in his opinion concurring in the 
judgment of Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), which was 
decided the same day as Belton, the Belton rule is also supported 
by the diminished expectation of privacy that an individual has in 
the circumstances giving rise to its application: 

12 

3. As is clear from the facts of Belton itself, an 
individual need not be inside the vehicle at the time of 
the arrest for Belton to authorize a search of the car 
incident to the arrest. Belton applies as long as the 
arrestee is a “recent occupant” of the vehicle, as was 
true in the case of Roger Belton himself. 453 U.S. at 
460; see id. at 462-463 (“[Belton]’s jacket was located 
inside the passenger compartment of the car in which 
the respondent had been a passenger just before he was 
arrested.”) (emphasis added); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 7.1(b) at 437 & n.26 (3d ed. 1996 & 
Supp. 2001) (“Belton applies whenever the person 
arrested was * * * the driver of or a passenger in the 
vehicle just before the arrest.”) (collecting cases). 
Justice Brennan underscored that dimension of Belton 
in his dissent. See 453 U.S. at 463 (The Court’s 
“ ‘bright-line’ rule [is] applicable to ‘recent’ occupants 

Belton trades marginal privacy of containers within the pas- 
senger area of an automobile for protection of the officer and of 
destructible evidence. The balance of these interests strongly 
favors the Court’s rule. The occupants of an automobile enjoy 
only a limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the auto- 
mobile itself. This limited interest is diminished further when 
the occupants are placed under custodial arrest. 

Id. at 431 (citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Edwards, 415 
U.S. 800, 808-809 (1974) (“While the legal arrest of a person should 
not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does—for at least a 
reasonable time and to a reasonable extent—take his own privacy 
out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, 
means of escape, and evidence.”). An individual’s expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle he was occupying immediately before an 
arrest is further diminished by the fact that the Fourth Amend- 
ment permits police to inventory the contents of impounded vehi- 
cles under standardized procedures at a time and place removed 
from an arrest. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-372 
(1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 

13 

of automobiles.”). And the Florida Supreme Court 
acknowledged it in this case. See Pet. App. A9 (“[T]his 
Court is mindful that the arrest and subsequent search 
should not be invalidated merely because the defendant 
is outside the vehicle.”). 

As a practical matter, that is the only rule that makes 
sense. The vast majority of arrests that take place in 
the Belton context occur “after the arrestees are no 
longer in [the car].” Belton, 453 U.S. at 459. See Pet. 
App. A19 (“We can think of few incidents where a 
driver will not be out of the vehicle when an arrest is 
made.”). Sound police practice explains why that is so. 
As this Court has recognized, police officers face an 
“inordinate risk” when “approach[ing] a person seated 
in an automobile” and, as a result, officers often order 
occupants out of the car when conducting an investi- 
gation that may lead to an arrest. Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam) (officer 
may, without particularized justification, order a driver 
out of the car after a stop of the vehicle); see also 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (rule of 
Mimms extends to passengers). Moreover, whenever 
the occupant or recent occupant of a vehicle is arrested, 
it will invariably be more dangerous and less efficient 
for an officer to search the vehicle while the arrestee is 
still in it. See LaFave, supra, § 7.1(a) at 435 n.15 (The 
“fairly standard practice” is to remove the arrestee 
from the car before the search, “both for reasons of 
safety and because of the practical physical limitations 
of effecting an arrest in such a confined area.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 

14 

B. The Belton Rule Applies Without Regard To Whether 

The Arrestee Exited The Car Of His Own Volition Or 

Upon The Direction Of Law Enforcement Personnel 

The Florida Supreme Court held that Belton does 
not govern this case because respondent “did not exit 
the vehicle upon the direction of the law enforcement 
officer.” Pet. App. A10. The court reasoned that 
“Belton’s bright-line rule is limited to situations where 
the law enforcement officer initiates contact with the 
defendant, either by actually confronting the defendant 
or by signaling confrontation with the defendant.” Ibid. 
That limitation is unsupported and unsound. 

1. Belton, along with the search-incident-to-arrest 
cases on which the Court relied in Belton, makes clear 
that the custodial arrest gives rise to the authority to 
the search. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (“ ‘A custodial 
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a rea- 
sonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that 
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest 
requires no additional justification.’ ”) (quoting Robin- 
son, 414 U.S. at 235). See also, e.g., United States v. 
Edwards, 415 U.S. at 802-803; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762- 
763; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. at 367. As 
explained above (pp. 8-9), that conclusion follows from 
the potential dangers inherent in every custodial arrest. 
Those dangers arise as soon as an individual is placed 
under custodial arrest, regardless of whether the 
individual initially got out of his vehicle voluntarily or 
upon the direction of police. 

This Court’s decision in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032 (1983), confirms that Belton is not limited to ins- 
tances in which the arrestee is ordered out of the car by 
police. In Long, police officers observed a car swerve 
off the road into a shallow ditch. When they stopped to 

15 

investigate, the driver of the car, “the only occupant of 
the automobile, met the deputies at the rear of the car.” 
463 U.S. at 1035. The officers did not arrest the driver 
but merely issued him a ticket. The question presented 
in Long was whether the officers lawfully conducted a 
protective Terry-type search of the passenger compart- 
ment of the car during the encounter. 

Before turning 
to that question, however, the Court observed that “[i]t 
is clear * * * that if the officers had arrested Long,” 
instead of simply issuing him a ticket, “they could have 
searched the passenger compartment” under Belton. 
Id. at 1035 n.1. As the Court explained, “Belton clearly 
authorizes [an automobile] search whenever officers 
effect a custodial arrest.” Id. at 1049 n.14 (emphasis 
added). That was true in Long even though the police 
officers did not initiate contact with the individual until 
after he had exited his car. 

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), reinforces the 
conclusion that the custodial arrest is the pivotal event 
for purposes of applying the Belton rule. In that case, 
the Court considered whether a police officer may con- 
duct a warrantless search of a vehicle when the officer 
gives the driver a citation in lieu of arresting him. 
After examining the twin rationales for the search- 
incident-to-arrest exception—officer safety and preser- 
vation of evidence—the Court held that the search was 
not authorized. The Court explained that “[t]he threat 
to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation * * * is 
a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest,” 
and that “the concern for destruction or loss of evidence 
is not present at all” in the case of a citation. Id. at 117, 
119. At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed 
that when, as here, there is a “custodial arrest,” police 
officers may “conduct a full search of the passenger 
compartment” of an automobile in order “to search for 

16 

weapons and protect themselves from danger.” Id. at 
117, 118 (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).5 

2. The Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that Belton is 
limited to cases in which the arrestee is directed out 
of his car by law enforcement personnel finds no 
support in either of the historic rationales underlying 
the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. 

As this Court has observed, Belton “recogni[zes] that 
part of the reason to allow area searches incident to an 
arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be 
armed, may be able to gain access to weapons to injure 
officers or others nearby, or otherwise to hinder legiti- 
mate police activity.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 n.14; see 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 457. 

The likelihood that an arrestee 
will lunge for a weapon contained in a vehicle that he 
recently occupied does not fluctuate based on the cir- 
cumstances under which the arrestee initially got out of 
the vehicle. As this Court has emphasized, “[t]he 
danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the 

5 As noted above, Justice Wells concurred in the result reached 
by the Florida Supreme Court because he believed that Knowles 
“control[s] the specific facts here,” since respondent’s arrest was 
not “made related to the vehicle.” Pet. App. A11. That analysis is 
flawed. This case is distinguishable from Knowles in a funda- 
mental respect: unlike the defendant in Knowles, respondent was 
subjected to a lawful custodial arrest. The fact that respondent 
was not arrested for operating the vehicle is of no moment. As this 
Court has recognized, “[t]he danger to the police officer flows from 
the fact of the arrest, * * * and not from the grounds for the 
arrest.” Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5. See United States v. 
Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1989) (“It is the threat of 
arrest or arrest itself which may trigger a violent response— 
regardless of the nature of the offense which first drew attention 
to the subject.”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990). Thus, this 
Court “treat[s] all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search 
justification.” Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 

17 

arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncer- 
tainty.” Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5 (emphasis added); 
see Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) 
(“Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk of 
danger to the arresting officer.”). Thus, regardless of 
why an individual gets out of his car, “the ‘bright line’ 
that [this Court] drew in Belton clearly authorizes [a 
search of the car] whenever officers effect a custodial 
arrest.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 n.14 (emphasis added). 

The same conclusion follows with respect to the other 
rationale underlying Belton. As this Court has recog- 
nized, upon arrest, everyone has an increased motive to 
conceal or destroy incriminating evidence. See Belton, 
453 U.S. at 457; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763; see also 
LaFave, supra, § 5.2(c) at 78 (“[A]s of the moment of 
arrest the arrestee is motivated to conceal, destroy or 
furtively abandon any incriminating evidence.”). The 
likelihood that an arrestee will attempt to destroy 
evidence in a car—and the officer’s interest in pre- 
venting such efforts—does not wax and wane based on 
whether an arrestee got out of his car of his own 
volition or upon an officer’s bidding. Either way, the 
arrestee will have the same motive to conceal or 
destroy incriminating evidence that may be in the car. 
And, as this Court has stated, the need to preserve the 
integrity of such evidence following the arrest “justifies 
an ‘automatic’ search” under Belton. Long, 463 U.S. at 
1049 n.14. See also Glasco v. Commonwealth, 513 
S.E.2d 137, 142 (Va. 1999) (“[A] knowledgeable suspect 
has the same motive and opportunity to destroy evi- 
dence or obtain a weapon as the arrestee with whom a 
police officer has initiated contact.”). 

In short, whether an individual is oblivious to police 
when he exits his car or is directed out of the car by 
police, the likelihood that the individual will attempt to 

18 

grab for a weapon or destroy evidence inside the car is 
a product of the fact that the individual is placed under 
custodial arrest, and not of his state of mind when he 
gets out of the car. 

3. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision needlessly 
blurs the bright line adopted by Belton, and will en- 
gender the same sort of uncertainty from the stand- 
point of the officer in the field and disarray in results 
that this Court sought to preclude in Belton. 

In Belton, this Court recognized that “ ‘[a] single 
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, 
who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on 
and balance the social and individual interests involved 
in the specific circumstances they confront.’ ” 453 U.S. 
at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
213-214 (1979)). See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 
431 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (Belton recog- 
nizes that “practical necessity requires that we allow an 
officer in these circumstances to secure thoroughly the 
automobile without requiring him in haste and under 
pressure to make close calculations about danger to 
himself or the vulnerability of evidence.”). At the same 
time, the Court recognized that the interests protected 
by the Fourth Amendment would better be served by 
a rule that, “in most instances, makes it possible [for 
police officers] to reach a correct determination before- 
hand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in 
the interest of law enforcement.” 453 U.S. at 458, 459 

n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). See LaFave, 
supra, § 7.1(c) at 445 (“Belton is grounded upon the 
compelling proposition that it is often advantageous to 
both privacy interests and law enforcement interests if 
rules of police conduct are stated in terms of easily 
understood standardized procedures which may be 
routinely followed.”) (footnote omitted). 

19 

The “search incident to arrest is by far the most 
common variety of police search practice.” LaFave, 
supra, § 5.2(c) at 77-78. The need for bright-line rules 
in this frequently recurring situation is as compelling 
today as it was when Belton was decided. And, since 
Belton, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the prin- 
ciple that a case-by-case approach to recurring Fourth 
Amendment issues may fail to “provide a workable 
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement 
and the interests protected by the Fourth Amend- 
ment.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984). 
See also, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305- 
306 & n.2 (1999); id. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring); 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576-577 (1991); 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987); Illinois v. 
Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 
462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983). 

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision requires the 
officer in the field to undertake precisely the sort of 
indeterminate, case-by-case inquiries that this Court 
sought to foreclose in Belton. Under the Florida deci- 
sion, the determination whether Belton permits the 
search of an arrestee’s car requires the officer to make 
an individualized determination as to the reason that 
the arrestee got out of his car. 

If the officer concludes 
that the arrestee exited his car because the officer 
“actually confront[ed]” or “signal[ed] confrontation” 
with him, or because the arrestee sought to “avoid the 
consequences of Belton,” then Belton applies and the 
officer may search the car incident to the arrest. Pet. 
App. A9-A10. In contrast, if the officer feels that the 
arrestee “voluntarily exit[ed] his car without provoca- 
tion from law enforcement personnel and without 
knowledge of their presence,” then Belton does not 
apply and the officer must conduct an analysis of the 

20 

Chimel factors—i.e., the threat to the officer’s safety 
and destruction of evidence in the particular case— 
before resolving whether he may search the car 
incident to the arrest. Id. at A4, A9-A10. 

That regime requires law enforcement personnel to 
make a variety of ad hoc determinations—subject to 
second-guessing by a court—in the “only limited time” 
that they have to react to “the specific circumstances 
they confront” in arresting the recent occupant of a 
vehicle, further compromising officer safety in this 
volatile situation. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).6 The regime will inevitably 
produce divergent results on similar facts from one 
officer or case to the next. And the regime accordingly 
is a far cry from the “workable rule [that] this category 
of cases requires.” Id. at 460. 

Respondent argues (Br. in Opp. 9-10) that “[w]ithout 
requiring that the officer confront the arrestee or signal 

6 For example, in deciding whether a Belton search is author- 
ized, officers would have to ascertain (1) whether the arrestee was 
aware of the police when he got out of the car, a determination that 
may depend on whether the police are in uniform or a marked 
squad car, police lights or sirens have been activated, or the 
arrestee was impaired in a manner that could have affected his 
awareness of the police; (2) whether, if the arrestee appeared to 
get out of the car voluntarily, the arrestee nevertheless did so to 
avoid the application of Belton, a determination that requires the 
officer to discern whether an arrestee knew about Belton; and (3) 
whether an officer sufficiently “signal[ed] confrontation” (Pet. 
App. A10) with an arrestee, such that the arrestee was getting out 
of the car in response to the officer rather than for another reason. 
The analysis would be more complicated when an officer confronts 
a vehicle with more than one occupant, since it is possible that 
occupants will exit a vehicle for different reasons, which may per- 
mit one arrestee, but not another, to challenge a search of the car 
incident to his arrest. 

21 

confrontation [with] the arrestee while he is still in the 
vehicle, the officer and the court[s] would have a diffi- 
cult time deciding whether or not the arrestee was a 
‘recent occupant’ of the vehicle.” That argument should 
be rejected. There is no doubt that an individual is the 
“recent occupant” of a vehicle when, as here, the officer 
sees the individual get out of the car and contacts him 
moments later beside the car. That is the situation in 
which the question presented is most likely to arise and, 
in deciding this case, the Court need go no further than 
considering the application of Belton in that context 
(i.e., the one presented here).7 

7 In other contexts, courts have considered whether, or under 
what circumstances, Belton applies when the recent occupant of a 
vehicle has gone beyond the immediate vicinity of the car before he 
is arrested. Compare, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 
159 (6th Cir. 1993) (Belton does not apply where individual was 
“approximately thirty feet from his vehicle when arrested,” such 
that “the passenger compartment of the vehicle was not within 
[his] ‘immediate control’ at the time of the arrest”); United States 

v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360, 361, 362 (D.C. Cir.) (Belton does not 
apply where individuals were “one car length away” from vehicle 
at the time of arrest, such that vehicle “was not within the 
‘immediate surrounding area’ into which [the suspects] might have 
reached” at time of arrest), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989), with 
United States v. Franco, 981 F.2d 470, 472 (10th Cir. 1992) (Belton 
applies where individual “was arrested in a Government truck that 
was parked in close proximity to his vehicle”); United States v. 
Arango, 879 F.2d at 1506 (Belton applies where individual was 
arrested “one block” away from car, where search of car was 
conducted after individual was returned to area near car, because 
officer “was in need of medical attention” there). Any doubt, 
however, as to whether Belton applies in such outlying cases 
provides no reason to deny officers the protections afforded by 
Belton in the more typical situation presented here. Cf. United 
States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 359-360 (1994); Albright 

v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 291 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in 
judgment). 

22 

4. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision could have 
the harmful unintended consequence of increasing the 
risks inherent in encounters between police and the 
recent occupants of vehicles. Although the Florida 
Supreme Court stated that “occupants of a vehicle can- 
not avoid the consequences of Belton merely by step- 
ping outside of the vehicle as the officers approach,” 
Pet. App. A9-A10, its decision may nevertheless en- 
courage suspects to exit their vehicles before ordered 
to do so by police in an attempt to render their vehicles 
“search proof ” for purposes of Belton. 

See Glasco v. 
Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d at 142. At the same time, 
the Florida rule may lead police to more quickly initiate 
contact with vehicle occupants, in order to ensure that 
Belton will apply in the event of an arrest. 

See State v. 
Wanzak, 598 N.W.2d 811, 815 (N.D. 1999). Either 
impulse will increase the confrontation, unpredict- 
ability, and thus perils posed by Belton encounters, 
creating a more volatile world for the officer in the field 
than the one that existed before Belton. 

Furthermore, the Florida decision fails to take into 
account that in many situations, including undercover 
operations, it may be undesirable for police to announce 
their presence and initiate contact with an individual 
before the individual gets out of a vehicle. Cf. Shipley v. 
California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969) (per curiam). That 
may be particularly true where police are on the 
lookout for a particular suspect, whose identity may not 
be known or discernable until the suspect exits a 
vehicle, or where police do not develop suspicion to 
investigate until an individual gets out of a vehicle, such 
as where officers observe an individual get out of a car 
brandishing a firearm or carrying contraband. 

23 

C. The Search Of Respondent’s Car Was Valid Under 

Belton, Because It Was A Contemporaneous Incident 

Of Respondent’s Lawful Custodial Arrest 

1. The search of respondent’s vehicle was a valid 
search incident to respondent’s arrest under Belton. 
Respondent was a “recent occupant” of the car. Belton, 
453 U.S. at 460. Officer Maney saw respondent drive 
up to the residence, park his car, and get out of the 
vehicle. Pet. App. A3. Respondent was subjected to a 
“lawful custodial arrest” only moments after he exited 
his car, while standing in practically the same spot in 
which Roger Belton stood during his arrest—“by the 
side of the car.” 453 U.S. at 457, 460 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). And Officer Maney searched the pas- 
senger compartment of respondent’s car as “a con- 
temporaneous incident” of respondent’s arrest. Id. at 
460. Only five minutes elapsed between the time re- 
spondent exited his car and was arrested and the 
search occurred. Pet. App. A3. 

2. The fact that Officer Maney handcuffed respon- 
dent and brought him into the nearby residence before 
searching the car does not alter that conclusion.8 By its 
terms, Belton only applies once an individual has been 
placed under “lawful custodial arrest.” 453 U.S. at 460. 
In effecting such arrests, it is commonplace for police 
officers to handcuff the arrestee and remove him from 
the immediate vicinity of the car before conducting a 
Belton search. As numerous courts of appeals have 

8 Respondent has not argued that Belton is inapplicable on the 
ground that he was restrained before his car was searched, and 
that issue was not decided by the Florida courts below and is not 
within the question on which this Court granted certiorari. See 
Pet. i. In any event, as we explain below, this issue provides no 
basis for avoiding the application of Belton in this case. 

24 

recognized, Belton does not require law enforcement 
officers to forego that prudent police practice in order 
to proceed with a Belton search. See United States v. 
Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 152 (7th Cir.) (“The fact that [the 
arrestee] had been handcuffed and placed in the police 
vehicle just prior to the commencement of the search 
that yielded the firearm does not affect the lawfulness 
of the search”; “it does not make sense to prescribe a 
constitutional test that is entirely at odds with safe and 
sensible police procedures.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 856 (1996).9 

That common-sense conclusion comports with the 
bright line drawn by Belton. In Belton, this Court re- 
jected the proposition that, “[w]hen the arrest has 
been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into 

9 See also, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1202 
(10th Cir. 2000) (A “search is valid under Belton without regard to 
the fact that the search occurred after Defendant had been re- 
strained.”); In re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d 759, 768 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(Belton search may be conducted after arrestee has been hand- 
cuffed; collecting cases); United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 
& n.15 (7th Cir. 1997) (courts have “consistently rejected” the 
argument that Belton is inapplicable when the arrestee has been 
handcuffed and placed in squad car; collecting cases); United States 

v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 791 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[T]he great weight 
of authority * * * holds that Belton’s bright-line rule applies 
even in cases where the arrestee is under physical restraint and at 
some distance from the automobile during the search.”) (collecting 
cases), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1074 (1995); United States v. Lacey, 
86 F.3d 956, 971 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 944 (1996); 
United States v. Moorehead, 57 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Valiant, 873 F.2d 205, 206 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 837 (1989); United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 
1989); LaFave, supra, § 7.1(c) at 448 (“[U]nder Belton a search of 
the vehicle is allowed even after the defendant was removed from 
it, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car.”); id. at 448-449 n.79 
(collecting cases). 

25 

custody, the justifications [for a warrantless search] 
cease to apply,” because “at that point there is no 
possibility that the arrestee could reach weapons or 
contraband.” 453 U.S. at 465-466 (Brennan, J., joined 
by Marshall, J., dissenting). Instead, the Court adopted 
the “generalization” that weapons or contraband within 
the passenger compartment of a car are “generally, 
even if not inevitably, within the area into which an 
arrestee might reach.” Id. at 460 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). That generalization enabled the Court 
to establish a bright-line rule authorizing automobile 
searches incident to the arrest of any recent occupant of 
a car, without regard to the “probability in a particular 
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact 
be found [in the car].” Id. at 461 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). And, as even the Belton dissenters 
acknowledged, the obvious import of that rationale is 
that Belton applies even after the arrestee has been 
handcuffed and moved away from the car. See id. at 
468 (“Under the approach taken today, the result would 
presumably be the same even if Officer Nicot had hand- 
cuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car be- 
fore placing them under arrest.”). 

10 

10 In Belton, this Court rejected the argument that the search 
was invalid “because Trooper Nicot, by the very act of searching 
the respondent’s jacket and seizing the contents of its pockets, had 
gained ‘exclusive control’ of them.” 453 U.S. at 462 n.5. As the 
Court explained, “under this fallacious theory no search or seizure 
incident to a lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid; by seizing 
an article even on the arrestee’s person, an officer may be said 
to have reduced that article to his ‘exclusive control.’ ” Ibid. 
Similarly, an officer should not be barred from searching a vehicle 
incident to the arrest of its recent occupant just because the officer 
has apparently seized control over the arrestee by handcuffing him 
and moving him from the immediate vicinity of the car. Cf. United 
States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 

26 

Even after individuals are taken into custody and 
restrained, they continue to pose a grave threat to law 
enforcement personnel. See, e.g., Plakas v. Drinski, 19 
F.3d 1143, 1145 (7th Cir.) (suspect handcuffed in back- 
seat of squad car escaped from squad car and later 
confronted police), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820 (1994); 
United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 210 & n.60 (5th 
Cir.) (citing incidents in which police officers were slain 
by handcuffed arrestees), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 955 
(1993). 

11 The bright-line Belton rule permits police 
officers to protect themselves against the small but 
nevertheless real risk that an arrestee who has been 
handcuffed or otherwise restrained will escape from 
custody by ensuring that, if the arrestee does somehow 
manage to break free, he will not succeed in retrieving 
a weapon from a nearby vehicle or in reaching into that 
vehicle and destroying evidence of a crime. 

3. At the same time, there is a limit on how Belton 
searches may be conducted. Belton requires that the 
search of the vehicle be undertaken as “a contempo- 
raneous incident of th[e] arrest.” 453 U.S. at 460. 
Compare, e.g., Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 
216, 220 (1967) (search of arrestee’s car was “too remote 
in time or place to [be] incidental to the arrest,” where 

11 In 1998, four officers were killed and 6,881 were assaulted 
while in the process of handling, transporting, or maintaining 
the custody of prisoners. Uniform Crime Reports at 29, 86. In 
addition, two veteran police officers were killed on the evening of 
May 19, 1998, when a handcuffed suspect in the back seat of their 
patrol car managed to free himself, retrieve one of the officer’s 
guns, and mortally wound both officers. Id. at 49. Another officer 
was killed on January 12, 1998, by an individual who had been 
ordered out of his car, when the individual managed to free himself 
during a struggle with the officer, retrieve a rifle from his car, and 
mortally wound the officer. Id. at 50. 

27 

search did not take place until the arrestee was in 
custody inside the courthouse and his car had been 
moved by police from the site of the arrest to the street 
outside the courthouse); Preston v. United States, 376 
U.S. at 368 (search of arrestee’s car was not incident to 
arrest when search was conducted after the car had 
been towed from the scene of the arrest to a garage); 
see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15 
(search of footlocker was too remote when it was 
conducted “more than an hour” after arrest); see also 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 461-462 (distinguishing Chadwick). 

As the District of Columbia Circuit has explained, a 
search meets the contemporaneous-incident standard 
whenever “it is an integral part of the lawful custodial 
arrest process.” United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 
F.3d 664, 668 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, in deciding whether a search incident to arrest is 
proper, “[t]he relevant distinction turns not upon the 
moment of arrest versus the moment of the search but 
upon whether the arrest and search are so separated in 
time or by intervening events that the latter cannot be 
fairly be said to have been incident to the former.” 
Ibid. Under that approach, the search of respondent’s 
vehicle was plainly conducted as a contemporaneous 
incident of respondent’s arrest, because the search and 
arrest were part of “one continuous event,” id. at 669, 
which began when respondent got out of his car and 
was arrested and ended just five minutes later when 
Officer Maney searched the car. 

* * * * * 

Because the search of respondent’s vehicle was 
conducted as a contemporaneous incident of respon- 
dent’s lawful custodial arrest, the search is valid under 

28 

Belton and, therefore, constitutes a reasonable intru- 
sion within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida 
should be reversed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD 
Acting Solicitor General 

JOHN C. KEENEY 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

MICHAEL R. DREEBEN 

Deputy Solicitor General 

GREGORY G. GARRE 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

LISA SIMOTAS 

Attorney 

FEBRUARY 2001