No. 00-1089 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC., 
PETITIONER 

v. 

ELLA WILLIAMS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 

THEODORE B. OLSON 
Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 

STUART E. SCHIFFER 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

PAUL D. CLEMENT 

Deputy Solicitor General 

MALCOLM L. STEWART 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

MARLEIGH D. DOVER 
CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH 

Attorneys 

Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
(202) 514-2217 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether an impairment that limits an individual’s 
ability to perform particular job-related manual tasks 
can constitute a “disability” under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A), even if 
there has been no finding that the plaintiff has been 
excluded from a class of jobs or a sufficiently broad 
range of jobs to establish a substantial limitation on the 
“major life activity” of “working,” and no finding that 
the plaintiff ’s impairment substantially limits her 
ability to perform manual tasks outside of work. 

(I) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Interest of the United States ...................................................... 
1 

Statement ........................................................................................ 2 

Summary of argument .................................................................. 
9 

Argument: 

I. The court of appeals’ approach to the major life 

activity of “performing manual tasks” would 

subvert the established rule that an individual is 

substantially limited in the major life activity of 

“working”only if his impairment excludes him 

from a class or broad range of jobs .............................. 

11 

II. By limiting its analysis to the performance of 

work-related manual tasks, the court of appeals 

failed to undertake an appropriate analysis of 

any properly defined “major life activity” ................. 

17 

III. This case should be remanded to allow the court 

of appeals to determine, based on appropriate 

legal standards, whether respondent has pre- 
sented sufficient evidence that she is substantially 

limited in the major life activities of either 

“working” or “performing manual tasks” ................... 
22 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 24 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) ..................... 

18, 20, 22 

Duncan v. WMATA, 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 

petition for cert. pending, No. 00-1776 .............................. 

11-12 

Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 

1997) ......................................................................................... 8 

(III) 

IV 

Cases—Continued: Page 

Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., No. 99-6656, 2001 WL 

587850 (6th Cir. May 31, 2001) ............................................ 

15 

Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999) ................................. 

12 

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 

(1999) ..................................................................... 

6, 9, 11, 13, 16 

Statutes and regulations: 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 

12101 et seq. ............................................................................. 

1 

Tit. I (42 U.S.C. 12111-12117) ..................................... 

1, 2, 19 

42 U.S.C. 12102(2) ....................................................... 

18 

42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A) ............................................. 

2, 4, 20 

42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(B) ............................................. 

4, 8, 22 

42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(C) ............................................. 

4, 8, 22 

42 U.S.C. 12111(8) ....................................................... 

19 

42 U.S.C. 12112(a) ....................................................... 

2, 19 

42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A) ............................................ 

2 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ................. 

1 

§ 501(d), 29 U.S.C. 791(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ............ 

1-2 

§ 503, 29 U.S.C. 793 ............................................................... 

2 

§ 504, 29 U.S.C. 794 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ...................... 

2 

28 C.F.R. 41.31(b)(2) ................................................................. 

3 

29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630: 

Section 1630.2(i) ............................................................... 

2, 10, 20 

Section 1630.2(j)(1) ................................................................ 

3 

Section 1630.2(j)(3) ................................................................ 

6 

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) ............................................................ 

3, 11 

App. § 1630.2(j) ....................................................................... 

16, 22 

41 C.F.R. 60-741.2(p) ................................................................ 2-3 

In the Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 00-1089 

TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC., 
PETITIONER 

v. 

ELLA WILLIAMS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 

This case concerns the proper understanding of the 
term “disability” as that term is used in the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 
et seq. The Department of Justice and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) are 
charged with enforcing the ADA, and those agencies 
have promulgated regulations and interpretive guid- 
ance concerning that statutory term. The Department 
of Labor has promulgated comparable regulations for 
purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabi- 
litation Act), 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Moreover, because 
the Rehabilitation Act makes the standards of Title I of 
the ADA (42 U.S.C. 12111-12117) applicable to the 
federal government, see 29 U.S.C. 791(d) (1994 & Supp. 

(1) 

2 

V 1999), the United States has a significant interest in 
the principles used to determine whether an individual 
has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA. 

STATEMENT 

1. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination by any 
covered entity “against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad- 
vancement, or discharge of employees, employee com- 
pensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). In 
pertinent part, the ADA defines the term “disability” 
as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). The forms of em- 
ployment discrimination prohibited by Title I of the 
ADA include “not making reasonable accommodations 
to the known physical or mental limitations of an other- 
wise qualified individual with a disability who is an ap- 
plicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demon- 
strate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business.” 42 U.S.C. 
12112(b)(5)(A). 
EEOC regulations implementing Title I of the ADA 
define the term “major life activities” to include “func- 
tions such as caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i). A regula- 
tion promulgated by the Justice Department contains 
the same definition of the term “major life activities” 
for purposes of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
see 28 C.F.R. 41.31(b)(2), as does a regulation promul- 
gated by the Department of Labor for purposes 
of Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, see 41 C.F.R. 

3 

60-741.2(p). The EEOC’s Title I regulations provide 
that an impairment “substantially limits” an individual 
if, as a result of the impairment, the person is (i) 
“[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the 
average person in the general population can perform,” 
or (ii) “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, 
manner or duration under which [he] can perform a 
particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the average 
person in the general population can perform that same 
major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1). Those regu- 
lations contain a special definition of the term “sub- 
stantially limits” with respect to the major life activity 
of working. In that context, 

[t]he term substantially limits means significantly 
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of 
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities. The inability to per- 
form a single, particular job does not constitute a 
substantial limitation in the major life activity of 
working. 

29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 

2. Beginning in 1990, respondent Ella Williams was 
employed as an assembly line worker in an auto manu- 
facturing plant operated by petitioner Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. Pet. App. 24a. As a 
result of her prolonged use of pneumatic tools, respon- 
dent developed carpal tunnel syndrome and tendinitis 
in her arms and hands. Id. at 2a, 24a.1 Petitioner 

1 Because this case arises out of respondent’s appeal from the 
district court’s award of summary judgment to petitioner, the facts 
as set forth in the text reflect the record evidence taken in the 
light most favorable to respondent. See Pet. App. 2a. 

4 

subsequently placed respondent on a team in the Qual- 
ity Control Inspection Operations unit of the assembly 
line. Id. at 25a. Respondent spent approximately three 
years inspecting cars on the assembly line for defective 
paint and manually wiping down each newly painted car 
as it passed on the conveyor. Id. at 2a, 26a. Her duties 
were then expanded to include new tasks, which re- 
quired her to grip a block of wood and to keep her 
hands and arms around shoulder height repetitively 
over several hours. Id. at 2a, 26a-27a. Her ligament 
and muscle problems reappeared in a more severe form 
as a result of the new job, and she developed tendinitis 
in her shoulders and neck as well. Id. at 2a, 27a. Re- 
spondent requested to be assigned back to her former 
functions, which she could perform without difficulty. 
Ibid. Respondent alleges that petitioner refused to 
assign her back to her former job in the paint inspection 
section, and that the refusal constituted a failure to 
provide reasonable accommodation as required by the 
ADA. Id. at 2a, 27a-28a. 

3. Respondent filed suit in federal district court, al- 
leging that petitioner had violated, inter alia, the ADA. 
The district court granted petitioner’s motion for sum- 
mary judgment. Pet. App. 23a-54a. With respect to 
respondent’s ADA claim, the court held that respon- 
dent was not substantially limited in any major life 
activity and therefore did not have a “disability” within 
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A).2 Pet. App. 
34a-42a. 

2 The ADA also defines the term “disability” to include “a re- 
cord of such an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(B), or “ being re- 
garded as having such an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(C). The 
district court held that respondent could not establish that she had 
a “disability” under either of those provisions. Pet. App. 43a-47a. 
Those holdings are not at issue in this Court. See note 3, infra. 

5 

Respondent contended that she was substantially 
limited in the major life activities of (1) performing 
manual tasks, (2) housework, (3) gardening, (4) playing 
with her children, (5) lifting, and (6) working. Pet. App. 
34a, 37a. The district court rejected allegations (2)-(4) 
on the ground that “[w]hen compared to activities such 
as walking, seeing, hearing, speaking and breathing, the 
Court cannot find that gardening, housework, playing 
with, or otherwise recreating with others, are such 
significant activities to warrant their inclusion into the 
‘statutory rubric’ of major life activities.” Id. at 35a. 
The court found that allegation (1) was “irretrievably 
contradicted by [respondent’s] continual insistence that 
she could perform the tasks in assembly and paint 
inspection without difficulty,” since those duties re- 
quired the performance of manual tasks. Id. at 36a. 
The court also stated that “no rational juror could 
conclude that [respondent] is substantially limited in 
her ability to perform manual tasks” because respon- 
dent had “failed to present any evidence regarding the 
nature and severity of [her] impairment, the duration 
or expected duration of her impairment, or the perma- 
nent or long term impact resulting from the impair- 
ment.” Ibid. The district court also rejected allegation 
(5) because respondent had failed to present evidence 
sufficient to persuade a rational juror that her ability to 
lift was substantially limited. Id. at 36a-37a. 

The district court then addressed respondent’s claim 
that she was substantially limited in the major life 
activity of “working.” Pet. App. 37a-42a. The court ex- 
plained that, to prevail on that theory, respondent was 
required to show that her impairment excluded her 
from a significant range of jobs. Id. at 37a-38a. The 
court acknowledged that respondent had offered expert 
vocational evidence that, as a result of her impairment, 

6 

“the number of jobs in the economy that [she] can 
perform has been reduced by 50% to 55%.” Id. at 38a. 
It stated, however, that under the applicable regula- 
tions, the “determination of whether one is substan- 
tially limited in the major life activity of working 
requires an examination, and therefore evidence, of a 
claimant’s ability, or inability, to access the job market 
in her own geographical area.” Id. at 40a. Based on its 
view that the evidence proffered by respondent “offers 
no assistance in evaluating her true employability with- 
in her own geographical area,” the district court con- 
cluded that respondent “cannot show that she is 
substantially limited in the major life activity of work- 
ing.” Ibid. 

4. The court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. 1a-11a. 
The court’s analysis focused on respondent’s ability to 
perform work-related manual tasks. The court of ap- 
peals cited the EEOC regulation that specifically 
addresses limitations on the “major life activity” of 
“working,” see 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3) (quoted at p. 3, 
supra), and this Court’s discussion of that regulation in 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), 
for the proposition that an individual “must be pre- 
cluded from * * * a substantial class of jobs” in order 
to establish disability based on the major life activity of 
“working.” Pet. App. 4a. The court recognized that 
respondent “asserts primarily that her impairments 
disable her from performing manual tasks, a different 
disability from ‘working.’ ” 

Ibid. (footnote omitted). 
The court of appeals nevertheless concluded that “in 
order to be disabled [respondent] must show that her 
manual disability involves a ‘class’ of manual activities 
affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.” Ibid. 

Applying that standard, the court concluded that 

7 

taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, * * * [respondent’s] set of impair- 
ments to her arms, shoulders and neck are 
sufficiently disabling to allow the factfinder to find 
she crosses the threshold into the protected class of 
individuals under the ADA who must be accorded 
reasonable accommodation. Her ailments are analo- 
gous to having missing, damaged or deformed limbs 
that prevent her from doing the tasks associated 
with certain types of manual assembly line jobs, 
manual product handling jobs and manual building 
trade jobs (painting, plumbing, roofing, etc.) that 
require the gripping of tools and repetitive work 
with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder 
levels for extended periods of time. 

Ibid. The court of appeals acknowledged that respon- 
dent could “perform a range of isolated, non-repetitive 
manual tasks performed over a short period of time, 
such as tending to her personal hygiene or carrying out 
personal or household chores.” Ibid. The court con- 
cluded, however, that respondent’s ability to perform 
those tasks “does not effect [sic] a determination that 
her impairment substantially limits her ability to 
perform the range of manual tasks associated with an 
assembly line job.” Ibid.3 

3 The court of appeals stated that “[a]lthough [respondent] has 
also claimed that she is substantially limited in the major life 
activities of lifting and working, in addition to manual tasks, her 
counsel conceded during oral argument that [respondent’s] 
strongest claim pertained to the major life activity of performing 
manual tasks.” Pet. App. 4a n.1. In light of its determination that 
respondent had presented sufficient evidence with respect to the 
performance of manual tasks, the court declined to determine 
whether respondent was also “substantially limited as to the major 
life activities of lifting or working.” Id. at 5a. For similar reasons, 

8 

Judge Boggs dissented from the court of appeals’ 
disposition of respondent’s ADA claim. He noted that 
although respondent’s physical impairment prevented 
her from performing the tasks associated with a 
discrete range of jobs, “this inability to perform certain 
types of tasks would not likely constitute being disabled 
with regard to the major life activity of working. In 
particular, this court has held that the inability to per- 
form a single, particular job does not constitute a sub- 
stantial limitation on working.” Pet. App. 9a (citing 
Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 
1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (collecting cases)). 

Judge Boggs concluded that respondent was likewise 
unable to demonstrate a substantial limitation on the 
“major life activity” of “performing manual tasks.” He 
explained that the record demonstrated respondent’s 
ability to perform many work-related manual tasks, as 
well as “the manual tasks of brushing her teeth, laun- 
dering her clothes, and doing some driving.” Pet. App. 
9a. In Judge Boggs’s view, the manual tasks that 
respondent was demonstrably unable to perform were 
almost exclusively tasks connected to a narrow range of 
jobs. Id. at 9a-10a. Judge Boggs concluded that if 
respondent’s inability to perform those tasks was an 
insufficient basis for finding a substantial limitation on 
her ability to work, there was no logical ground for 
treating her impairment as a substantial limitation on 
her ability to perform manual tasks. Id. at 10a-11a. 

the court found it unnecessary to address respondent’s alternative 
claims that she had a “record” of qualifying impairment, see 
42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(B), or was “regarded as” disabled, see 42 U.S.C. 
12102(2)(C). Pet. App. 6a. 

9 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

Under the pertinent EEOC regulations and this 
Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471 (1999), an ADA plaintiff cannot establish that 
he is “substantially limited” in the “major life activity” 
of “working” simply through proof that his impairment 
precludes him from performing a particular job or a 
narrow category of jobs. Rather, an individual is “sub- 
stantially limited” in “working” only if his impairment 
excludes him from a class of jobs or a broad range of 
jobs in various classes. Where a plaintiff alleges that he 
is substantially limited in the activity of “performing 
manual tasks,” and the tasks he identifies are solely 
work-related, the plaintiff should likewise be required 
to show that as a result of his impairment he is exclud- 
ed from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Any 
other approach would permit circumvention of the rules 
that govern claims based on “working,” because an 
inability to perform a particular job can almost always 
be recharacterized as an inability to perform the 
manual tasks or functions associated with that job. 

The court of appeals decided this case on the appa- 
rent assumption that respondent was not substantially 
limited in the major life activity of “working.” The 
court nevertheless held that respondent could show a 
substantial limitation on the activity of “performing 
manual tasks,” based solely on her inability to perform 
work-related manual tasks. That approach was erro- 
neous and would subvert the established rule that a 
plaintiff must prove exclusion from a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in order to establish disability 
based on “working.” 

The approach adopted by the court of appeals not 
only threatens to circumvent the proper analysis of the 

10 

major life activity of “working,” but also produces a 
truncated and incomplete analysis of the major life 
activity of “performing manual tasks.” By focusing only 
on manual tasks undertaken in the workplace, the court 
of appeals failed to evaluate the full extent of respon- 
dent’s limitations with respect to manual tasks gener- 
ally. In considering major life activities other than 
working, judicial inquiry cannot properly be limited to 
effects of the individual’s impairment that are 
evidenced in the workplace. Indeed, a principal goal of 
the ADA is to ensure that disabilities that do not affect 
a person’s actual ability to function in the workplace 
will not be used as a basis for irrationally limiting the 
employment opportunities of qualified disabled individ- 
uals. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals em- 
ployed an incorrect legal analysis. Accordingly, the 
court’s judgment should be vacated and the case should 
be remanded for further proceedings. On remand, re- 
spondent may be able to demonstrate, under the ap- 
propriate legal standards, that the record evidence is 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment for petitioner 
on the question whether respondent is substantially 
limited as to (a) working and/or (b) performing manual 
tasks. 

11 

ARGUMENT 

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APPROACH TO THE 
MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY OF “PERFORMING 
MANUAL TASKS” WOULD SUBVERT THE ES- 
TABLISHED RULE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL IS 
SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED IN THE MAJOR 
LIFE ACTIVITY OF “WORKING” ONLY IF HIS 
IMPAIRMENT EXCLUDES HIM FROM A CLASS 
OR BROAD RANGE OF JOBS 

A. The EEOC’s regulations provide that, in order to 
establish a substantial limitation in the major life activ- 
ity of working, a plaintiff must show that he is “signifi- 
cantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class 
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), 
this Court “[a]ssum[ed] without deciding that working 
is a major life activity and that the EEOC regulations 
interpreting the term ‘substantially limits’ are reason- 
able.” Id. at 492. Applying those regulations, the Court 
held that “[w]hen the major life activity under con- 
sideration is that of working, the statutory phrase 
‘substantially limits’ requires, at a minimum, that plain- 
tiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of 
jobs.” Id. at 491. It is therefore clear that a plaintiff 
cannot establish that he is “substantially limit[ed]” in 
the “major life activity” of “working” simply through 
proof that his impairment precludes him from perform- 
ing a particular job or a narrow category of jobs. See, 

e.g., Duncan v. WMATA, 240 F.3d 1110, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (en banc) (testimony that the plaintiff “was not 
qualified for the particular kind of job—truck dri- 

12 

ver—for which he chose to apply” was insufficient to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff was substantially limited 
in the major life activity of working), petition for cert. 
pending, No. 00-1776; cf. Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 
523 (1999) (“to be regarded as substantially limited in 
the major life activity of working, one must be regarded 
as precluded from more than a particular job”). 

B. An inability to perform a particular job virtually 
always can be recharacterized as an inability to perform 
the manual tasks or functions associated with that job. 
The limiting principle described above would therefore 
be wholly undermined if a plaintiff whose impairment 
excluded him from an employment category too small to 
constitute a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs (and 
who therefore could not show a substantial limitation on 
the major life activity of “working”) could nevertheless 
establish a disability based solely on his inability to per- 
form the manual tasks associated with that narrow 
category of jobs. If a plaintiff claims that he is “sub- 
stantially limited” in the activity of “performing manual 
tasks,” and if the tasks he identifies are solely work- 
related, his inability to perform those tasks should be 
regarded as a “disability” only if the category of jobs 
from which he is thereby excluded is sufficiently broad 
so that he is substantially limited in “working.”4 

4 The situation described in the text—i.e., where a plaintiff 
attempts to prove a substantial limitation on the performance of 
manual tasks solely by reference to work-related tasks—may not 
arise with great frequency, because a physical impairment that 
affects a plaintiff's ability to work will often have effects outside 
the workplace as well. That will not always be true, however. For 
example, a person whose impairment renders him unable to per- 
form a particular task continuously or repetitively for a prolonged 
period of time, see Pet. App. 4a (stating that respondent’s impair- 
ments “prevent her from doing the tasks associated with certain 

13 

C. In granting petitioner’s motion for summary 
judgment, the district court found that respondent had 
failed to present evidence sufficient to persuade a 
reasonable juror that she was substantially limited in 
the major life activity of “working.” See Pet. App. 37a- 
42a. Although the court of appeals did not specifically 
address that conclusion, the court appeared to decide 
this case on the assumption that respondent was not 
excluded from a class of jobs or a sufficiently broad 
range of jobs to allow her to establish a substantial 
limitation on her ability to work.5 

types of * * * jobs * * * that require the gripping of tools and 
repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above 
shoulder levels for extended periods of time”), may be excluded 
from certain jobs without being significantly restricted in other 
areas of his life. An impairment that renders an individual unable 
to perform an especially demanding task—e.g., to lift very heavy 
objects, or to perform delicate operations requiring an unusual 
degree of dexterity—may also disqualify the individual from 
particular jobs without restricting him outside the workplace (or in 
the workplace for any class or broad range of jobs). 

Such deter- 

minations are to be made on an individualized basis. See Sutton, 
527 U.S. at 483. 
5 The precise basis of that assumption is unclear. The court of 
appeals stated that “[respondent] asserts primarily that her 
impairments disable her from performing manual tasks, a different 
disability from ‘working,’ the disability at issue in the Sutton case.” 
Pet. App. 4a (footnote omitted). The court further observed that 
“[a]lthough [respondent] has also claimed that she is substantially 
limited in the major life activities of lifting and working, in addition 
to manual tasks, her counsel conceded during oral argument that 
[respondent’s] strongest claim pertained to the major life activity 
of performing manual tasks.” Id. at 4a n.1. Those statements 
might suggest that the court understood respondent essentially to 
have conceded that she could not establish a substantial limitation 
on the “major life activity” of “working.” On the other hand, the 
court also stated that “[b]ecause we conclude that [respondent] is 
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, we do not need 

14 

The court of appeals nevertheless held that respon- 
dent could show a substantial limitation on the activity 
of “performing manual tasks,” based solely on her in- 
ability to perform work-related tasks. Thus, the court 
stated that “in order to be disabled [respondent] must 
show that her manual disability involves a ‘class’ of 
manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks 
at work.” Pet. App. 4a. It found that respondent’s 
“ailments are analogous to having missing, damaged or 
deformed limbs that prevent her from doing the tasks 
associated with certain types of * * * jobs * * * that 
require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with 
hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels 
for extended periods of time.” Ibid. The court further 
observed that “[t]he fact that [respondent] can perform 
a range of isolated, non-repetitive manual tasks per- 
formed over a short period of time, such as tending to 
her personal hygiene or carrying out personal or house- 
hold chores, does not effect [sic] a determination that 
her impairment substantially limits her ability to 
perform the range of manual tasks associated with an 
assembly line job.” Ibid. The court also described re- 
spondent’s claim as resting on “the rather simple con- 
cept that she is disabled as to performing manual tasks 
because she suffers from a severe impairment to her 
limbs, shoulders and neck that seriously reduces her 
ability to perform the manual tasks that are job- 
related.” Id. at 5a. 

to determine whether [respondent] is substantially limited as to 
the major life activities of lifting or working.” Id. at 5a. That for- 
mulation suggests that the court simply assumed, arguendo, that 
respondent could not resist summary judgment with respect to 
“working.” 

15 

Those statements strongly suggest an exclusive focus 
on work-related manual tasks.6 And a subsequent Sixth 
Circuit decision construes the decision below in 
precisely that manner. In Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., No. 
99-6656, 2001 WL 587850 (May 31, 2001), the court 
stated that “[t]o demonstrate a substantial limitation in 
the performance of manual tasks, a plaintiff must prove 
his ‘manual disability involves a “class” of manual 
activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at 
work.’ ” Id. at *8 (quoting Pet. App. 4a). The Kiphart 
court’s description of the court of appeals’ opinion in 
this case (see ibid.) focused solely on the evidence 
suggesting that respondent was unable to perform 
various work-related manual tasks. Thus, in Kiphart as 
in the instant case, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff could establish a substantial limitation on the 
“major life activity” of “performing manual tasks,” 
based solely on work-related manual tasks, without 
deciding whether the plaintiff was substantially limited 
in the “major life activity” of “working.” 7 

That ap- 
proach is erroneous and would subvert the established 
rule that a plaintiff must prove exclusion from a class of 
6 The court of appeals did state later in its opinion that re- 
spondent’s impairments “are sufficiently severe to be like de- 
formed limbs and such activities affect manual tasks associated 
with working, as well as manual tasks associated with recreation, 
household chores and living generally.” Pet. App. 6a (emphasis 
added). But that observation appears disconnected from the Sixth 
Circuit’s legal analysis. 

7 The Kiphart court concluded that “a reasonable jury could 
have determined Kiphart’s impairments substantially limited his 
ability to perform an entire class of manual activities associated 
with assembly-line and product-handling jobs involving the use of 
vibrating hand-held power tools and requiring frequent, repetitive 
twisting, bending, or flexing of the wrists, elbows, or neck.” 2001 
WL 587850, at *9. 

16 

jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes in order 
to establish disability based on “working.” See pp. 11- 
12, supra. Limiting the inquiry to the plaintiff’s ability 
or inability to perform manual tasks in the workplace 
leads naturally to a focus on the employee’s ability to 
perform the tasks associated with her particular job. 
The EEOC regulations, and this Court’s decision in 
Sutton, preclude such a job-specific focus and mandate 
a broader perspective. 

The court of appeals suggested (Pet. App. 5a-6a) that 
its mode of analysis was consistent with (or, indeed, 
mandated by) the principle that a court should consider 
the major life activity of working only “[i]f an individual 
is not substantially limited with respect to any other 
major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j); 
see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. But that direction as to the 
appropriate order of proceeding presupposes a proper 
application of tests for major life activities other than 
working. The decision below improperly truncated the 
analysis of manual tasks, with the effect of circum- 
venting the rules governing the analysis of working. 

By focusing on manual tasks “in the workplace,” the 
court of appeals converted respondent’s manual tasks 
claim into a working claim. However, in the process of 
conversion, the court of appeals omitted the require- 
ment that the employee’s impairment affect her ability 
to perform a class or broad range of jobs. The court of 
appeals’ approach does not comply with principles of 
orderly decisionmaking; it simply enabled the court to 
find sufficient evidence of disability, based solely on the 
effects of respondent’s impairment on her job 
performance (and consequent employability), without 
making the requisite determination whether respon- 

17 

dent was excluded from a broad or narrow category of 
jobs.8 

II. BY LIMITING ITS ANALYSIS TO THE PER- 
FORMANCE OF WORK-RELATED MANUAL 
TASKS, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO 
UNDERTAKE AN APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS OF 
ANY PROPERLY DEFINED “MAJOR LIFE 
ACTIVITY” 

The court of appeals’ analysis places undue emphasis 
on the extent to which a disability is manifested in the 
workplace and affects job performance. In articulating 
the standard for establishing a substantial limitation on 
the ability to perform manual tasks, the court of appeals 
stated that “to be disabled the plaintiff must show that 
her manual disability involves a ‘class’ of manual activi- 
ties affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.” Pet. 
App. 4a (emphasis added). The court then concluded 
that respondent’s ability to perform “personal or house- 
hold chores, does not effect [sic] a determination that 
her impairment substantially limits her ability to 
perform the range of manual tasks associated with an 

8 The petition for certiorari argues that “ ‘working’ and ‘per- 
forming manual tasks’ are indeed distinct inquiries, and that each 
must be resolved without reference to the other.” Pet. 21. The 
petition further contends that by “evaluat[ing] how an impairment 
affects a plaintiff’s ability to work in order to determine whether 
that impairment limits the major life activity of performing manual 
tasks,” the court of appeals “improperly fuse[d] two distinct 
analyses into one.” Ibid. In our view, the greater defect in the 
court of appeals’ approach is that, in fusing the two inquiries, the 
court eliminated an important aspect of the working 
inquiry—namely, the determination whether respondent’s impair- 
ment had the effect of excluding her from a class or broad range of 
jobs. 

18 

assembly line job.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The court 
thus (a) held that an ADA plaintiff who alleges a 
substantial limitation on the activity of “performing 
manual tasks” must prove an adverse effect on job 
performance, and (b) improperly truncated its exami- 
nation of respondent’s “manual tasks” claim by treating 
the performance of work-related manual tasks as 
though it were a “major life activity.” Both aspects of 
the court’s analysis are erroneous. 

A. The statutory definition of “disability” (42 U.S.C. 
12102(2)) clearly encompasses impairments that have 
no effect on job performance. See, e.g., Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (holding that “[r]epro- 
duction falls well within the phrase ‘major life 
activity,’ ” and that “[n]othing in the [ADA] definition 
[of ‘disability’] suggests that activities without a public, 
economic, or daily dimension may somehow be regarded 
as so unimportant or insignificant as to fall outside the 
meaning of the word ‘major’ ”); id. at 639 (“The inclusion 
[in the regulations] of activities such as caring for one’s 
self and performing manual tasks belies the suggestion 
that a task must have a public or economic character in 
order to be a major life activity for purposes of the 
ADA.”). With the obvious exception of “working,” 
proof that an individual is substantially limited in one of 
the major life activities identified in the regulations 
does not require a showing that his impairment affects 
job performance. In particular, an individual whose 
impairment substantially limits his ability to perform 
manual tasks has a “disability” within the meaning of 
the ADA, even if the tasks that the individual is unable 

19 

to perform all occur off the job and the impairment does 
not affect his “ability to perform tasks at work.”9 

Title I of the ADA generally prohibits employment 
discrimination “against a qualified individual with a dis- 
ability because of the disability of such individual.” 42 
U.S.C. 12112(a). Title I defines the term “qualified 
individual with a disability” to mean “an individual with 
a disability who, with or without reasonable accom- 
modation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or de- 
sires.” 42 U.S.C. 12111(8). That the definition of 
“qualified individual with a disability” includes a person 
who can perform the relevant job “without * * * 
accommodation” reinforces the conclusion that proof of 
an effect on job performance is not necessary to esta- 
blish the existence of a “disability.” It would be per- 
verse, moreover, to suggest that an individual who is 
substantially limited in some other “major life activity” 
could be deprived of Title I’s employment protections 
on the ground that her performance of work-related 
functions is not impaired. Indeed, a major goal of the 
ADA is to ensure that disabilities that do not affect a 
person’s actual ability to function in the workplace will 

9 Respondent’s brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari 
reflects the same misunderstanding as the court of appeals’ 
opinion. Respondent states that “[i]t is appropriate that the im- 
pairment claimed always ‘affect’ or be related to employment 
because [Title I] of the ADA only relates to employment.” Br. in 
Opp. 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. 12112(a)). That is a non sequitur. It is true 
that Section 12112(a) applies only to disability-based discrimi- 
nation in employment, and that “[t]he ADA does not prohibit 
disability discrimination in social settings.” Ibid. But the fact that 
the discrimination proscribed by Title I is limited to employment 
practices does not mean that the impairment must have workplace 
effects in order to constitute a disability. 

20 

not be used as a basis for irrationally limiting the em- 
ployment opportunities of qualified disabled individu- 
als. 

B. The requirement that an impairment must sub- 
stantially limit one or more “major life activities” of an 
individual is at the heart of the ADA’s definition of 
“disability.” See 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). The term 
“major” indicates that only fundamental activities will 
qualify, and the activities identified in the applicable 
EEOC regulation, see 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) (defining 
major life activities to include “functions such as caring 
for onself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working”), 
reinforce that reading. 

In holding that reproduction is 
a major life activity, this Court noted that “[r]epro- 
duction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are 
central to the life process itself.” Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 
638. Although the pertinent EEOC regulation does not 
purport to provide an exhaustive catalogue of “major 
life activities,” see id. at 638-639, the fundamental char- 
acter of the enumerated activities indicates that courts 
should proceed with caution in identifying “major life 
activities” other than those listed in the regulation. In 
particular, it is inappropriate to define as a “major life 
activity” a work-related subset (e.g., “hearing” or 
“seeing” in the workplace) of one of the activities enu- 
merated in the rule. 

The performance of work-related manual tasks is a 
subset of both “performing manual tasks” and “work- 
ing,” but it is not itself defined in the pertinent regula- 
tions as a “major life activity.” By framing the question 
before it as whether respondent was substantially 
limited in performing work-related manual tasks, the 
court of appeals essentially declined to consider evi- 
dence that would have been directly relevant to analy- 

21 

sis of a properly defined “major life activity.” A proper 
determination whether a plaintiff is substantially 
limited in “working” would generally include considera- 
tion of his ability (or inability) to carry out jobs that do 
not significantly entail the performance of manual 
tasks. And a proper determination whether a plaintiff 
is substantially limited in “performing manual tasks” 
would include an assessment of his ability (or inability) 
to perform manual tasks outside the workplace as well 
as those on the job. 

10 The court of appeals failed to per- 
form either of those analyses. 

10 The court of appeals’ truncated analysis of manual tasks is 
neither pro-employee nor pro-employer; it is simply erroneous. 
The effect of truncating the “manual tasks” inquiry by focusing 
only on work-related tasks will likely work to the advantage of 
some plaintiffs and to the disadvantage of others. On the one hand, 
an exclusive focus on work-related tasks may cause workplace 
restrictions to appear more “substantial” by reducing the universe 
of potential manual tasks, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
some plaintiffs (particularly those whose impairments manifest 
themselves most severely on the job) will be found to be disabled. 
On the other hand, a refusal to consider the individual’s inability 
to perform non-work-related tasks may unfairly deny the pro- 
tections of the Act to other persons who are fully able to function 
in the relevant workplace but who are substantially limited in the 
performance of manual tasks generally. 

22 

III. THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO ALLOW 
THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DETERMINE, 
BASED ON APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARDS, 
WHETHER RESPONDENT HAS PRESENTED 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS SUB- 
STANTIALLY LIMITED IN THE MAJOR LIFE 
ACTIVITIES OF EITHER “WORKING” OR “PER- 
FORMING MANUAL TASKS” 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate 
the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to 
permit the courts below to determine, under the correct 
legal standards, whether respondent has adduced 
evidence sufficient to foreclose summary judgment for 
petitioner on the question whether respondent is sub- 
stantially limited in the major life activities of either 
“working” or “performing manual tasks.” 

11 The fol- 
lowing observations may be relevant to the proceedings 
on remand: 

A. Although an ADA plaintiff cannot establish a 
substantial limitation on “working” based on exclusion 
from a particular job or narrow class of jobs, “an in- 
dividual does not have to be totally unable to work in 
order to be considered substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 
§ 1630.2(j); cf. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641 (“The Act 
addresses substantial limitations on major life activi- 
ties, not utter inabilities.”). Thus, the fact that respon- 
dent can perform some assembly line jobs does not, in 
and of itself, preclude her from establishing that she is 

11 The courts below can also address on remand respondent’s 
alternative claims that she has a “record” of qualifying impairment, 
see 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(B), and that she is “regarded as” disabled, 
see 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(C). See notes 2, 3, supra. 

23 

substantially limited in the “major life activity” of 
“working.” 

As we explain above, the court of appeals appeared 
to decide this case on the assumption that respondent 
was not excluded from a class of jobs or from a suffi- 
ciently broad range of jobs to establish disability based 
on “working.” The court did not squarely resolve that 
question, however, and it remains open to respondent 
on remand to challenge the district court’s adverse 
ruling on that point. The government takes no position 
on the question whether respondent’s evidence on that 
point is sufficient to withstand petitioner’s motion for 
summary judgment. 

B. A plaintiff may sometimes be able to establish a 
“disability” based on an inability to perform, or sub- 
stantial restrictions on the performance of, a combina- 
tion of work-related and non-work-related manual 
tasks. Thus, even if respondent is unable on remand to 
establish a substantial limitation on the activity of 
“working,” her inability to perform the manual tasks 
associated with a particular job or narrow category of 
jobs might still support a claim of disability if respon- 
dent can also demonstrate that her impairment sub- 
stantially limits her ability to perform manual tasks 
outside the workplace. 

The court of appeals briefly alluded to respondent’s 
contention that her impairments affect her ability to 
perform “manual tasks associated with recreation, 
household chores and living generally,” Pet. App. 6a, 
but it undertook no meaningful analysis of the record 
evidence bearing on respondent’s ability to perform 
non-work-related manual tasks. (The court’s failure to 
perform such an analysis may have resulted from its 
misconception that to demonstrate a substantial limita- 
tion on the activity of “performing manual tasks,” an 

24 

ADA “plaintiff must show that her manual disability 
involves a ‘class’ of manual activities affecting the 
ability to perform tasks at work.” Id. at 4a; see pp. 18- 
20, supra.) Although the court of appeals’ analysis of 
the “manual tasks” issue was legally flawed, respondent 
may still be able to prevail on remand under the appro- 
priate legal standards if she can establish a substantial 
limitation on her ability to perform a combination of 
work-related and non-work-related manual tasks. The 
government takes no position on the question whether 
respondent presented sufficient evidence to withstand 
petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on that 
point. 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the court of appeals should be va- 
cated, and the case should be remanded to the court of 
appeals for further consideration under the appropriate 
legal standards. 

Respectfully submitted. 

THEODORE B. OLSON 

Solicitor General 

STUART E. SCHIFFER 

Acting Assistant Attorney 

General 

PAUL D. CLEMENT 

Deputy Solicitor General 

MALCOLM L. STEWART 

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

MARLEIGH D. DOVER 
CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH 

Attorneys 

JUNE 2001